Upjohn Press

Upjohn Research home page

1-1-2003

Job Creation, Job Destruction, and International Competition
Michael W. Klein
Tufts University

Scott Schuh
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Robert K. Triest
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_press
Part of the International Economics Commons, and the Labor Economics Commons

Citation
Klein, Michael W., Scott Schuh, and Robert K. Triest. 2003. Job Creation, Job Destruction, and
International Competition. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
https://doi.org/10.17848/9781417524426

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License.

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.

Job Creation,
Job Destruction, and
International Competition

Job Creation,
Job Destruction, and
International Competition
Michael W. Klein
Scott Schuh
and

Robert K. Triest

2003

W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Klein, Michael W., 1958–
Job creation, job destruction, and international competition / Michael
W. Klein, Scott Schuh, and Robert K. Triest.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-88099-271-9 (pbk. : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-88099-272-7
(hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Foreign trade and employment—United States. 2. Free trade—Social
aspects—United States. 3. Job creation—United States. 4.
Unemployment—United States. 5. Labor market—United States. 6.
Manpower policy—United States. 7. Manufacturing industries—United
States—Employees. 8. Competition, International. I. Schuh, Scott. II.
Triest, Robert K. III. Title.
HD5710.75.U6K54 2003
331.12'0973—dc22
2003015610

© 2003
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007–4686

The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are
the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or U.S. Bureau of the
Census. This book does not contain or use any confidential Census Bureau data.

Cover design by Alcorn Publication Design.
Index prepared by Nairn Chadwick.
Printed in the United States of America.
Printed on recycled paper.

Contents
Acknowledgments

ix

1 Introduction
Job Reallocation and International Trade
Reallocation Across and Within Industries
Overview and Summary of Results
Notes

1
4
7
9
13

2 Openness
Openness Over Time and Across Industries
The Volatility of Dollar Exchange Rates
The Diversity of Behavior of Industry-Specific Exchange Rates
Conclusion
Notes

15
17
22
26
30
30

3 Job Creation and Job Destruction
Gross Job Flows in U.S. Manufacturing
Conclusion
Notes

33
35
46
47

4 Literature Review
International Factors and Labor Markets
International Factors and Net Employment
International Factors and Gross Flows
Notes

49
50
61
72
80

5 Job Flows and the Exchange Rate
Job Flows and Idiosyncratic Shocks
The Role of Aggregate Shocks
Implications of the Model
Conclusion
Notes

83
84
88
91
93
94

6 Regression Implementation and Results
Empirical Implementation
Regression Results
Conclusions and Interpretations
Notes

v

97
98
102
109
110

7 Job Flows and Trade
Economic Effects of Trade Liberalization
An Overview of NAFTA
Previous Research Related to the Economic Effects of NAFTA
Sector-Specific Effects
Conclusion
Notes

113
114
117
118
121
145
147

8 Policy Implications
Summary of Main Findings
Exchange Rate Management
Tariffs and Industrial Policy
Worker Assistance Policies
Conclusion
Notes

149
151
153
154
157
159
161

9 Directions for Future Research
Matching Job and Worker Flows
Data Development
Measuring Labor-Adjustment Costs
Summary
Notes

163
164
165
169
171
172

Appendix A: Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) System

173

Appendix B: A Formal Economic Model of the Effect of Exchange
Rate Changes on Job Creation and Job Destruction
Note

175
178

Appendix C: Data Sources
Note

179
180

References

183

The Authors

193

Index

195

About the Institute

201

vi

Figures
2.1 Distributions of Openness across Industries (1958–1994)
2.2 Real Trade-Weighted Exchange Value of the U.S. Dollar
(January 1973–October 2002)
2.3 Balance on the U.S. Current Account (Q1:1973–Q2:2002)
2.4 Distributions of Real Exchange Rates across Industries
(1973–1993)
2.5 Distributions of Real Exchange Rate Growth Rates across Industries
(1974–1993)

18
23
25
28
29

3.1 Gross Job Flows and the Real Exchange Rate—Job Creation
(1973–1993)
3.2 Gross Job Flows and the Real Exchange Rate—Job Destruction
(1973–1993)
3.3 Gross Job Flows and the Real Exchange Rate—Job Reallocation
(1973–1993)
3.4 Gross Job Flows and the Real Exchange Rate—Net Employment
Growth (1973–1993)

40

4.1 Schematic Diagram of the Labor Market

53

40
41
41

5.2 Job Flows in Response to a Depreciation
89
7.1 Macroeconomic Developments in Mexico (Real GDP growth
123
Q1:1981–Q3:2002, Real exchange rate Q1:1980–Q4:2002)
7.2 U.S. Employment in the Textile and Apparel Industries (1939–2001)
125
7.3 International Trade Shares in the Textile and Apparel Industries,
128
U.S. Multilateral and Bilateral U.S.–Mexico (1972–2001) 128
7.4 Ratio of U.S.–Mexico Bilateral to U.S. Multilateral Trade in the
128
Textile and Apparel Industries (1972–2001)
7.5 U.S. Gross Job Flows in the Textile and Apparel Industries
130
(1973–2002)
7.6 U.S. Employment in the Chemical Industry (1939–2001)
134
7.7 International Trade Shares in the Chemical Industry,
134
U.S. Multilateral and Bilateral U.S.–Mexico (1972–2001)
7.8 Ratio of U.S.–Mexico Bilateral to U.S. Multilateral Trade
136
in the Chemical Industry (1972–2001)
7.9 U.S. Gross Job Flows in the Chemical Industry (1973–2002)
136

vii

Tables
2.1 Regression of 1990 Openness on Industry Indicator Variables
2.2 Transitions of Four-Digit Industries between Openness Quintiles

20
21

3.1 Net and Gross Job Flows in the Auto Industry
3.2 Job-Flow Regressions on Industry Variables

37
45

4.1 Studies on the Relationship between International Factors
and Labor Markets

62

6.1 Baseline Job-Flow Regression Results
6.2 Job-Flows Regression Results with Exchange Rate Decomposition
6.3 Job-Flow Responses to a Real Exchange Rate Appreciation

104
106
107

7.1 NAFTA Changes for Textiles and Apparel
7.2 NAFTA Changes for Chemicals and Allied Products
7.3 NAFTA Changes for Automobiles

124
132
138

Appendix A.1 Two-Digit SIC Industries

173

Appendix C.1 Notation and Data Definitions

181

viii

Acknowledgments
We benefited greatly from the assistance of many individuals during the
preparation of this monograph. From the data collection to the research to the
writing and ultimately to publication, the entire project was a collaborative
team effort achieved over a period of several years. We wish to express our
deepest and sincerest appreciation to everyone involved in the process.
This monograph builds on our research paper published by the Journal of
International Economics (Klein, Schuh, and Triest 2003). We thank Andrew
Rose, the editor of the JIE, and two very conscientious anonymous referees
for helpful suggestions that improved the article significantly, and contributed
to its publication and effectiveness.
We also thank several colleagues for reviewing early versions of our JIE
article and this manuscript, and for providing insightful suggestions for
improvement. In particular, we appreciate Michelle Barnes, who read and
commented on the entire manuscript. Linda Goldberg and Pierre-Oliver Gourinchas also contributed many useful ideas to the formulation of the JIE artocle. Participants in numerous professional seminars and conferences also gave
helpful suggestions.
This study relies heavily on a large, detailed data base assembled from
many diverse data sources that were integrated by a team of outstanding
research assistants. We especially thank Jennifer Young, who spent countless
hours writing code to assembly and construct the data base, and preparing the
graphs. Joshua Congdon-Martin, Catherine Humblet, Radoslav Raykov, and
Fred Rosenberg also provided excellent research assistance in gathering and
manipulating data.
Several individuals contributed their expertise to the writing and preparation of this manuscript. Marcella Vencil converted the manuscript between
word processing software packages and also provided outstanding secretarial
assistance in general. Ann Eggleston and Robert Wathen contributed excellent
editorial services for the manuscript.
Klein gratefully acknowledges financial support from the W.E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research. We thank Upjohn and its staff, especially
Randall Eberts, Kevin Hollenbeck, and Rich Wyrwa, for their support and
patience during this project. Schuh and Triest gratefully acknowledge the
extensive support provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in the
preparation of this book and the ongoing research program on labor markets
and international factors.

ix

1
Introduction
Seattle had seemed like such a good choice. The organizers who
selected it as the site of the November 1999 World Trade Organization
(WTO) ministerial meeting cannot be faulted for thinking that the city
would showcase the benefits of international trade. After all, one
source of the city’s prosperity was the Boeing corporation, which
depends upon exports for a significant proportion of its total sales.
Also, Seattle is an important center of the computer and internet industries, and advances in information technology contribute to eroding the
difficulties in trading over great distances and across national borders.
Furthermore, perched on the Pacific Rim, Seattle represented a reorientation in trade toward emerging markets.
But, the perceived consequences of trade with emerging markets
fueled demonstrations that have now made Seattle more synonymous
with antiglobalization street protests than with coffee or computers.
Prominent among the issues raised by demonstrators were a number of
concerns about the effects of trade on labor markets in industrial countries. Will cheap labor in Southeast Asia wholly displace highly paid
workers in the Northwest United States? In the wake of greater liberalization, will multinationals close up shop in the industrial countries and
set up factories in countries where they can employ children?
The answers provided by economists to these questions is generally “No.” Evidence suggests that international differences in wages
reflect differences in productivity between, say, American workers
who have the benefits of training and infrastructure and Malaysian
workers who do not enjoy these advantages.1 Furthermore, there are
many reasons to believe that international trade serves as an important
source of economic advance both for American and Malaysian workers. International trade widens the set of goods available to consumers
and, by fostering competition, offers consumers better opportunities.
Competition promotes the reallocation of resources to their most productive uses. The efficiency gains obtained through this reallocation
contribute to the overall economic welfare of a country.

1

2

Klein, Schuh, and Triest

These overall economic benefits are the source of the intellectual
arguments for free trade, and the arguments bear up well in both theory
and practice. Advocates of free trade are often dismayed that, even in
the face of these arguments and this evidence, free trade remains a controversial issue. One important reason for this controversy is that the
gains from trade are often accompanied by adjustment costs, including,
importantly, worker dislocation. Historically, economists have tended
to emphasize that the gains from trade are large and much larger than
any adjustment costs, which in theory and practice have been argued to
be transitory and small compared with total economic activity.
Until recently, the magnitude of worker dislocation typically has
been gauged by the decline in the level of employment in manufacturing or in a particular industry affected by international factors. However, innovations in research on labor-market dynamics reveal that
changes in manufacturing or industry total net employment are much
smaller than the underlying increases and decreases in employment
occurring simultaneously at individual establishments within industries. These establishment-level employment changes represent gross
flows of employment, termed job creation and destruction. Prior
research on these gross job flows indicates that labor reallocation is
much more intensive and extensive than previously thought. Gross job
flows occur at rates often an order of magnitude higher than net
employment changes. Thus, relatively small changes in total employment do not reflect anywhere near the full extent of job creation and
destruction that impacts individual workers and establishments.
Consequently, a more complete understanding of the overall
impact of international factors on labor markets requires the analysis of
gross job flows, which we undertake in this volume, as well as complementary analyses of the gross flows of workers among jobs and in and
out of the labor force.2 Moreover, a more complete understanding of
labor-adjustment costs, and thus the net efficiency gains from trade,
also requires the analysis of gross labor flows. This book delves more
deeply into the issues of labor-market dynamics and the adjustment
costs associated with international factors. We go beyond economywide and even sector-wide analyses of the effects of trade and, instead,
focus on its disparate effects between and even within detailed industries.
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After studying these issues at a more detailed level, we conclude
that changes in international factors—exchange rates, trade agreements, and the like—have a much larger and more complex effect on
labor markets than was previously understood. For any size of total
employment change induced by changes in international factors, the
changes in individual jobs at individual establishments are much
greater. Many more jobs are destroyed, but many more jobs also are
created, than is apparent from the change in total employment. In fact,
even when changes in international factors seem to have no effect on
total employment at all, these changes are linked to greater job creation
and destruction.
The turnover of jobs via greater creation and destruction entails
numerous costs and benefits not previously considered in estimates of
the overall impact of international trade. Workers whose jobs are
destroyed are not necessarily the ones who obtain the new jobs that are
created, at least not right away, so unemployment usually rises. Prior
calculations of internationally generated labor-adjustment costs have
considered these unemployment costs, but they have overlooked others. Every job created and every job destroyed entails a cost to a firm,
to a worker, or both. Sometimes the job and worker dislocation have
very large, permanent effects on one or both parties. At the same time,
the creation of new jobs, and the benefits of international trade, surely
bring meaningful economic welfare gains in the long run. In fact, a better understanding of the effects of job turnover may very well increase
estimates of gains from trade. Although we raise important new ideas
and evidence for consideration, neither our analysis nor the economics
profession more generally can yet provide a complete quantification
and evaluation of these costs and benefits.
Our central empirical finding provides support for arguments on
both sides of the Great Trade Debate. On one hand, openness to international trade and changes in international factors do expose some jobs
and workers to a significantly greater risk and cost of dislocation than
is often acknowledged by economic researchers and trade policy analysts. To some extent, this validates the concerns so forcefully voiced
on the streets of Seattle by trade opponents. On the other hand, the
adjustment of labor markets to changes in international factors
involves the creation of new jobs and opportunities that improve the
overall performance and efficiency of the economy.
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Our analysis and results also raise a vital policy-related question:
what, if anything, can and should be done about this impact of changes
in international factors on labor markets? Opinion polls find relatively
weak support for free trade among the public if it is not accompanied
by policies to aid workers who are displaced by foreign competition.3
Economists and trade advocates, on the other hand, tend to favor limited intervention. Regardless of whether one believes trade-related
polices are needed, our work indicates that the design of such policies
is even more difficult than previously thought. Widespread heterogeneity in how firms and plants are affected by trade, even within narrowly
defined industries, renders simplistic policies intended to attenuate the
impact of globalization ineffective or possibly even counterproductive.
From the outset, we want to be clear that we do not oppose free
trade or flexible exchange rates. However, we do see a need for deeper
understanding and concern about the actual economic costs of adjustment to changes in international factors born by workers and firms. All
parties—whether for or against free trade—would do well to consider
the effects of international factors on gross flows of jobs and workers
in their ideas, views, and debates. To fully realize the economic benefits of free trade, it is necessary to face and address the political and
economic realities stemming from the true magnitude of adjustment
costs associated with trade-induced reallocation. This book is part of a
first step being taken toward building a base of knowledge that should
improve our understanding of, and policies toward, the effects of international competition on labor markets. Many more steps still need to
be taken.

JOB REALLOCATION AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The goal of this book is to document and study the diversity of
effects of international factors on employment across and within manufacturing industries in the United States. In particular, we are interested
in the way fluctuations in exchange rates, changes in overseas economic activity, and the altering of trade restrictions contribute to the
simultaneous creation of jobs among some firms and the destruction of
jobs among other firms. This internationally generated churning in
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labor markets is a source of the allocative costs associated with international trade.
Our efforts extend the work of Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh
(1996), who demonstrated that job reallocation is an intense, pervasive,
and regular feature of U.S. labor markets. They found that, on average,
almost one in five jobs in manufacturing is either created or destroyed
each year. Reallocation is a necessary part of a dynamic economy.
Through reallocation, workers move to more productive and more
remunerative positions as new opportunities become available and as
new jobs are created. Labor-market reallocation has a costly side as
well, however. In the wake of job loss, workers could experience protracted periods of unemployment during their search for employment.
Successful reemployment may require retraining, which itself demands
time and resources, or moving to another part of the country. Workers
may also find that they cannot match, in their new jobs, the wages they
earned in their old positions.4
Of course, many factors contribute to the reshuffling of employment across firms. Some of these factors are specific to a relatively
small set of firms or a particular narrowly defined industry; for example, there has been widespread job destruction among firms in the
office product industry that specialized in typewriters and failed to
make the transition to word-processing products. The effects of
changes in other factors are felt more widely; for example, virtually all
firms must pay higher borrowing costs when the Federal Reserve raises
interest rates. Reallocation costs due to economy-wide factors are
higher than more narrowly focused ones for the obvious reason that
these costs are broadly felt. More subtly, the costs of reallocation may
increase more than proportionally with reallocation simultaneously
generated across industries by an economy-wide disturbance since, for
example, it is more difficult to find a new job when many other people
are also seeking work.
Job reallocation reflects the response of the labor market to a wide
range of factors, including changes in the domestic macroeconomic
environment, technological change, and changes in the international
competitiveness of domestic firms. In this book we are concerned with
job reallocation due to international factors. There are two main sets of
variables that affect the international competitiveness of firms in the
United States: the exchange rate of the dollar and the trade policies in
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place between the United States and its trading partners. In some ways,
the formal analysis of the manner in which these two sets of factors
affect job reallocation are quite similar, but there are also important differences between the two. For example, a change in both a tariff and
the exchange rate alter the relative price of domestic and foreign goods,
but these changes may be viewed as having different degrees of permanence. Therefore, we may expect that a firm’s responsiveness to a
change in relative prices due to exchange rate movements will differ
from the responsiveness in relative prices due to a change in a tariff.
There are purely economic, as well as political, reasons for focusing on the manner in which international competition affects job reallocation. From an economic perspective, international variables in
general, and the exchange rate in particular, tend to vary more than
many purely domestic macroeconomic variables. In addition, international trade is a natural source of pure allocative forces, as distinct from
aggregate forces, influencing labor markets. Not all firms and industries engage in international trade, so changes in real exchange rates or
in trade policies directly affect only a subset of the economy. This clear
differential across firms and industries contrasts with other aggregate
variables, which influence all firms and industries but to varying
degrees, producing transitory reallocation that is hard to distinguish
from permanent reallocation due to relative price changes (e.g., a
change in exchange rates).5 For these reasons, international variables
are good candidates for being important sources of reallocation.
From a political perspective, it is important to note that, rightly or
wrongly, trade is viewed as an important source of job churning in the
United States. For this reason, there is a tendency to associate concerns
about job security with the expansion of trade. This perception threatens free trade because industry groups often advocate protectionism as
a recourse to job loss. For example, in the spring of 2002, the Bush
administration imposed tariffs on imported steel in response to industry
claims of dumping by foreign steel producers. These tariffs harm U.S.
consumers directly by raising the price of a good used as an input to
production of a range of other goods. The steel tariffs also threaten to
lead to a trade war. If this does occur, the most vulnerable would likely
be developing countries that seek access to world markets as a way to
escape the trap of poverty.
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REALLOCATION ACROSS AND WITHIN INDUSTRIES
Job reallocation is a manifestation of changing fortunes across
firms as some firms create new jobs while others eliminate positions.
Reallocation occurs both across and within industries. Reallocation
across industries arises when firms within one broad industrial category respond in a similar fashion to a change in the economic environment while firms within another industrial category respond in the
opposite manner. For example, reallocation across industries would
occur if all firms in the petroleum and coal products industry added
jobs in response to a rise in the price of oil while all firms in the transportation industry cut jobs in response to the same event. Reallocation
within industries occurs when some firms within an industry cut jobs
while other firms in that industry added jobs. For example, reallocation
within an industry would occur if some firms in the industry were
affected by a price change or trade restriction and other firms in the
same industry were not.
In this book we will show that reallocation in response to changes
in the international environment occurs both across and within industries. At the broadest level, total employment in manufacturing
responds in a significant way to changes in the exchange rate. This
response represents across-industry job reallocation as a stronger real
exchange rate contributes to a decrease in manufacturing employment.
But this overall movement in manufacturing employment masks a
wide variety of responses across manufacturing industries that generates within-industry reallocation. Indeed, a central theme of this book
is that the effects of international competition vary across industries
and even among firms within seemingly narrow industrial categories.
This diversity leads to simultaneous job creation and job destruction
within industrial categories. In light of this, we show that it is difficult
to offer simple conclusions like, “Trade is good for the machinery
industry but hurts the apparel industry.” Instead, we offer evidence of a
more nuanced picture in which the effects of international trade vary
widely. This has some important policy implications. For example, policy responses that attempt to ameliorate the costs of reallocation may
be better targeted toward particular workers than toward broad classes
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of industries, as would occur with tariff protection, since, within industries, the experience of firms may differ widely.
We are able to provide this more nuanced picture of the effects of
international factors on reallocation partly through the use of data on
gross job flows. Gross job flows in a particular industry consist of the
total number of employment positions gained (job creation) and the
total number of employment positions lost (job destruction) by all
establishments within that industry. A common measure of labor-market churning, called job reallocation, is the sum of job creation and job
destruction.
The data presented in this book offer a picture in which simultaneous job creation and job destruction, even in narrowly defined industries, characterizes labor markets for manufacturing industries. Thus, it
is important to consider gross job flows and reallocation data rather
than just net changes in employment (which represent the difference
between job creation and job destruction) for particular industries to
gauge more accurately the size of labor-market adjustment. For example, consider a particular net change in employment of, say, a decrease
in 100,000 jobs. This can reflect a reallocation of 100,000 jobs if this
net change arises solely through job destruction. Alternatively, it can
reflect a reallocation of two million positions if 950,000 jobs are created while 1,050,000 jobs are destroyed. Given a cost to reallocation,
we would expect the welfare consequences of these two scenarios to
differ.
Simultaneous job creation and job destruction within a narrowly
defined industry reflects heterogeneity among firms in that industry.
One possible source of heterogeneity is structural differences among
firms that cause them to react differently to a common change in the
economic environment. For example, the overall effect of an exchange
rate appreciation on the fortunes of a firm depends upon the international exposure of that firm, which depends on the extent to which that
firm exports its products, the extent to which it uses imported goods to
manufacture its own products, and the extent to which its products
compete with imports. Firms within a narrowly defined industry may
exhibit a wide range of international exposure along these three dimensions, making them respond differently to a given change in the
exchange rate. This can give rise to simultaneous job creation and job
destruction. In addition, simultaneous creation and destruction may
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reflect spillover effects whereby one firm’s increased demand for labor
affects the ability of another firm to hire workers at the going wage.
In this book we document the differences across narrowly defined
industries in the extent of exposure to international competition. We
show that there has been a general increase in exposure to international
competition among manufacturing industries since the 1960s. There
has also been an increasing divergence in the range of exposure to
international competition over this period. We also show that the
responsiveness of a particular industry to movements in the exchange
rate is linked to the level of its international exposure. Thus, we are
able to provide a more complete understanding of the manner in which
international factors affect the labor market.

OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The foregoing introduction has raised some of the main themes of
our book: the costs and benefits of labor-market reallocation, the contribution of changes in the international environment to reallocation
both across and within manufacturing industries in the United States,
differences in international exposure even among firms classified in the
same narrow industrial category, and the divergence in responses to
international factors across manufacturing industries. Each of these
themes is taken up and more fully developed in this book. Here we outline our presentation.
Chapter 2 offers some initial evidence on the varying importance
of international factors across U.S. manufacturing. The statistics presented in this chapter support the commonly held view that, at least for
manufacturing, the last few decades have been marked by increasing
openness with respect to international competition. But, more to the
point for our study, we also show that there has been a steady increase
in the divergence of exposure to international competition over this
period. Very little of the variance in international exposure across narrowly defined industries is explained by membership in broader industrial categories. This diversity in openness is one source of the
divergent responses to international factors across manufacturing.
Another source of the divergent response to international factors is that
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bilateral trade patterns vary across industries, which gives rise to differences in the relevant exchange rates across industries. The industryspecific exchange rates presented in Chapter 2 are used later in the
book in our empirical analysis.
The heterogeneity of responses to international factors gives rise to
differences in labor-market dynamics, not only across industries, but
within narrowly defined industries as well. As mentioned above, the
labor market in U.S. manufacturing industries is characterized by significant churning. This churning can be understood using the concepts
of job creation and job destruction, which are introduced in Chapter 3.
This chapter also presents some initial statistics on job reallocation in
U.S. manufacturing industries, including the responsiveness of overall
manufacturing job creation and job destruction to business cycle factors and to international factors. We also show that membership in a
particular broad industry group explains little of the behavior of job
creation and job destruction for firms in the most narrowly defined
industrial categories.
Our use of gross job creation and destruction data represents the
way in which the analysis in this book advances our understanding of
the impact of international competition on U.S. labor markets. There is,
however, an existing literature on the effects of international factors on
employment that uses data on changes in net employment. We survey
this literature in Chapter 4, putting our contributions in the proper context and linking our work to other research on gross job and worker
flows. In addition, we highlight the implications of gross flows for the
costs of labor adjustment to international (and other) factors. In particular, we raise the question of whether adjustment costs associated with
gross flows might be considerably larger than those associated with net
employment growth. If so, the net welfare gains from trade might be
considerably smaller than previously thought.
Chapter 5 presents an economic model that shows the relationships
between openness, exchange rates, tariffs, and job creation and
destruction. This model shows how a change in the value of the
exchange rate can give rise to simultaneous job creation and job
destruction within one industry. The source of this job churning is differences in openness across firms combined with interactions among
firms in an industry. This model provides a framework for our empiri-
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cal analysis of the effects of the real exchange rate on job creation and
job destruction.
In Chapter 6 we examine the extent to which movements in the real
exchange rate contributed to job destruction and job creation over the
entire period since the end of the Bretton Woods fixed-exchange-rate
era in 1973 until the mid 1990s. In this chapter, we explore the possibility that the impact of a given change in the exchange rate on job
flows depends upon whether that change is viewed as permanent or
temporary. We find that this distinction is quite important. Changes in
the trend component of real exchange rates have a significant allocative effect on labor markets, moving job creation and destruction in the
same direction, but essentially no effect on net employment growth. If
our estimated trends represent the permanent components of industry
exchange rates, this result suggests that permanent exchange rate
changes influence job reallocation only. In contrast, changes in the
cyclical component of the exchange rate have a significant effect on net
employment growth, but only through job destruction and not on job
creation (hence no effect on reallocation other than the reduction in net
employment). If our estimated cyclical components represent the transitory components of industry exchange rates, this result suggests that
transitory exchange rate changes merely lower employment without
providing an offsetting benefit through new jobs. Furthermore, the
magnitude of these effects is scaled by the openness of industries. The
exchange rate effects are larger in industries that are more open to
international trade. In sum, our quantitative estimates indicate that
movements in real exchange rates are an important determinant of
labor market fluctuations.
In Chapter 7 we offer a more detailed view of the heterogeneous
effects of international competition by studying the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). We focus on the response of three
industries—the textile and apparel industry, the chemical and allied
products industry, and the automobile industry—to the changes in trade
restrictions enacted in NAFTA. In the early 1990s, NAFTA was a
source of intense political debate. Some of the issues raised in that
debate are sure to resurface with the reemergence of protectionist pressures at the beginning of this decade. And beyond its topical interest,
the discussion in Chapter 7 complements the statistical analysis in
Chapter 6 by providing case studies of the effects of a changing envi-
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ronment of international competition on labor markets in manufacturing industries. In particular, the case studies in Chapter 7 demonstrate
that changes in trade restrictions or agreements, like real exchange
rates, can generate significant reallocation of trade and possibly
employment within seemingly narrow industries, and that these effects
may not appear at the industry level. This result underscores the potential effects of pervasive heterogeneity in trade activity and trading partners, and hence the diverse responses to international competition that
must be taken into account when examining the effects on labor markets.
These diverse responses to international competition mean that
international competition both offers new opportunities and presents
challenges associated with dislocations and downsizing. Free trade
offers important sources of growth. The reallocation that is often
required for this growth to be realized, however, can come at a significant cost to individuals whose jobs are lost. We need to be concerned
about these costs both for reasons of equity and because political support for free trade is predicated on the provision of an adequate safety
net. In Chapter 8 we discuss policies that have been used to mitigate
the adjustment costs of trade, as well as newly proposed policies. In
that chapter, we discuss the implications for these policies of the results
presented in this book. For example, economists typically argue that
tariffs subsidize inefficient industries and represent an expensive way
to preserve jobs. Our demonstration of the diversity of responses to
international competition even within narrowly defined industries suggests that the costs of tariffs are even higher than typically thought
because this blunt instrument also subsidizes firms that would survive
without assistance. A more efficient program would target displaced
workers, but the Trade Adjustment Assistance program currently in
place is seen as ineffectual. We discuss some newly proposed policies
and mention how our analysis contributes to our understanding of their
likely impact.
The policy discussion in Chapter 8 points towards an agenda for
research on the important issue of the adjustment costs of trade. In the
ninth and final chapter of this book, we offer some concrete proposals
for the establishment of new data sets. These data would enable
researchers to address some of the issues that cannot be fully analyzed
now, even with the data employed in this book.
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Notes
1. See, for example, Golub (1999).
2. A good example of an analysis of international trade and gross worker flows is
Kletzer (2001), a complementary volume to this book.
3. The Program on International Policy Attitudes found that only 18 percent of the
respondents to a survey in October 1999 favored free trade if it was not accompanied
by programs to help workers who lose their jobs due to international competition.
See <www.americans-world.org/digest/global_issues/intertrade/summary.cfm>.
4. This issue is addressed by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993a,b)
5. The fact that not all firms and industries that engage in trade do so to the same
degree generates identification problems that are similar to the differential
responses to aggregate factors.

2
Openness
Growth and Diversity
A central theme in economics concerns the gains from voluntary
exchange. An early example of this is David Ricardo’s demonstration
of the gains from international trade and his development of the concept of comparative advantage in the early nineteenth century.1 Ricardo
showed that the welfare of citizens of a country improves when they
are allowed to freely trade with citizens of other countries who have
different relative abilities to produce goods and services. Strikingly,
this result holds even if the citizens of the other country have an absolute advantage whereby they can produce all goods and services more
efficiently.
Notwithstanding the long and time-honored position of this argument in economic theory, the alternative view of trade as a competition
in which some countries “win” while others “lose” has always had its
adherents. The view of trade as competition enjoyed a resurgence in
the United States in the early 1990s, after a decade in which the U.S.
trade balance reached historic deficits and the U.S. real exchange rate
underwent unprecedented swings in value. For example, Lester
Thurow’s (1992) book that described an economic war among the
world players surviving the cold war period was on the New York
Times’ bestseller list for more than six months.2
Although most economists do not subscribe to the view of trade as
competition, there is widespread recognition that, within countries, an
increase in international trade will alter the economic landscape in
ways that may benefit some groups of individuals while putting others
at a relative disadvantage. Ricardo himself pointed this out, showing
the differential effects on workers and landowners of opening up to
trade. Of course, a change in any important macroeconomic factor will
lead to the relative advance of some groups and the relative decline of
others, but international trade seems to hold a special place of promi-
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nence in the popular imagination as a source of labor-market reallocation and dislocation, if not of opportunity for workers.
Popular focus on international factors as a source of economic turbulence reflects, in part, the behavior of dollar exchange rates and U.S.
trade balances over the past quarter century. Exchange rates between
the dollar and other major currencies have been marked by both wide
swings in value and notable short-run fluctuations since the breakdown
of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in 1973. Over this
same period, the current account of the United States, a broad measure
of its net international sales of goods and services, has shifted from
small surpluses in the early 1980s to record deficits in the latter part of
that decade, to near balance in the early 1990s and then again to large
deficits a few years later. At the beginning of the twenty-first century,
the U.S. trade deficit was at its highest level, both in absolute terms and
as a percentage of national income, since the end of World War II.
These dramatic movements in the value of the dollar and in the
external balances of the United States have prompted research into the
possible links between international developments and the performance of the labor market in the United States. In fact, this book
reflects our contribution toward better understanding of these links. In
this chapter, we begin our exploration of this topic with a first look at
some relevant data. We begin by discussing the evolution of openness
to international trade among U.S. manufacturing industries. We then
discuss the evolving external environment facing those industries, with
a special focus on the often turbulent behavior of dollar exchange rates.
A common theme in our discussion of openness and the exchange
rate is the diversity of experience, even across narrowly defined industries. We will show that the interaction of individual industries with the
world economy ranges widely, both in terms of overall interaction and
in terms of the specific trade partners relevant for a particular industry.
To demonstrate this type of interaction, we must use an industrial classification system. Appendix A provides a brief overview of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system for grouping industries, a
system we refer to throughout this book. Readers unfamiliar with this
system may want to refer to the appendix before moving on to the rest
of this chapter.
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OPENNESS OVER TIME AND ACROSS INDUSTRIES
It has been widely noted that the U.S. economy has become more
open to international trade over time. But, as with many popular conceptions, the details behind this fact are both less well known and provide a more nuanced picture. In this section we confirm the presence of
an overall growth in openness in manufacturing, but we also demonstrate that the change in openness over time varies widely across industries, with openness increasing among some industries while other
industries remain largely closed.
“Openness” can be defined in a variety of ways, and no single
measure can reflect all relevant dimensions by which an industry interacts with consumers, suppliers, and potential competitors from the rest
of the world. For example, Campa and Goldberg (1997) developed a
measure of openness of disaggregated manufacturing industries (e.g.,
food and kindred products or primary metal products) that accounts for
exports, imports of competing products, and imports of inputs. They
found that all three of these measures, as well as a measure of net external orientation (representing the difference between the industry export
share and the imported input share), increased from the early 1970s to
the mid 1990s for the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.
This overall pattern of increasing external orientation is not evident
among Japanese manufacturing industries. As with the other three
countries, export shares of manufacturing industries grew in Japan.
However, in contrast to the United States, Canada, and the United
Kingdom, imported input shares declined over time for Japanese manufacturing industries, and the share of imports in the Japanese consumption of imported manufactured goods largely remained steady.
As with many economic variables, there is a trade-off here
between having a measure that is comprehensive, at least along one
dimension, and one that is feasible to construct. Campa and Goldberg
were able to disaggregate manufacturing industries into about 20 categories (for U.S. data, this represents a two-digit SIC disaggregation).
But, as discussed in more detail later in this chapter, we find a great
deal of heterogeneity, even within industries at this level of disaggregation, with respect to openness.3 Therefore, to study industries at a more
disaggregated level, we utilize a less comprehensive measure of open-
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ness, but one that enables us to examine the diversity across more narrowly defined industries, those at the four-digit SIC level. Our measure
of industry openness is the ratio
Exports + Imports
———————————————–
Domestic sales + Exports + Imports
which measures the proportion of an industry’s total activity devoted to
international trade. We are able to construct this indicator of openness
for almost 450 four-digit SIC industries over the period 1958 to 1994.4
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the general increase in openness over time
of U.S. manufacturing industries as well as the increasingly divergent
degree of openness among four-digit SIC industries. This figure shows
the tenth percentile value, lower quartile value, median value, upper
quartile value, and ninetieth percentile value of openness for four-digit
industries for each year between 1958 and 1994. This figure confirms
Figure 2.1 Distributions of Openness across Industries (1958–1994)

Exports plus imports as a fraction of domestic sales plus exports
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NOTE: Figure displays the time series of percentiles from the annual cross-section distributions of openness over four-digit SIC industries.
SOURCE: Feenstra (1996, 1997).
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the upward trend in overall openness over time, with the median value
of openness increasing from 4 percent in 1958 to 22 percent in 1994.
This growth in the median value of openness proceeded somewhat
unevenly over the sample, with relatively little change from the late
1950s until the end of the 1960s when the average annual change in the
median value of openness was 3.5 percent. The pace of the growth of
openness quickened after 1972. Between 1972 and 1987 the median
value of openness grew at an average annual rate of 5.0 percent. This
growth has accelerated slightly in recent years, with an annual average
growth rate of the median value of openness of 5.25 percent in the
years between 1987 and 1994.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Figure 2.1, however, is not the
growth in the median value of openness over time but the increasingly
divergent international exposure of four-digit industries. While there
are industries throughout the period with essentially no direct international exposure, the value of our openness measure defining the upper
quartile of industries almost quadrupled between 1958, when the value
was just under 10 percent, and 1994, when its value was 39 percent.
Likewise, openness increased for the 90th percentile from 18 to 55 percent over the period. The magnitude of the increase in openness at the
top end of the distribution was not matched by the increase among the
industries at the lower end. The value of openness at the 25th percentile
increased from 2 percent in 1958 to 9 percent in 1994 while its value at
the 10th percentile increased from 1 percent to 3 percent over the same
time period. As a consequence, the range of openness for the mid 50th
percentile increased from 8 percentage points in 1958 to 30 percentage
points in 1994 and the range for the mid 80th percentile increased from
17 percentage points in 1958 to 52 percentage points in 1994.
The data presented in Figure 2.1 reveal the range of openness but
not the composition of industries constituting high, medium, or low
values of openness. One may expect similar levels of openness among
industries producing common products. In fact, this is not the case. We
regress the values of openness for four-digit industries on three different sets of dummy variables representing more aggregated industry
categories: the broad classification of durable/nondurable industries,
the larger set of 20 two-digit SIC industry indicators, and the set of 143
three-digit SIC categories. In each case, the measure of the overall fit
of the regression (the adjusted R-squared) reflects the extent of open-
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ness explained by industry categories. The increase in the value of the
overall fit of the regression (the change in the value of the adjusted Rsquared) from one regression to another shows the marginal difference
explained by a more disaggregated set of industry indicators.
The results from each of these three regressions, using the measure
of openness in 1990 for four-digit industries, are presented in Table
2.1. This table shows that there is virtually no difference on average
between the openness of durable and nondurable manufacturing industries, with an adjusted R-squared of only 0.02 in a regression using
only one dummy variable to distinguish between nondurable and durable manufacturing industries. An interpretation of this result is that
only 2 percent of the variation in openness across the 450 four-digit
industries is explained by that industry being in either the durable or
the nondurable group. The extent to which the variation in openness
across four-digit industries is explained by membership in a particular
two-digit SIC industry is also relatively small since the adjusted Rsquared for a regression using 19 dummy variables to control for the 20
two-digit SIC industries is 0.27. Regressing openness on three-digit
industry dummy variables raises the adjusted R-squared to 0.44, well
above its value when using two-digit industry dummies but still below
one-half.
These results indicate a great deal of heterogeneity in the degree of
openness which is largely unrelated to differences among two-digit or
even three-digit industry groupings. This suggests that there are likely
to be substantial differences in the extent to which real exchange rate
movements affect job creation and destruction across industries that
constitute a particular two-digit or even three-digit industry.
Increasing heterogeneity over time, as depicted in Figure 2.1, may
reflect the fact that the most open industries in 1958 became even more
Table 2.1 Regression of 1990 Openness on Industry Indicator Variables
(442 observations)
Industry indicators
No. of Variables

R

2

Durability

2-digit

3-digit

1

19

142

0.02

0.27

0.44

SOURCE: See Data Sources 2 and 3 in Appendix C.
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open over time while the most closed industries at the beginning of the
period remained closed. Alternatively, the data shown in Figure 2.1
could also be consistent with significant churning whereby industries
that were relatively closed early in the sample period may have become
more open over time while other industries experienced little change in
openness or even a decline in openness over time. We present a transition matrix in Table 2.2 to address the question of the stability of the
ranking of industries by openness over time.
Table 2.2 presents the percentage distribution for quintiles with
respect to openness in 1973 of the 442 four-digit SIC industries against
the respective percentage distributions for 1993 (the range of years for
which we have job flows data for our regression analysis). This table
demonstrates that there has been relatively little reshuffling in the ranking of industries’ degrees of openness. Fifty-two percent of the fourdigit industries stayed in the same openness quintile between 1973 and
1993 and 88 percent either stayed in the same quintile or moved to an
adjoining quintile.5 Note, however, that the cutoff values of openness
for each quintile more than doubled during this time period, confirming
the overall increase in openness we first noted with reference to Figure
2.1.
These statistics offer an interesting depiction of the growth and
heterogeneity of openness in U.S. manufacturing industries. The average degree of openness has increased enormously in recent decades, a
result that also is apparent from the work of Campa and Goldberg
Table 2.2 Transitions of Four-Digit Industries between Openness
Quintiles
1993 quintile (range of openness)
1
2
3
4
5
1973 quintile (0.0– 0.07) (0.07– 0.16) (0.16–0.26) (0.26– 0.40) (0.40–1.0) Total
1 (0.00–0.03)
78
17
3
1
1
100
2 (0.03–0.06)
18
40
24
14
5
100
3 (0.06–0.12)
6
26
40
20
8
100
4 (0.12–0.19)
0
10
24
40
26
100
5 (0.19–1.00)
0
6
9
25
60
100
NOTE: The table shows the percentage distribution of industries in each 1973 quintile
across 1993 quintiles.
SOURCE: See Data Sources 2 and 3 in Appendix C.
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(1997) discussed above. There has been a tendency for all industries to
become more open over time, but the biggest increase in openness has
been in the industries which were initially most open. This has resulted
in an increasingly large degree of heterogeneity in openness to trade
across four-digit SIC manufacturing industries. Some four-digit SIC
industries have become strongly integrated into the global economy,
but others remained largely isolated from international competition.
Very little of this heterogeneity is associated with differences between
broad industry groups. Even within three-digit SIC industries, there is a
large variance in the importance of international trade.
One might suspect that increasing, and increasingly divergent,
openness across manufacturing industries has made these industries
more sensitive to international factors over time. Perhaps the key international variable that affects manufacturing industries in the United
States is the real exchange rate. We next turn to an examination of its
behavior over the past quarter century.

THE VOLATILITY OF DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATES
The prices of German, British, Korean, Japanese, or Mexican
goods are translated into dollars through euro (formerly deutsche
mark), pound, won, yen, or peso exchange rates, respectively. These
exchange rates, however, also figure in the determination of the returns
of assets denominated in these respective currencies. The volume of
trade in assets, comprising the capital account of nations, swamps the
volume of trade in goods and services, which constitutes the current
account of nations.6 For example, the estimated volume of trade in the
largest 43 foreign exchange markets is estimated to be $1.5 trillion per
day. This is about 60 times the daily value of global trade in goods and
services.7
Given the relative size of these flows, it is not surprising that dollar
exchange rates behave more like the price of an asset than the price of a
good. The lexicon used to describe exchange rates includes terms such
as overshooting, misalignment, and volatility, terms that are more frequently associated with the prices of other assets, like stocks or bonds,
rather than with the price of goods or services. Figure 2.2 illustrates
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this point by graphing the multilateral trade-weighted value of the real
dollar exchange rate index since the breakdown of the fixed-exchangerate Bretton Woods system in March 1973.8 The figure includes two
multilateral real exchange rates: the widely used but discontinued G-10
rate and the new Federal Reserve broad index. An increase in these
exchange rates represents an appreciation of the dollar relative to the
foreign currencies. This figure illustrates both the wide swings in the
value of the dollar, lasting for five years or more, as well as the monthto-month volatility of the exchange rate.
Figure 2.2 illustrates that, in trade-weighted terms, the dollar ended
the century at about the same level at which it began the floating rate
period in 1973. But the dollar was subject to wide swings in value during the intervening 27 years. Most noteworthy in this respect is the
large run-up in the value of the dollar from late 1978 to early 1985.
During this period, the trade-weighted value of the dollar rose by more
Figure 2.2 Real Trade-Weighted Exchange Value of the U.S. Dollar
(January 1973–October 2002)
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than 50 percent. The dollar then reversed course in early 1985, decreasing in value by almost 30 percent between mid 1985 and early 1987.
While the dollar more or less lost value steadily for three years after
1975, and more or less gained value steadily in the period between the
summer of 1995 and early 2002, the period from 1978 to 1987 stands
out as the most dramatic period change for the dollar exchange rate in
the post–Bretton Woods era.
Economists’ explanation of the movement of the dollar during this
period reflects the view that currency values broadly respond to macroeconomic events that influence the flow of capital across national borders. For example, the appreciation of the dollar in the first half of the
1980s is typically seen as a response to the increase in interest rates in
the United States during that period, initially due to tight, disinflationary monetary policy and then continuing with the expansion of the federal budget deficit after 1982. Government policy can also have an
influence on exchange rates. The depreciation of the dollar, beginning
in early 1985 and continuing for the next two years, came in the wake
of government intervention in the foreign exchange market. Notable
here was the September 1985 Plaza Accord in which the finance ministers and central bank officials of the G-7 (consisting of the seven largest industrial economies) voiced their concern with the strong dollar
and undertook intervention in the foreign exchange market to influence
currency values.9 Movements in exchange rates, like movements in the
prices of other assets, sometimes defy explanation. For example, the
steep run-up in the value of the dollar at the end of 1984 and the rapid
decline in the value of the dollar during the spring of 1995 do not easily
lend themselves to explanations based upon underlying economic fundamentals or government policies.
Whatever their cause, exchange rate movements alter the price of
goods and services traded across national boundaries. Exports sold by
American firms become more expensive when the dollar strengthens
while imports become cheaper, all else equal. This change in the relative price contributes to a deterioration in the trade balance of the
United States, but the effect of currency movements on imports and
exports may occur only slowly over the course of a year or more since
contracts for foreign trade are signed well before delivery takes place.
Furthermore, firms may adjust their domestic currency prices to soften
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the effect of currency movements on the prices of their goods and services sold abroad.10
The relationship between a particular change in the exchange rate
and the short-run response of a firm is also complicated by the uncertainty facing managers, who must decide whether the most recent currency movement is part of a long-run trend or merely a short-lived blip.
For example, managers may be more reluctant to raise prices and surrender market share in the face of a depreciation perceived as temporary as compared to one perceived as permanent when they incur fixed
costs in the establishment of distribution or marketing networks.11 In
our empirical analysis in Chapter 6, we attempt to address this issue by
decomposing exchange rate movements in a way that captures these
considerations.
While short-run decisions may mitigate the contemporaneous
response of trade to exchange rates, the time path of the U.S. current
account in Figure 2.3 nevertheless presents a broad correlation between
Figure 2.3 Balance on the U.S. Current Account (Q1:1973–Q2:2002)
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dollar movements and the U.S. current account. The appreciation of the
dollar in the first half of the 1980s accompanied the increasing current
account deficit at that time. The subsequent dollar depreciation contributed to the reversal of this deterioration and to the eventual, albeit
short-lived, current account surplus in the early 1990s. The recent
renewed increase in the current account deficit is largely a reflection of
the differential in the growth of income between the United States and
its major trading partners in the 1990s. The ongoing U.S. expansion
has fueled a demand for imports while the relatively slower growth
among many trading partners has not led to a commensurate surge in
U.S. exports. The post-1995 strength of the dollar has also contributed
to the increasing trade deficit of the United States.12
While it is well known that particular bilateral dollar exchange
rates, as well as the multilaterally weighted value of the dollar, have
exhibited dramatic shifts in value over the floating exchange rate
period, the differences across industries in the relevant trade-weighted
values of the dollar are less well known. In the next section, we turn to
this issue.

THE DIVERSITY OF BEHAVIOR OF INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC
EXCHANGE RATES
As described in the previous section, multilateral exchange rates
are weighted averages of many bilateral exchange rates, with the
weights reflecting the volume of bilateral trade between each country
and the United States. The multilateral exchange rates plotted in Figure
2.2, for example, are weighted averages of the bilateral exchange rates
between the U.S. dollar and the currencies of the United States’ major
trading partners. The G-10 index, which was readily available and
common in older studies of exchange rates and labor markets, uses
trade weights for the 10 largest U.S. trading partners based on trading
patterns between 1972 and 1976.13 The Federal Reserve’s broad index
includes many more U.S. trading partners and updates trade share
weights more frequently.14 Although the two measures generally move
together over time, the magnitude of their difference varies significantly over time. This fact suggests that the choice of trading partners
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included in a multilateral exchange rate may be a quantitatively important matter.
This last point is especially relevant for understanding the effects
of exchange rates on industry-level trade. In any particular industry,
the most appropriate weights to use in constructing a multilateral index
would reflect trading patterns for the goods produced by that industry
rather than trading patterns for all goods and services, as in the common aggregate multilateral exchange rates. For example, the yen-dollar
bilateral exchange rate would be given greater weight in constructing a
multilateral exchange rate appropriate for the automobile industry than
it would in a general economy-wide index or in an industry that traded
very little with Japan. Furthermore, industries vary widely in the composition of countries with which they trade.
Following this idea, we have constructed industry-specific real
exchange rates. For each detailed (four-digit SIC) manufacturing
industry, we constructed a multilateral exchange rate series with the
weights on the bilateral exchange rates based on trading patterns for
the industry’s output over a lagged two-year period.15 In calculating the
exchange rates, we used approximately 60 countries, a much broader
range than those included in the G-10 index, reflecting the increased
importance of trade with newly industrialized and developing countries. For any particular industry, however, the number of exchange
rates included in the industry-specific multilateral exchange rate is
much smaller because most industries only trade significantly with a
relatively small number of countries. Because of trade-weight updating
and the large number of countries included, our industry-specific multilateral exchange rates are similar in spirit to the Federal Reserve
economy-wide multilateral exchange rate.
The distributions of industry-specific real exchange rates is shown
in Figure 2.4. All of the exchange rates are indexed such that they
equal 100 in 1973. For any given year, the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and
90th percentiles of the distribution of the industry-specific real
exchange rates are shown. This figure demonstrates that there is considerable heterogeneity across industries in the time path of the relevant real exchange rate.16 Each industry-specific real exchange rate is a
multilateral index, with weights on the component bilateral exchange
rates reflecting the relative importance of trade with other countries in
that industry’s output. Industry-specific exchange rates will follow dif-
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Figure 2.4 Distributions of Real Exchange Rates across Industries
(1973–1993)
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NOTE: Figure displays the time series of percentiles from the annual cross-section distributions of real exchange rates over four-digit SIC industries.
SOURCE: See Appendix C, Data Sources.

ferent patterns over time because either the combination of bilateral
exchange rates and/or the trading partner weights differ across industries.
The two multilateral exchange rates in Figure 2.2 also are shown in
Figure 2.4. It is striking that even the swings in the Federal Reserve’s
broad index are more pronounced than the swings in most of the industry-specific real exchange rates; the G-10 fluctuations are greater still.
Both the Federal Reserve broad and G-10 exchange rates show the dollar depreciating during the 1970s, sharply appreciating in the early
1980s, and then suddenly depreciating in the mid-to-late 1980s. In contrast, the median of the industry-specific exchange rates stays roughly
constant in the 1970s, and then shows a dollar appreciation that is considerably smaller than that experienced by the two economy-wide
indexes.
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The differences between the G-10 real exchange rate and the others
is explained primarily by two factors: the G-10 index uses a narrower
range of bilateral exchange rates, and the trade weights used in constructing the G-10 index were fixed over time. However, the differences between the Federal Reserve broad multilateral exchange rate
and the industry multilateral exchange rates are more important to
decipher. The differences may be explained partly by the fact that data
limitations prevent us from using the exchange rates from literally
every country with which every industry traded. Nevertheless, given
the broad range of exchange rates and their movements, it appears that
the economy-wide multilateral exchange rate may not provide an adequate representation of exchange rate movements for all industries at
all times.
This last point is made more clearly by Figure 2.5, which is similar
to Figure 2.4 except that it shows the distributions of the growth rates

Figure 2.5 Distributions of Real Exchange Rate Growth Rates across
Industries (1974–1993)
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of the industry-specific real exchange rates instead of their levels. This
figure makes it evident that, in addition to being more volatile than the
industry-level exchange rates, the economy-wide exchange rates cannot reflect the heterogeneity in the direction of change of the exchange
rate. Specifically, in many years, some industry-specific real exchange
rates appreciate at the same time that others depreciate. This fact highlights the importance of heterogeneity across industries in the importance of different trading partners. It also underscores the importance
of using industry-specific real exchange rates because our theoretical
model in Chapter 5 demonstrates that gross job flows are linked to the
growth of the exchange rate rather than to its level.

CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided a context for the analysis that follows.
The dramatic swings in the value of the dollar, and the corresponding
movements in the U.S. trade account, make international factors one of
the usual suspects in most accounts of the fate of workers in the manufacturing sectors of the United States. The research surveyed here suggests that this perception may be warranted, but the focus of this
research is, for the most part, on manufacturing broadly or on a subset
of industries within manufacturing. In the next chapter we begin our
analysis by showing that, even within seemingly narrow industries,
there is a range of responses by firms to a changing international environment. This points to a more nuanced effect of international factors
on labor markets in the United States.

Notes
1. See Ricardo (1963). This book was first published in 1817.
2. Irwin (1996) provides a history of the debate over free trade since the time of
Ricardo.
3. We also find a great deal of heterogeneity across two-digit industries with respect
to job flows, a point we discuss in Chapter 3.
4. Our data on exports and imports comes from Feenstra (1996, 1997), who updated
data from Abowd (1990). The use of export share and import share alone, without
information on the share of intermediate imported goods, while theoretically
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ignoring a potentially important channel, may not represent much loss of information. Campa and Goldberg found a high correlation between their three measures
of external exposure and, because of this, use only two, rather than all three, measures of openness in subsequent research in which they use openness in wage and
employment regressions (see Campa and Goldberg 2001).
These percentages are calculated from Table 2.2 as follows. The percentage staying in the same quintile is the average of diagonal entries. The percentage staying
the same or adjacent quintiles is obtained by first summing the same and adjacent
quintiles in each row, then averaging over these row sums.
The current account consists of exports and imports of goods and services (also
known as the trade account), payments to factors of production in the form of
investment income, and net unilateral transfers. To give some idea of the relative
size of these magnitudes, the 2002 Economic Report of the President 2002
reports, in Table B-103 (p. 398) that, in 2000, exports were $772 billion, imports
were $1,224 billion, receipts on assets abroad were $353 billion, payments on foreign assets in the United States were $368 billion, and net unilateral transfers were
$54 billion.
The figure for the volume of capital flows is from the Bank for International Settlements’ triennial survey, published in October 1998, and it is cited in the February 1999 Economic Report of the President 1999, p. 224.
The figure depicts a weighted average of bilateral dollar real exchange rates calculated by the Federal Reserve Board. The weights reflect the amount of bilateral
trade between each country and the United States. The real exchange rate is the
product of the nominal exchange rate and the relative prices of baskets of goods
and services in the United States and its trading partners. For example, the real
exchange rate between the United States and Japan is the product of the yen/dollar
exchange rate and the ratio of the Producer Price Indices of the United States and
Japan. A graph of the multilateral trade-weighted nominal exchange rate index
would be virtually the same as Figure 2.2 since the correlation between the nominal dollar exchange rate and the real dollar exchange rate for industrial countries
is on the order of 0.9 or greater. But, as discussed below, trade-weighted exchange
rates for particular U.S. manufacturing industries, where the weights reflect the
amount of bilateral exports and imports for those industries, can differ significantly from the overall trade-weighted exchange rate for the United States.
It is not at all clear, however, that the dollar’s path would have been markedly different in the absence of government intervention. The efficacy of governments’
efforts to manage exchange rates is the subject of a great deal of research. Economists are especially interested in the role of sterilized intervention whereby governments attempt to alter currency values without adjusting monetary policy.
Research tends to suggest that sterilized intervention does not have a systematic
effect on exchange rates. For a good overview of these issues, see Dominguez and
Frankel (1993).
There is a wide literature on this exchange-rate pass-through effect. For an early
and influential article, see Knetter (1989).
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11 See, for example, Froot and Klemperer (1989).
12. Of course, both the exchange rate and the trade account are jointly determined and
reflect the influence of other, underlying, macroeconomic factors. Still, for particular U.S. manufacturing industries, an appreciation of the dollar will, all else
equal, likely contribute to a decline in demand. The model in Chapter 5 develops
this point more fully.
13. The countries included in the index are Belgium/Luxembourg, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom.
14. Details of the construction of this new multilateral exchange rate index is
described in Leahy (1998).
15. We follow essentially the same methodology as Gourinchas (1998) in constructing the exchange rates: see, in that article, pages 165–166, especially footnote 16.
16. The spread in the real exhcange rate distribution tends to grow over time, at least
initially, because the exchange rates are indexed to a common value for 1973.

3
Job Creation and
Job Destruction
A First Look
In any given year, the fortunes of establishments diverge. Some
establishments grow and add jobs while others shrink and offer fewer
opportunities for employment. It is common to consider the ebb and
flow of employment as a response to the business cycle and, consequently, to think of the changing number of jobs as generally reflecting
movements in the overall amount of employment in the economy. This
view, however, provides only a partial picture of churning within the
labor market. A more complete picture reflects widespread and simultaneous creation and destruction of jobs, even within narrowly defined
industries.
In this chapter we introduce the measures of labor-market churning
that we employ throughout the rest of this book—job creation, job
destruction, and job reallocation—as well as the traditional measure of
labor market activity, changes in net employment. An innovative
aspect of our analysis is the use of gross flows of jobs—that is, creation, destruction, and reallocation—to assess the impact of international factors on labor markets.1 As discussed in more detail in the next
chapter, the vast majority of studies of the labor-market effects of international factors use data only on change in the level of employment.
These data, however, miss the churning that takes place within narrowly defined manufacturing sectors and, consequently, do not provide
a full depiction of the consequences for the labor-market of a changing
international environment.
Our data were developed by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996)
using the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) from the U.S.
Bureau of the Census.2 The basic observation in the LRD is the number
of jobs (employment) at an individual manufacturing establishment, or
equivalently “plant,” in a particular year. Because establishments are
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linked in the data set year to year, the change in establishment employment can be calculated each year. Thus, establishments can be identified as having a net increase in jobs (therefore experiencing job
creation, but no job destruction), a net decrease in jobs (therefore experiencing job destruction, but no job creation), or no net change in jobs
(therefore having neither job creation nor job destruction).3 These data
are summed over all establishments within a four-digit industry to yield
the amount of gross job creation and destruction within that industry.
We use four-digit-level gross job-flow data because this is the most disaggregate level at which the trade (export and import) data are available.
These gross job-flow data provide us with a measure of the rate
of reallocation within an industry. Job reallocation is defined as the
sum of the rates of job creation and job destruction. The rate of net
employment change is the difference between the rate of job creation
and the rate of job destruction. A given rate of net employment
change is consistent with a wide range of values of job creation and
job destruction. For example, a net employment change of –2 percent
can be generated by no job creation and a job destruction rate of 2
percent, or by a job creation rate of 10 percent and a job destruction
rate of 12 percent.
However, the welfare consequences of these two scenarios are
probably quite different. Job creation and job destruction have different
implications for the labor-market status of workers, unemployment,
human capital accumulation, and wages—factors that are fundamentally important for calculating the welfare costs of labor adjustment to
international competition. In particular, job destruction is closely
linked to the dislocation of workers from jobs, and the evidence indicates that dislocated workers typically suffer severe losses of human
capital and permanent income. Moreover, job destruction tends to be
permanent and occurs disproportionately in larger, older, high-wage
plants. Thus, job destruction is likely to involve permanent dislocation
of high-wage and/or older workers, human capital destruction, and permanent income loss—all of which are likely to lead to higher structural
unemployment.4
We next describe the construction of gross job-flow measures from
establishment-level data. Some initial statistics on gross job flows
describe the overall characteristics of job flows in U.S. manufacturing.
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This analysis is complemented by statistics that offer some initial information on the heterogeneity in the year-to-year behavior of job creation
and job destruction within narrowly defined industry categories. These
statistics suggest that an analysis that considers only net employment
changes across broader industrial categories misses an important component of job reallocation due to simultaneous job destruction and job
creation within industries.
Overall, this chapter sets the stage for much of the material presented in the rest of this book. An understanding of the distinction
between gross job flows and changes in net employment informs the
literature review of the international determinants of employment, presented in the next chapter, since most of this literature focuses on net
employment changes rather than gross job flows. The simultaneous
creation and destruction of jobs in seemingly narrowly defined industries documented here informs the choice of a theoretical framework,
which is presented in Chapter 5. This model provides us with an empirical specification which is presented and tested in Chapter 6. In that
chapter we present evidence of a significant role for exchange rates in
affecting gross job flows. Some evidence in this chapter foreshadows
those results by showing that gross job flows for manufacturing as a
whole respond in a significant manner to movements in the multilateral
dollar exchange rate.

GROSS JOB FLOWS IN U.S. MANUFACTURING
We begin this section with a brief description of methodology
used by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) to construct the gross
job-flow data; for more details, see especially their data appendix. We
then offer some initial evidence on the extent of simultaneous creation
and destruction among manufacturing establishments. The data show
that, on average, about one in five manufacturing jobs is either created
or destroyed each year. This extensive labor-market churning is surprisingly diffuse across manufacturing. We present evidence that membership within narrow industrial groups accounts for little of the crosssectional variation in gross job flows.
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Data Definitions
To illustrate the calculation of job creation and destruction rates,
define Lpit as the level of employment in a particular manufacturing
establishment, plant p, which is classified as a member of industry i, in
year t. Denote its first-difference as ∆Lpit = Lpit – Lpi,t–1.5 Job creation
occurs in a particular manufacturing establishment if ∆Lpit is positive
while job destruction occurs if ∆Lpit is negative. Thus, establishments
that increase their level of employment over a given time period will be
recorded as having, for that period, job creation equal to ∆Lpit and a
value of job destruction equal to zero, while, for establishments that
reduce their employment, job creation is zero and job destruction is
equal to –∆Lpit.
Aggregating the employment changes across all establishments
within a particular four-digit SIC industry gives us the level of job creation and job destruction in that industry. The size of the establishment
is defined as the average of current and lagged employment, or 1/2(Lpit
+ Lpi,t–1). Then the rates of job creation and destruction in industry i in
year t, denoted Cit and Dit respectively, equal

Cit =
Dit =

∑ p∈M + ∆Lpit
1
∑ p∈( M + ∪ M − ) ( Lpit + Lpi,t −1 )
2
1
2

∑ p∈M − ∆Lpit
,
∑ p∈( M + ∪ M − ) ( Lpit + Lpi,t −1 )

where M+ is the set of establishments for which ∆Lpit > 0 and M– is the
set of establishments for which ∆Lpit < 0. The reallocation rate within
industry i in year t, Rit, is defined as the sum of its creation and destruction rates (Rit = Cit + Dit). The net change in employment of industry i in
year t, Nit, is the difference between its job creation rate and the job
destruction rate in that year (Nit = Cit – Dit). This last calculation shows
that a particular rate of net change in employment is consistent with a
wide range of different rates of job creation and job destruction, a point
alluded to above.
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Gross Job Flows in the Auto Industry

To illustrate these concepts, consider the data on net employment
change and on gross job creation and destruction for the motor vehicles
and car bodies, or “auto,” industry (SIC 3711). Table 3.1 reports these
data in levels and rates for each year from 1980 to 1990, along with the
averages for the period. The first two columns contain the level and
growth rate, Nit, of net employment change, whereas the remaining columns contain the levels and rates, Cit and Dit, of job creation and
destruction. The average level of total employment in the auto industry
during this period was slightly more than 270,000.
The table shows that employment declined 4.1 percent, or 12,586
employees, per year on average during this period. In contrast, the
gross job flows were much larger. The number of new jobs created
each year was on average roughly twice as large as the net change in
industry employment. At the same time, job destruction averaged
Table 3.1 Net and Gross Job Flows in the Auto Industry

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

Net employment change
Level
Nit
–79,835
–23.6
–21,666
–7.6
–28,831
–11.0
–7,446
–3.0
46,661
17.7
26,418
8.8
–6,768
–2.2
–30,292
–10.4
–23,924
–9.0
–6,036
–2.4
–6,727
–2.7

Creation
Level
Cit
11,535
3.4
24,800
8.6
19,095
7.3
23,357
9.6
52,425
19.9
39,816
13.3
19,597
6.3
18,962
6.5
16,170
6.1
17,490
7.0
15,242
6.3

Destruction
Level
Dit
91,371
27.0
46,466
16.2
47,926
18.3
30,803
12.6
5,764
2.2
13,397
4.5
26,364
8.5
49,254
16.9
40,094
15.1
23,526
9.4
21,969
9.0

Average –12,586
–4.1
23,499
8.6
36,085
12.7
NOTE: The rates Nit, Cit, and Dit are in percent and defined in the text. The level of
total employment (Lit) used to derive the levels data in the table comes from the
NBER Productivity database, which contains data from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers from the Census Bureau. In 1990, total employment in the auto industry was
239,500.
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approximately three times the net change in industry employment.
Thus, approximately 50,000 jobs were either created or destroyed on
average, about four times more than were lost on net each year.
Not only are gross job flows large relative to net employment
change, but jobs are being simultaneously created and destroyed within
the industry each and every year. In 1980, for example, 91,371 jobs
were destroyed (27 percent of employment) and net employment fell
79,835 (23.6 percent), but 11,535 new jobs were created (3.4 percent)
that same year. Conversely, 5,764 jobs (2.2 percent) were destroyed in
1984, a year when total employment grew 17.7 percent. In fact, the
rates of job creation and destruction never dropped below 2 percent of
employment in any year during this period. Regardless of whether the
industry as a whole was expanding or contracting, there was always a
simultaneous expansion of the number of jobs at some establishments
and contraction of the number of jobs at some other establishment
within the industry. In general, a substantial number of jobs are simultaneously created and destroyed in virtually every year.
Gross Job Flows in All Manufacturing

The data for the auto industry presented in Table 3.1 give some
hint of the simultaneous job creation and destruction that occurs within
manufacturing, even in years in which there is a relatively large swing
in overall employment. Statistics for manufacturing as a whole provide
a more complete picture of the extensive churning that takes place.
These statistics summarize information from a panel of annual data of
about 450 four-digit manufacturing industries, covering the period
1973, the year that the dollar began to float against the currencies of the
major U.S. trading partners, to 1993, the final year for which data on
job flows are available.6
The average value of the annual job creation rate in manufacturing
over the period 1973 to 1993 was 8.8 jobs created per 100 positions
each year, while the comparable average rate of job destruction was
10.2 jobs destroyed per 100 positions each year (Schuh and Triest
1998). Thus, the average annual rate of job reallocation in manufacturing was 19 percent between 1973 and 1993 while, during this period,
the manufacturing sector saw an average net decline of 1.3 jobs per 100
positions (numbers do not add up due to rounding).
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These statistics mask the wide swings that have sometimes
occurred over our sample period in job destruction and job creation
rates for manufacturing. Figures 3.1–3.4 present the time series variation in gross job flows. The four panels of this figure present annual
data on job creation, job destruction rate, job reallocation rate, and net
employment growth rate for the manufacturing sector during the period
1973 to 1993.7 This figure also demonstrates the wide variation in
gross job flows over time. For example, the reallocation rate exceeded
20 percent in half the years of the sample, reaching a high of 24 percent
in 1983. These figures also demonstrate differences between the two
components of gross job flows, job creation and job destruction. A
comparison of the top two panels shows that the job destruction rate is
more volatile than the job creation rate, with the job destruction rate
exceeding 15 percent in three years—1975, 1982, and 1983.
Figures 3.1–3.4 also provide evidence on the correlation between
manufacturing gross job flows and the business cycle. Shaded bars in
the figure represent periods of recession. The data in the figure suggest
that the job destruction rate is strongly countercyclical, while the job
creation rate is procyclical. The figure also depicts the G-10 multilateral real exchange rate over the sample period; we use the G-10 rate for
this figure and the subsequent regression analysis below, to facilitate
comparison with prior research on the effects of exchange rates on
labor markets. Note that each gross job-flow measure is correlated positively with the real exchange rate. The job destruction rate is more
closely correlated with the real exchange rate than the job creation rate,
but the job reallocation rate is most closely correlated with the real
exchange rate. Net employment growth does not track movements in
the real exchange rate very closely at all.
The relationships suggested by inspection of the figures are supported by simple regressions using the annual job creation rate in manufacturing, Ct, the annual job destruction rate in manufacturing, Dt, the
lagged percentage change in the G-10 real exchange rate, %∆RERt–1,
and the lagged percentage change in manufacturing industrial produc-
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Figure 3.1 Gross Job Flows and the Real Exchange Rate—Job Creation
(1973–1993)
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SOURCE: See Data Sources 1 and 6 in Appendix C.

Figure 3.2 Gross Job Flows and the Real Exchange Rate—Job
Destruction (1973–1993)
20

150

135

15

Percent

105
10

90

Job destruction (left)
Real exchange rate (right)
5

75
1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

SOURCE: See Data Sources 1 and 6 in Appendix C.

1987

1989

1991

1993

Index (1973 = 100)

120

Job Creation and Job Destruction: A First Look

41

Figure 3.3 Gross Job Flows and the Real Exchange Rate—Job
Reallocation (1973–1993)
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Figure 3.4 Gross Job Flows and the Real Exchange Rate—Net
Employment Growth (1973–1993)
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tion, %∆IPMt–1. Estimating these equations over the period 1974 to
1993, we find

Ct = 8.28− 0.015% ∆RERt −1 + 0.10% ∆IPM t −1
( 0.51)

( 0.05)

( 0.09 )

R = 0.07
DW = 1.63
n = 19
Dt = 11.12 + 0.12% ∆RERt −1 − 0.24% ∆IPM t −1
2

( 0.56 )

R = 0.41
2

( 0.056 )

DW = 2.07

( 0.10 )

n = 19

where standard errors are in parentheses. The coefficients in these
regressions are all of the expected sign, and the coefficients in the
destruction equation are significant at the 95 percent level. Note that
the real exchange rate and industrial production coefficients are insignificant in the job creation equation.
These simple regression results, along with Figure 3.1, suggest a
link between the real exchange rate and gross job destruction. They are
also a robust precursor of our later results from the more detailed estimation reported in Chapter 6. Most importantly, note that these results
imply an economically important impact of real exchange rates on job
destruction. For example, from 1982 to 1986, the job destruction rate in
manufacturing averaged 12.2 percent, 2 full percentage points above
its unconditional sample average of 10.2 percent. The average value of
the lagged change in the real exchange rate during that time was 8.9
percent. Thus, more than 50 percent of the average increase in the job
destruction rate (8.9 × 0.12 = 1.07 percentage points of the 2 percentage point rise) may be attributable to the real exchange rate appreciation.
Gross Job-Flow Heterogeneity across Industries

Industries are sometimes described as being in a certain phase of
their life cycle. Terms like “sunset” industries, or regional tags like
“rustbelt” reflect a view that broadly defined industries are being
eclipsed, perhaps by “emerging” industries that happen to be located in
“booming” regions. This view may not be broadly accurate, however.
At any moment there may be both successful, growing establishments

Job Creation and Job Destruction: A First Look

43

and less successful establishments that are downsizing even within narrowly defined manufacturing industries or within a certain region.
The data and statistics presented in the previous section, which
reveal a high degree of churning within manufacturing as a whole, cannot, by themselves, provide any information concerning the divergence
of fortunes of establishments within certain industries. For example,
the average reallocation rate of 19 percent could be consistent with
either persistent destruction in one broad industrial category and persistent creation in another, or with shifting patterns of gross job flows
across industries. Likewise, the relationship between gross job flows
and aggregate economic variables like the real exchange rate and
industrial production could reflect either common responses by all
establishments in particular broad industrial categories to business
cycle and international factors or, alternatively, a more varied pattern
of responses across establishments within narrowly defined industries.
At the broadest level, heterogeneous performance within manufacturing as a whole is to be expected since this sector of the economy is
populated by establishments producing a wide range of products and
serving vastly different markets. Consequently, we would expect the
presence of simultaneous creation and destruction within manufacturing. More surprisingly, there is evidence of heterogeneous creation and
destruction behavior within narrow industrial categories in which we
might have expected more common performance among establishments.
A simple, albeit stringent, condition to consider is whether there is
evidence of simultaneous creation and destruction among establishments within four-digit SIC industries. If all establishments within
these categories faced a common fate, then we would expect to find
many years in which particular four-digit industries had either no job
creation or no job destruction. In fact, this is not the case. Either the
creation rate or the destruction rate equals zero in only 0.2 percent of
all possible cases (that is, among all 447 industries over 21 years). Easing these criteria, we still find only a small number of cases of lopsided
creation or destruction activity. In only about 2 percent of all observations is the rate of job destruction or the rate of job creation less than 1
percent. Furthermore, there are very few cases of low rates of job creation even if we consider only observations when job destruction was
large. Job creation was less than 1 percent in only 1.8 percent of the
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cases when job destruction was above its overall average of 10.7 percent. Likewise, job destruction was less than 1 percent in only 1.1 percent of the cases when job creation was above its overall average of 8.7
percent.
A more systematic examination of heterogeneity in creation and
destruction can be obtained by determining the extent to which membership in a particular industrial category explains these gross job
flows. We run regressions of the form
n −1

∑i =1 αi X i + εitc
n −1
β X + ε itd ,
Dit = ∑
i =1 i i

Cit =

where Cit is the job creation rate for the ith four-digit SIC industry in
year t, Dit is the job destruction rate for the ith four-digit SIC industry in
year t, Xi is a 0/1 dummy variable corresponding to a particular SIC
group, n is the number of industries in that group, and εit is the regression error.8 For example, the broadest group is where Xi = 1 if the fourdigit industry is in a Durable Goods industry and otherwise Xi = 0. In
this case, n = 2.
Table 3.2 reports the goodness-of-fit statistic adjusted for number
of degrees of freedom, the adjusted R2, associated with this regression
for testing differences across the durable versus nondurable groups (n
= 2), as well as the R2 statistics for regressions for the more disaggregated groups of all two-digit industries (n = 20), all three-digit industries (n = 143), and all four-digit industries (in this case, n = 442 rather
than the full 447 because there are not data for all four-digit industries
for all 21 years). The adjusted R2 values reflect the time-series and (in
all cases but for the regressions using dummy variables associated with
the four-digit SIC categories) the cross-section variation associated
with membership in particular industry categories. If, for example, all
four-digit industries within any two-digit category had very similar
measures of job creation, then we would find a large adjusted R2 in a
regression of job creation on a set of two-digit dummy variables and
little difference between this adjusted R2 and the ones we would obtain
for regressions of job creation on a set of three-digit dummy variables
or on a set of four-digit dummy variables.
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The top part of Table 3.2 reports results for regressions using a
pooled sample representing all 21 years for which we have job-flow
data. In this pooled data set, job creation rates and job destruction rates
vary both over four-digit industries and over time. These results show
that virtually none of the variation in gross job-flow rates is accounted
for by membership in the broad categories of durable and nondurable
goods. Membership in the more narrow two-digit categories accounts
for only 6 percent of the variation in both job destruction rates and job
creation rates. Membership in a particular three-digit industry, while
offering almost seven times as many categories of industries, still
accounts for only 12 to 13 percent of the variation in creation or
destruction rates. The most disaggregated classification scheme, consisting of a complete set of four-digit dummy variables, still generates
adjusted R2 values of only 18 percent for job destruction and 23 percent
for job creation.
The adjusted R2 in the last column of the top panel of Table 3.2
reflects only time-series variation since, with 441 dummy variables
corresponding to the full set of SIC four-digit industries, there is no
scope for variation within industrial categories within any year. The
large increase in the adjusted R2 values from 0.13 to 0.23 for creation
and 0.12 to 0.18 for destruction, suggests that temporal variation in the
job-flow rates of four-digit industries is a much more important contributor to their overall variance than are any persistent differences
across four-digit industries in the degree of job churning.

Table 3.2 Job-Flow Regressions on Industry Variables ( R 2 values)
Durability
1

Industry indicators
2-digit
3-digit
19
142

4-digit
No. of variables
441
1973–1993 (9,282 observations)
Job creation
0.01
0.06
0.13
0.23
Job destruction
0.00
0.06
0.12
0.18
1990 (442 observations)
Job creation
0.00
0.07
0.18
Job destruction
0.01
0.06
0.13
NOTE: Table entries are the adjusted R2 values from regressions of job-flow rates on a
set of industry dummy variables.
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We investigate this point further in the bottom part of Table 3.2 in
which we isolate the cross-sectional variation in openness by performing a comparable ANOVA using data from a single year, 1990.9 As
with the results in the top panel of this table, the results presented in the
bottom panel indicate that little of the cross-sectional variation in jobflow rates among four-digit industries in that year is due to systematic
differences between more aggregated industry groups. For example,
only 6 percent of the cross-sectional variation in job destruction rates is
explained by a four-digit industry’s membership in a two-digit category, and only 13 percent is explained by its membership in a threedigit industry category. These results suggest that much of the variation
in gross job flows cannot be attributed to common movements across a
large proportion of establishments within particular industrial groups,
even when these groups are narrowly defined.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have introduced the relationships between
stock and flow measures in the labor market and, in so doing, have
defined gross job flows. We then show how, in practical terms, gross
job-flow measures are constructed from establishment-level data. This
demonstration is important for the subsequent analysis in this book
because it aids in an understanding of the relationship between the
actual measures of job flows that we use and the concept of job churning.
Statistics presented in this chapter demonstrate the pervasive level
of heterogeneity in the labor market. For example, we have documented the existence of simultaneous job creation and job destruction
in a narrowly defined industry, as well as the relative lack of explanatory power for gross job-flow rates of membership in a particular narrow industry. The previous chapter has shown a similar presence of
heterogeneity in openness and trade patterns across narrowly defined
industries. In subsequent chapters we will explore whether there is a
mapping between international factors and job flows in a way that
matches up divergent patterns across industries along these two dimensions. But first, to provide a context for that undertaking, we turn to a
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discussion of the existing research on the effect of international factors
on labor markets.

Notes
1. Gourinchas (1998,1999) also examined the response of job flows to real exchange
rate movements. Our analysis differs from and extends his in several ways, as we
explain in the next chapter.
2. These data are available at: <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/haltiwanger/download.htm>.
3. These data do not capture churning of jobs within an establishment since any single establishment is recorded as having job creation and no job destruction, job
destruction and no job creation, or neither job creation nor job destruction. Thus,
for example, a manufacturing plant that destroyed a number of assembly line jobs
and created the same number of engineering jobs would be recorded as having
neither job creation nor job destruction. Neither do these data identify movements
of particular workers within and between establishments. Thus, for example, a
plant may fire a worker and hire a replacement worker for the same job without
any change in its stock of jobs.
4. On these points, see Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) or the surveys by Fallick (1996) and Kletzer (1998b).
5. Due to the timing of the data surveys underlying the LRD, this difference represents March-to-March employment changes. Whenever we compare job-flow
data with other data that have a different chronological timing, we attempt to correct for the mismatch by using appropriate lags.
6. See Appendix C for details.
7. In this figure, the annual job flows data have been interpolated to a quarterly frequency to permit accurate plotting of business cycle dates.
8. This is an example of ANOVA (ANalysis Of VAriance). Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992) used similar techniques to make the analogous point about job reallocation, the level of detailed industries, and other plant characteristics.
9. Results from this particular year are broadly representative of results obtained
from any other particular year.

4
Literature Review
This chapter surveys research that attempts to explain and quantify
the effects of real exchange rates and international trade on employment. The survey provides a context for the research we present later in
this book. Our research on the influence of international factors on
gross job flows is directly related to, and an extension of, previous
studies of employment dynamics. However, as discussed in this chapter, the preponderance of these studies focus on changes in net employment rather than on job creation and job destruction.
The survey comprises three parts. The first section describes the
connection between international trade and labor markets, and it
explains how standard trade theory has had a limited view of this connection until recently. The second section reviews the early empirical
studies, which focused primarily on the relationship between international factors and net employment. Finally, the third section reviews
recent research based on the flow approach to labor markets, which
focuses on the relationship between international factors and the
dynamic processes of gross job and worker flows.
It is in this last area where our research on international factors and
gross job flows contributes to the literature. We introduce labor-flow
dynamics into the analysis of international trade and, in so doing, help
clarify the costs of adjustment associated with changes in international
factors. This analysis also highlights the role of international factors as
an important channel for allocative forces that drive labor-market
dynamics. We evaluate the importance for labor-market dynamics of
the real exchange rate and trade policy relative to other factors that
have been more extensively studied.
Before proceeding, we note that a voluminous body of research
considers the effects of international factors on real wages, skill-biased
technological change, and income distribution. This research is closely
related to the questions we pose and attempt to answer in this book, and
it should be integrated with them in future research. However, research
on wage-related issues is so vast and sufficiently distinct from our concern with dynamic employment responses that we do not take it up.
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Thus, a full review of the literature on trade and wages is beyond the
scope of this book.1

INTERNATIONAL FACTORS AND LABOR MARKETS
Trade and Unemployment

In his Ely Lecture, “The Challenge of High Unemployment,” Alan
Blinder (1988) identified the field of international trade as one of two
where theory had failed to sufficiently address the problem and consequences of unemployment. Blinder wrote:
Conditions of full employment are necessary to validate standard
propositions in trade theory. High unemployment calls many of
these propositions into question. Both the positive predictions of
trade theory and its normative prescriptions may be wrong. (p. 11)

This assessment did not lead Blinder to support barriers to free
trade, but he did conclude that it is necessary “to pursue a vigorous
full-employment policy so that displaced workers will be quickly
reemployed” (p. 11). In Blinder’s view, there is a large gap between
economists’ overwhelming and unswerving advocacy of free trade to
obtain long-run welfare gains on the one hand and the striking reality
of vehement opposition to free trade by many individuals, firms, and
interest groups on the other. In our view, the only way to bridge the gap
is to consider explicitly the short-run welfare costs associated with job
and worker reallocation, unemployment, and the destruction of human
capital.
Economists’ conclusions about the welfare gains from trade in the
long run derive from the standard Heckscher-Olin-Samuelson (HOS)
trade model, where factors of production are assumed to be homogeneous across sectors, and there are no impediments to the intersector
mobility of factors. In the HOS model, a change in the terms of trade
engenders reallocation of factors across sectors, but at no explicit cost.
Aggregate employment is constant across changes in underlying conditions in the static version of this model.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, this theoretical prediction seems to
have guided empirical research, which focused on net employment
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effects in aggregate sectors and, to a lesser extent, detailed industries.
In his survey of the literature, Baldwin (1994) reported that “The general findings of these inquiries is that the net employment effects of
changes in exports and imports have not been significant in OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries.” However, studies surveyed by Baldwin do find that “trade
changes have produced significant adverse employment effects in particular industries . . .” (pp. 13–14). The next section corroborates this
conclusion in more detail and with respect to real exchange rates.
Despite large effects on industry-level employment, the underlying
presumption of these studies is that the aggregate welfare gains far
exceed the cost incurred by factors, especially workers, that shift
industries or sectors. These studies largely ignore the adjustment costs
associated with changes in employment patterns across sectors, as well
as distributional effects, focusing instead on potential net welfare gains
in the aggregate.
Responding to Blinder’s challenge, Davidson, Martin, and Matusz
(1999) reconsidered the predictions of the HOS model by adding
unemployment that arises because trade-dislocated labor must search
for a new job in another sector. They found that some of the traditional
conclusions, including welfare implications, are modified or changed
altogether and depend on whether laborers are employed or unemployed (searching for a job). Their central conclusion is that unemployment rises in large, relatively capital-abundant countries that increase
their trade with small, relatively labor-abundant countries, and that the
unemployed workers in the large countries suffer welfare losses. This
unemployment-augmented HOS model bears similarities to the
Ricardo-Viner (RV) trade model where some factors of production are
completely immobile across sectors. Thus, the nature and process of
factor adjustment to trade are of critical importance in assessing the
impact of trade on factor markets.2
This important line of research underscores Blinder’s fundamental
critique of prior research on unemployment: “too much of our theoretical debate has taken place within the confining strictures of homogeneous labor” (emphasis added). In reality, factors of production are not
all perfectly mobile across sectors. In fact, workers and jobs are heterogeneous within sectors and industries, even within firms and establishments, so the process of matching the right workers and jobs is
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complex. Because of this pervasive heterogeneity, reallocation of labor
across sectors, industries, regions, firms, and establishments is very
costly and time consuming.
Although an important step in the right direction, the new efforts to
account for unemployment in measuring the net effects of international
trade are still incomplete. Increases in unemployment are proportional
to reductions in net employment (plus changes in the labor force).
However, changes in net employment significantly understate the magnitude of gross job destruction and creation occurring in the economy,
as we explain in the remainder of this section.
Labor-Market Flows

A microeconomic-based flow approach to labor markets has
become the dominant paradigm for modern macroeconomic theories of
unemployment and labor-market dynamics.3 This flow approach
explains the behavior of employment and unemployment by introducing dynamic changes in the number and location of workers and jobs.
In the flow approach, heterogeneous firms continuously offer a variety
of job opportunities, and heterogeneous workers (each of whom has
distinct skills) continuously offer their services. Thus, the labor market
is characterized by continuous search—firms seeking the best workers
and workers seeking the best jobs.4
Figure 4.1 provides a schematic diagram of labor-market stocks
and flows. The figure illustrates how workers and jobs flow among
stocks, or states, of the labor market. Employment, and other labor
stocks, typically have inflows and outflows from multiple sources and
thus may change for different reasons at different times. In particular,
the flows indicate that the labor market is in a constant state of flux and
that it is necessary to study the flows to understand how the stocks
change over time.
Consider first the labor-market stocks. Total net employment (E) is
the set of all matches (denoted by the saw-toothed intersection)
between heterogeneous workers who supply labor (Es) and the heterogeneous jobs offered by firms that demand labor (Ed). Note, importantly, that the levels of labor supply and demand are typically never
equal because there are always unemployed workers (U) and unfilled,
or vacant, jobs (V) arising from frictions associated with heterogeneity

Figure 4.1 Schematic Diagram of the Labor Market
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and the costs of matching. Unemployed workers do not fill vacancies
instantaneously because it takes time for workers to find the vacancies,
the skills of unemployed workers do not match the skill demands of the
vacancies, or the geographic location of the workers is different from
that of the vacancies.
The level of employment is jointly determined by the net result of
two types of labor-market flows, worker flows and job flows. On the
supply side of the labor market (Es), workers flow among three states
of the labor market: employment, unemployment, and not in the labor
force (N). Employment increases when the flows into employment (ne
and ue) rise, or the flows out of employment (en and eu) fall, or both.
Some workers flow from job to job (ee) but do not affect employment.
On the demand side of the labor market (Ed), jobs flow among firms
that continuously create new jobs (C) and destroy old jobs (D).
Employment increases when job creation (ce) rises and more vacant
jobs are filled (ve), or when job destruction (ed) falls, and fewer existing jobs become vacant (ev).
It is important to understand that worker flows and job flows are
not synonymous. For example, if unemployed workers merely replace
newly retired workers (i.e., both en and ue flows rise), employment
doesn’t change. Furthermore, these worker flows occur without
changes in the stock of jobs (labor demand) through greater job creation. Similarly, if a firm replaces newly destroyed jobs with newly
created jobs, and its employed workers are simply reassigned jobs
within the firm, then worker flows and employment do not change.
In practice, however, labor-market matching is much more complex, and all worker and job flows tend to occur simultaneously. Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996, chapter 6) and Bleakley, Ferris, and
Fuhrer (1999) showed that there are relatively steady correlations
among certain types of flows, but the connections are not one for one.
In general, the termination of existing matches via job flows (ed or ev)
generates worker flows (eu, en, and ee), which tend to raise unemployment. Likewise, the establishment of new matches via job flows (ce
and ve) also generates worker flows (ue, ne, and ee), which tend to
reduce unemployment. But, even in these instances, the link between
labor-market stocks is not one for one. Simply put, employment and
unemployment are not inextricably linked.5
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Abstracting from economic growth, the flow approach says that
even when employment reaches an equilibrium or steady state value,
the labor market is not at rest. The reason is that gross job and worker
flows are not zero when employment is in equilibrium. Individual
workers and individual jobs are involved continuously in matching and
rematching.
In fact, empirical estimates reported in the literature indicate that
gross flows are much larger than net flows such as employment
growth, which averages around 2 percent per year in the United States.
In manufacturing, job creation and destruction occur at annual rates of
about 10 percent each, implying a job reallocation rate of about 20
percent, compared with net employment growth in manufacturing of
only about –1 percent (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1996). Monthly
worker flows into and out of employment and unemployment also
occur at annual rates an order of magnitude larger than employment
growth (Blanchard and Diamond 1990; Bleakley, Ferris, and Fuhrer
1999). Monthly flows of workers directly from one employer to
another (ee) are even higher than other worker flows (Fallick and
Fleischman 2001).
Figure 4.1 helps explain why we focus on job flows rather than
worker flows in our investigation of the effects of international factors
on employment. Changes in real exchange rates and trade liberalization
directly affect the demand for labor; hence, they directly affect the pace
of job creation and destruction. These factors also may affect worker
flows but only indirectly, if at all. Given existing data, it is quite difficult empirically to identify worker flows resulting from job flows and
worker flows occurring for other (supply-side) reasons. For example,
job destruction caused by international factors may reduce employment if the workers whose jobs are destroyed move to unemployment
(eu) or leave the labor force (en). However, it will not reduce employment if the worker simply moves to another job (ee) that was created at
the same time, either by the same employer or by another. Furthermore,
workers connected to internationally open firms may move in and out
of the labor force (ne and en) or to and from unemployment (eu and ue)
for reasons having nothing to do with international factors.
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Labor-Market Adjustment Costs

Standard trade theory generally does not emphasize the costs associated with adjusting, or reallocating, factors of production.6 There are
two main reasons: the adjustment process is assumed to be transitory
and short-lived, and the benefits of trade are thought to far outweigh
the adjustment costs. However, the actual evidence in the literature on
the nature and duration of adjustment and on the net benefits of trade
liberalization is modest and incomplete, as we explain in this section.7
In the prevailing view, changes in international factors affect
aggregate employment only transitorily because workers eventually
are reallocated to other sectors or firms where they are most productive. This process may take some time, but the presumption is that
appropriate macroeconomic policy will return the economy to full
employment relatively quickly and at a low cost. Because internationally generated labor reallocation raises the efficiency of the aggregate
economy, aggregate welfare increases. Thus, at the aggregate level, it
appears that flexible exchange rates and more open trade policies provide something for nothing—higher welfare with no overall employment change, at least in the long run.
A study by Magee (1972) provided detailed estimates of the welfare gains from eliminating all U.S. trade-related restrictions in 1971.
Magee’s efforts are impressive, but this endeavor is so daunting that
the estimates must be considered extremely rough and incomplete.8
Nevertheless, he included estimates of both welfare gains and the
short-run labor-adjustment costs associated with the elimination of all
trade-related restrictions.
In estimating labor-adjustment costs, Magee took the traditional
aggregate, homogeneous labor approach criticized by Blinder. Adjustment costs are calculated solely as the income loss due to unemployment arising from net employment loss in the industries affected by the
relaxation of trade-related restrictions. Specifically, Magee calculated
adjustment costs as “the implied change in [net] employment, multiply
this by a wage rate and an assumed duration of unemployment, and
spread this loss equally over the five-year period that I assume industries require to adjust to changes in trade barriers and reach a new longrun equilibrium” (p. 680). Note that this methodology makes two
implicit assumptions that are critical to the results. It assumes that the
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dislocated workers are reemployed rather than replaced in the labor
force by new workers or reentrants, in which case dislocated workers
might experience long-term structural unemployment or leave the
labor force. More importantly, it assumes that the dislocated workers
receive the same wage once they are re-employed (or that the entrants
earn the same wage). In addition, Magee completely ignores direct
costs to firms and workers such as hiring and firing costs, retraining
costs, and relocation costs.
According to Magee’s calculations, the welfare gains from eliminating all U.S. trade-related restrictions would have swamped the associated costs of adjustment. He estimated that annual welfare gains
amounted to approximately 1 percent of Gross National Product (GNP)
in 1971, whereas estimated adjustment costs amounted to only 0.01
percent of GNP. This implies that the ratio of welfare gains to adjustment cost losses is approximately 100 to 1.9
Baldwin, Mutti, and Richardson (1980) drew similar conclusions.
They provided estimates of U.S. welfare gains and adjustment costs
associated with a 50 percent multilateral tariff reduction in the late
1970s (as opposed to Magee’s 100 percent reduction). Their adjustment cost estimates offered several improvements on Magee’s calculations, including controls for detailed demographic characteristics of
unemployed workers, positive income effects from export promotion,
and estimates of capital adjustment costs. They conclude: “In the
aggregate, the calculated gains from trade liberalization dwarf the measured adjustment costs by a ratio of almost 20 to 1” (p. 405, emphasis
added). Interestingly, it is not the inclusion of capital adjustment costs
that produces a smaller gain-to-cost ratio than Magee’s, because capital
adjustment costs account for only about 12 percent of total adjustment
costs.10
With welfare gains estimated to be at least 20 times greater than
adjustment costs, and perhaps 100 times greater or more, it is not surprising that many economists have essentially ignored adjustment costs
associated with changes in international factors. But, if the net gains to
trade are so large, why is there such breadth and depth of opposition to
introducing trade restrictions? One logical explanation is that adjustment costs are concentrated in a small number of workers and firms
who have much to gain from being very vocal, while the benefits are
highly diffuse and thus small—perhaps imperceptibly small—to most
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economic agents. However, another possibility is that adjustment costs
are larger than previously estimated or believed. If so, ignoring adjustment costs becomes less tenable.11
One reason adjustment costs might be larger is that labor reallocation may involve fixed costs of reallocation in addition to income loss
during unemployment. Recent research has begun to recognize the
existence and potential importance of per-worker adjustment costs for
each trade-dislocated worker, as in Fung and Staiger (1996), Furusawa
and Lai (1998), and Davidson and Matusz (2001a). These fixed costs
may include time and resource costs of retraining or relocating, among
other things. However, these studies focus on net employment changes
at the industry level rather than the much larger gross flows at the
establishment level. If adjustment costs are proportional to gross job
and worker flows, which are roughly an order of magnitude larger than
net employment growth, then adjustment costs might turn out to be an
order of magnitude larger than previously estimated. To our knowledge, the only other study that raises this issue is Kletzer’s (2001) analysis of imports and worker flows.
If adjustment costs are proportional to gross flows, then the net
welfare gains from trade would be considerably smaller than previously believed. For example, the gain-to-loss ratios could drop to 10 to
1 in Magee’s study and only 2 to 1 in the Baldwin, Mutti, and Richardson (1980) study. The calibrated model of Davidson and Matusz
(2001a) indicates that short-run adjustment costs could amount to 90
percent of the long-run gains from trade in some cases. Of course, any
projections such as these are hypothetical at this point, and they need
empirical verification as well as theoretical consideration. But it seems
worth exploring these ideas, given the stakes involved. In any event,
the magnitudes of the ratios suggested by gross-flow-based analysis
seem to have the potential to better explain the breadth and intensity of
opposition to free trade. At a minimum, they suggest that adjustment
costs and the redistribution of gains from trade may merit more attention from economists than they have received.
In contrast to standard theory, the flow approach to labor markets
inherently emphasizes the simultaneous occurrence of “winners and
losers.” Gross job and worker flows in response to changes in international factors imply that some individual firms and workers end up
worse off while others end up better off. Economists typically assume
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that aggregate welfare gains from trade are large but that welfare costs
typically associated with adjustment to changes in international competition are small. However, a complete and accurate assessment of the
true net welfare gains from international openness depends crucially on
a complete and accurate assessment of the true welfare losses associated with these adjustment costs.
Unfortunately, there is very little evidence on the magnitude of the
welfare losses associated with the labor-market effects of international
openness. The vast majority of evidence, summarized in the next section, is based on net employment changes in aggregate sectors, such as
manufacturing, or broad industries that may exhibit modest differentials in openness. But the flow approach to labor markets informs us
that net employment changes significantly understate the magnitude of
gross flows in labor markets, even within detailed industries. Thus, a
more complete and accurate estimate of the labor-adjustment costs
associated with international factors must focus on the impact of these
factors on gross worker and job flows. In particular, even when net
employment is unchanged, international factors can induce significant
costs of adjustment through job destruction and creation.
Many specific types of labor-adjustment costs arise in connection
with job and worker flows induced by international factors. These costs
can be summarized broadly in two types. One type is costs to the firm
associated with the hiring, training, and firing of workers. The other is
costs to fired or dislocated workers, which take several distinct forms:
1) spells of unemployment, 2) loss of firm-specific human capital, 3)
costs associated with moving geographic location to find a new job,
and 4) general retraining for a new job. The first two take the form of
income loss; the latter two are out-of-pocket expenses.12
Very few studies quantify these labor-adjustment costs directly
because detailed data are not readily available and because it is inherently difficult to quantify these costs. Instead, most efforts focus on
inferring the costs indirectly from econometric models of labordemand and adjustment-cost functions (see Hamermesh and Pfann
1996). Many of these studies use aggregate data, but some actually use
firm-level data. However, the most precise and complete estimates
come from studies of European economies, which may have higher
costs of adjustment to labor flows than does the U.S. economy.
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Abowd and Kramarz (1997, p. 1) claimed to “present the first
direct evidence on the fixed costs associated with hiring and separations [firing] of various types, the asymmetries in these costs, and the
shape of the adjustment cost functions.”13 They used a unique database
from France containing matched worker-firm data on a host of labor
variables, including among the best available estimates of direct adjustment costs to firms. Abowd and Kramarz found that the cost of firing a
worker (average for all reasons) amounts to 56 percent of the average
annual labor cost to the firm of that worker. Put another way, the cost is
more than one-half, or 6.7 months, of the worker’s annual compensation. The cost of firing a worker for economic reasons is even greater,
amounting to 126 percent or 15.1 months of annual compensation.14 In
contrast, the total cost of hiring and training a worker amounts to about
5 percent or 0.6 month of annual compensation. French firing costs are
approximately linear with respect to the number of workers fired, and
there is a fixed cost attributable to personnel departments. This adjustment cost structure likely leads to large, discrete labor adjustment at
the microeconomic level.
Another source of direct evidence on labor turnover costs is Del
Boca and Rota (1998), a study of 61 primarily small and medium-sized
manufacturing companies in Italy. They estimated that hiring costs
(including training) range between 2.0 and 2.6 months of labor costs,
and firing costs range from less than one month to 20 months of labor
costs, depending on the nature of the separation. These cost estimates
are somewhat larger than the Abowd and Kramarz estimates for
France. Unfortunately, we do not have analogous estimates for U.S.
firms.
Empirical evidence on the second type of adjustment cost, the costs
suffered by dislocated workers, also is limited largely by data availability. Nevertheless, surveys of this literature by Hamermesh (1989), Fallick (1996), and Kletzer (1998b) all draw the same general conclusions.
Workers dislocated from their jobs by international or other factors are
likely to experience unusually long unemployment spells and declines
in their post-displacement income. The actual unemployment spells and
income losses of displaced workers depend heavily on individual
worker characteristics, such as age, work experience, and industry.
Some displaced workers can even earn higher incomes on their subsequent jobs. More typical, however, is one of the leading studies in this
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field, Jacobsen, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993a,b). They found that dislocated workers with high job tenure and significant firm-specific
human capital experience average earnings losses of 25 percent of their
predisplacement annual income.
In addition to unemployment spells and earnings losses, dislocated
workers can also face substantial welfare losses associated with other
pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs of adjustment. Workers who must
ultimately move to another geographic region to obtain employment
may face pecuniary losses, such as moving costs or capital losses on
homes, and nonpecuniary losses, such as family separations or broken
social ties as well. To our knowledge, there are no concrete estimates
of these types of adjustment costs, but they surely factor into a complete calculation of social welfare.

INTERNATIONAL FACTORS AND NET EMPLOYMENT

Virtually all early studies of the relationship between international
factors and labor markets focused on net employment, either at an
aggregate level, such as manufacturing, or in industries that have relatively intense exposure to international competition.15 Table 4.1 summarizes these studies, which we discuss in detail in this section. A
central question of these studies is whether net employment declines in
response to increased international competition. International competition includes the effects of (real) exchange rates, the volume of exports
and imports, and trade policies such as tariffs or quotas.
Interest in the relationship between international trade and employment in U.S. manufacturing industries grew in the early 1980s as the
trade balance registered record deficits, but trade deficits were far from
the only determinant of manufacturing employment during this period.
In the early 1980s, the U.S. economy suffered its deepest recession
since the Great Depression of the 1930s. An important task facing
researchers is to disentangle the effects of international factors from the
effects of other contemporaneous events.
Isolating the effects of international competition is often more than
just an academic exercise. For example, an industry that petitions the
International Trade Commission (ITC) for actions to help alleviate

Sample, Industries, countries (U.S.
periodicity unless specified otherwise) Dependent variable
Regressor
1973–1983, Blast Furnaces and Steel Hours of employment for Ratio of tariff-inclusive
monthly
Mill Products
production workers
price of foreign steel to
(SIC 3312)
U.S. price index
Grossman
1969–1979, Nine import-competing Hours of employment;
Import prices
(1987)
monthly
three-digit and four-digit average hourly earnings
SIC industries (separate of production workers
regressions)
Branson and 1970–1986 Twenty two-digit SIC
Employment of production Multilateral dollar real
Love (1988) quarterly
manufacturing industries or non-production
exchange rate
(separate regressions)
workers
Article
Grossman
(1986)

Revenga
(1992)

Burgess and
Knetter
(1998)
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Table 4.1 Studies on the Relationship between International Factors and Labor Markets
Finding
Significant unitaryelasticity

Significant effects for:
employment—one
industry, wages—three
industries.
Significant in 13
industries:
elasticities from 0.13–
0.65, with largest for
durable goods and
production workers.
1977–1987, Thirty-eight three-digit Production workers:
Industry-specific import Employment elasticity =
quarterly
and four-digit SIC
number, average number prices interacted with
0.23; with import price ×
manufacturing industries of weekly hours, average import share
import share, elasticity =
(pooled cross-section)
hourly earnings
0.16 (at mean import
share); elasticity = 0.29
at import share 1 s.d.
above mean.
1970–1988, Fourteen industries (two- Growth rate of
For each country, average Significant coefficient of
annual
digit SIC) in G-7
employment in particular of six bilateral G-7 real expected sign in > 25%
countries (95 separate
industries
exchange rates
of regressions, wrong
regressions)
sign and significant in
3%.

Campa and
Goldberg
(2001)

1972–1995, Two-digit SIC industries Number of jobs, total
Industry-specific RER,
annual
(panels with all
hours, wages, overtime decomposed into
industries, low and high hours, overtime wages
transitory and
markup, separate)
permanent, interacted
with exports or
intermediate imports
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Real exchange rate
significant for number of
jobs, overtime
employment in lowmarkup industries
(interact with both
exports and imported
intermediate goods).
Goldberg and 1971–1995, Two-digit SIC industries, Net employment wages Industry-specific import Differences across import
Tracy (2000) annual
separated by U. S. states
and export real
and export real exchange
exchange rate
rate, unambiguous
employment response in
13 of 20 industries.
Displacement rates (gross Price of imported goods Export sales significantly
Kletzer (1998a,
Three-digit CICa
industries
worker flows)
for particular industries, lower displacement
2000)
export sales
rates, not so with import
prices.
Goldberg,
1977–1997, Current population
Probability of changing Two-digit SIC industry- Exchange rate
Tracy, and
annual
surveys, 18 two-year
jobs for men across
specific import and
significantly affects job
Aaronson
panel data sets
successive surveys
export exchange rates.
change probability
(1999)
during appreciation but
not depreciation, and
sign differs for import
and export real exchange
rate.
Gourinchas
1972–1988, Gross job flows (LRD) Job creation rate
Developed from trend of Appreciation raises both
(1998)
quarterly
68 “traded” and 35
Job destruction rate
four-digit SIC industry- creation and destruction,
“nontraded” industries
specific real exchange
and depreciation lowers
(of possible 450)
rate
both rates.
a
Commerce Industrial Classification.
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international competition must show that import pressure is the most
significant cause of its injury. In two separate studies, Gene Grossman
studied the effects of import competition on employment. One of these
studies focused on the U.S. steel industry, and the other considered
nine U.S. manufacturing industries.
Grossman’s (1986) study of the steel industry involved the estimation of employment equations, in which the dependent variable was the
average weekly hours of employment of production workers in the
Blast Furnaces and Steel Mill industry (SIC number 3312). The regression uses monthly data over the period from 1973 to 1983. One of the
regressors was the ratio of the dollar price of foreign steel, inclusive of
any tariff costs, to an overall U.S. price index. The tariff-inclusive dollar price of foreign steel is the product of the foreign-currency price of
steel, the relevant bilateral exchange rate, and a tariff rate drawn from
the University of Michigan model of World Production and Trade.
There were two large changes in the tariff rate over the sample period,
a tariff surcharge during the Nixon administration and the Tokyo round
of tariff reductions, which concluded in 1979.
Grossman found a statistically significant unitary elasticity of the
relative cost of foreign steel on the hours of employment of production
workers. But when comparing the actual time path of workers’ hours
and a counterfactual in which the tariff-inclusive domestic-currency
price of foreign steel is unchanged, he found that, for the most part,
actual hours exceed the hours estimated to have prevailed had the price
of foreign steel remained unchanged. The exception here, the case
where simulated hours fall short of actual hours, is during the period of
the rapid dollar appreciation at the end of his sample from mid 1982
through 1983. Thus, Grossman concluded that the source of the significance of the price of foreign steel on employment is changes in the
exchange rate rather than changes in tariff rates or changes in the foreign-currency price of foreign steel. He also noted that the exchange
rate represents the single biggest determinant of hours of employment
by production workers except for the secular shift away from employment in SIC 3312; a time trend in these regressions indicated a significant reduction of hours of 9 percent per year.
In subsequent research, Grossman (1987) found less evidence of
the effect of import prices in other manufacturing industries. This
paper applied the methodology of his earlier work to a study of the
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effects of the price of imports on average hourly earnings and production-worker employment hours in nine manufacturing sectors. The nine
sectors he studied were either three-digit or four-digit SIC industries
that are commonly thought of as competing with imports, such as
Leather Tanning (SIC 311), Ball and Roller Bearings (SIC 3562), and
Radio and Television (SIC 365). The sample consists of monthly
observations over the period of 1969 to 1979. He found that a significant reduction in import prices adversely affected employment in only
one of these nine industries, Radio and Television. Significant effects
of import prices on wages were found for only three industries: Leather
Tanning, Ball and Roller Bearings, and Photography Equipment (SIC
386), and the elasticities were generally small.
Grossman’s sample period ends in the midst of the great dollar
appreciation of the 1980s. Branson and Love (1988) addressed a similar question to Grossman (1987), but their focus was on the effects on
employment of the exchange rate during the entire period of the appreciation of the dollar during the first half of the 1980s. Their sample
covers the period 1970 to the first quarter of 1986. While Grossman
targeted import competition, Branson and Love, by using the real
exchange rate and a wider sample of industries, implicitly focused on
both import competition and export promotion. Branson and Love estimated separate regressions for each of the 20 two-digit SIC manufacturing industries using quarterly data. The key dependent variable in
their study is a multilateral dollar real exchange rate. This is one way in
which their work differs from that of Grossman, who used separate
sector-by-sector foreign price series. Branson and Love’s work is also
distinguished from Grossman’s research by their running of separate
regressions for employment of production workers and employment of
nonproduction workers.
Branson and Love found a significant negative coefficient on the
exchange rate (that is, an appreciation reduces employment, and conversely) in 13 of the 20 industries they studied. Among the significant
coefficients on the real exchange rate, the elasticities range from 0.13
to 0.65, with the larger values found in durable goods industries and
among production workers. Especially strong effects are found in the
Primary Metals, Fabricated Metal Products, and Non-electrical
Machinery industries. These three industries, along with the Transportation Equipment industry, account for two-thirds of the one million
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jobs they estimated were lost as a result of the dollar appreciation as
compared to a counterfactual case of no appreciation in the first half of
the 1980s. As with the results presented by Grossman, they attributed a
bigger change in employment to the change in the exchange rate than
to other factors, such as the change in the price of energy, although they
too found that the trend change in employment accounts for more of
the reduction in employment than does the change in the real exchange
rate.
The estimate by Branson and Love of the loss of one million manufacturing jobs in response to the dollar appreciation of the first half of
the 1980s is consistent with the results presented by Revenga (1992).
This similarity is striking because Revenga studied only a subset of relatively disaggregated manufacturing firms consisting of 38 three-digit
and four-digit SIC manufacturing industries. This subset represented
72 percent of total manufacturing imports and 35 percent of total manufacturing employment in 1985. The period Revenga studies, 1977 to
1987, also differs from the longer sample of Branson and Love but, of
course, both samples include the dollar appreciation episode of the first
half of the 1980s. The key dependent variable in Revenga’s regressions
is industry-specific import prices. For each industry, Revenga constructed this variable by using the weighted average of bilateral dollar
exchange rates where the weights represent the U.S. imports from the
respective countries. She regressed this variable, as well as a number of
controls, on quarterly data for both employment (measured either as
the number of production workers or as the average number of personhours per week) and the average hourly earnings of production workers. Among the pooled cross-section regressions that she ran, her most
significant estimate is an employment elasticity of –0.23. Given
Revenga’s estimate of a decline in import prices of about 20 percent
over the 6-year period from 1980 to 1985, and total manufacturing
employment that annually averaged 19.4 million jobs over this period,
the estimate of the annual average job loss is 0.15 million manufacturing jobs.16 Thus, over this 6-year period, Revenga’s estimates suggest a
loss of 0.9 million manufacturing jobs, an estimate strikingly close to
that of Branson and Love.17
Revenga’s research also documented the wide variation in exposure to international competition across the industries she studied, a
result that is particularly relevant for our research presented later in this
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book. Revenga reported that the ratio of imports to total output across
the industries in her sample ranges from 0.04 (for Meat Products, SIC
2010) to 0.70 (for Apparel, SIC 2380). She divided her industries into
three groups based on share of imports. Over the period 1980 to 1987,
the fall in employment across these groups is quite diverse, with a
reduction of 28 percent in the high import share group, 14 percent in
the medium import share group, and 8 percent in the low import share
group. Revenga also noted, however, that the standard deviation within
each group is quite high, a point consistent with the statistics presented
in the previous chapter and one that suggests the importance of considering gross job flows rather than net employment changes. The wide
differences across import share groups in the mean values of net
employment change motivate Revenga’s use of a regression specification that interacts import share with import price. This specification
also emerges from the model we present in Chapter 5 and implement in
our empirical analysis in Chapter 6. Revenga estimated elasticities of
employment with respect to import prices equal to 0.16 for an industry
with the mean level of import share (equal to 18 percent) and 0.29 for
an industry with an import share one standard deviation above the
mean (that is, import share equal to 29 percent). The estimated elasticities of wages with respect to the exchange rate are much lower, ranging
from 0.06 to 0.09. Revenga suggested that these differences in the relative size of elasticities reflect a situation where workers are highly
mobile across industries but not across skill groups.18
The studies mentioned above do not distinguish between import
competition from developing and industrial nations. A noteworthy
aspect of the expansion of trade between the United States and the rest
of the world, however, is that imports from developing nations represented about a quarter of all U.S. imports in 1970 and 1980 and then
rose to 32 percent of all imports in 1990 and 38 percent of all imports
in 1996. An often-voiced concern is that trade with developing nations
represents a greater threat to manufacturing employees in the United
States (especially those with relatively low skill levels) than a comparable amount of trade with industrial countries.
Sachs and Shatz (1994) attempted to decompose the role played by
trade with developing countries from that of trade with industrial countries in altering employment in the United States. They based their
analysis on a data set consisting of the amount of bilateral trade of 51
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three-digit U.S. manufacturing industries with each of 150 countries in
the years 1978 and 1990. They calculated a counterfactual value of
trade that would have occurred had the pattern of bilateral trade in
1990 been the same as the pattern of trade in 1978, assuming a constant
relationship between industry shipments and industry final demand
across those two years. These estimates are then used to calculate
employment patterns in 1990 had the 1978 pattern of trade prevailed in
that year. Sachs and Shatz concluded that employment levels in 1990
were 7.2 percent lower for production workers and 2.1 percent lower
for nonproduction workers than would have been the case had the pattern of bilateral trade in that year been the same as the pattern of bilateral trade in 1978. They stated that almost all of the difference between
the actual and the calculated counterfactual employment is due to a tilt
in trade toward developing countries. But, as pointed out in the published comments on this paper by Deardorff (1994), the correlation
between trade and labor-market outcomes does not address questions
of causality since both trade and employment could be responding to
other factors that changed between 1978 and 1990, such as trade liberalization, the (exogenous) growth of labor-abundant foreign economies, and technical change.
This problem of joint causality cited by Deardorff is probably less
pronounced for the aforementioned studies of the effect of dollar
exchange rates on United States employment. It is more reasonable,
when using annual data, to assume that changes in real dollar exchange
rates are not driven by contemporaneous events originating in the U.S.
labor market for narrowly defined industries.19 Regression analysis
allows one to control for factors such as monetary policy and fiscal
policy that jointly affect aggregate labor-market developments and dollar exchange rates. It may be more difficult to control for joint causation between trade patterns and employment, especially over a period
of a decade or more.
All of the studies on the effects of exchange rate changes on
employment cited above look only at labor-market responses in the
United States. Burgess and Knetter (1998) expanded the scope of analysis by considering the effects of the real exchange rate on manufacturing employment in the G-7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Separate regressions were run for 14 industries in each country (although data are not
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available for three of the potential 98 industry-country groups). The
industry categories, based on an OECD classification, correspond
approximately to two-digit SIC industries and cover manufacturing as
well as agriculture, mining, finance, construction, transport services,
and wood products. The regressions use annual data over the period
from 1970 to 1988. The dependent variable is the growth rate of total
employees of the particular industry. The exchange rate series used in
the regressions are simple averages of the seven bilateral exchange
rates for each of the seven countries with respect to the other members
of the G-7.
Burgess and Knetter reported significant coefficients on the real
exchange rate of the expected sign (that is, an appreciation reduces
employment growth, and conversely) in more than one-quarter of the
95 regressions they estimated. The coefficient on the real exchange rate
is of the opposite sign and significant in only 3 percent of the regressions. The country with the highest average estimated response of
employment growth to the real exchange rate for the full set of industries is the United Kingdom, followed by the United States, followed
by Germany and Japan. The estimated speed of adjustment is also
faster in the United States and the United Kingdom than in Germany or
Japan. Using the full panel, Burgess and Knetter found that the only
country with a responsiveness of employment growth to the real
exchange rate that is significantly different from the United States’ is
the United Kingdom.
The research cited above tends to find a significant effect of the
real exchange rate on employment, which contrasts with the general
tenor of the results of Campa and Goldberg (2001). Campa and Goldberg suggested that the source of the difference between their results
and those of either Branson and Love, or of Revenga, lies in the way in
which they account for differences in the scope and type of currency
exposure across industries. They noted that there are three channels
through which the exchange rate affects labor demand: import penetration, export orientation, and the use of imported inputs. The first two of
these channels would be associated with a situation where an appreciation lowers labor demand and, consequently, reduces employment.
This is the direction of causation that the previously mentioned studies
considered, but the third channel, the use of imported inputs, tilts the
exchange rate response in the other direction, since an appreciation
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lowers the cost of production and, given an appropriate cross-elasticity
of demand for labor and other inputs, increases labor demand and
employment.
Campa and Goldberg captured the different channels through
which the exchange rate influences labor demand and employment by
using, in their regressions, the product of the exchange rate and a measure of the level of industry exports and, separately, the product of the
exchange rate and a measure of the use of imported intermediate goods
by an industry. The high correlation across industries of import penetration and imported intermediate use precludes Campa and Goldberg
from including the product of the exchange rate and a measure of
import penetration as well. They used both a multilateral real exchange
rate, which is common across all industries, and a real exchange rate
that reflects the trade patterns of particular industries. They reported
that the results with either series are similar and, therefore, only presented results using industry-specific exchange rates. The exchange
rates are decomposed into their permanent (nonstationary) and transitory (stationary) components, using the technique of Beveridge and
Nelson (1981). The dependent variables studied include number of
jobs, total hours worked, industry wages, overtime hours, and overtime
wages. The regressions on number of jobs, total hours, and industry
wages use only the permanent component of the exchange rate, while
the regressions on overtime hours and overtime wages use only the
transitory component. The observations represent annual data at the
two-digit SIC level over the period 1972 to 1995. All the variables in
the regressions are first differences but for lagged levels of the dependent variables. Campa and Goldberg ran both time series panels using
data from all industries, panels in which they split the sample into lowmarkup and high-markup industries, and separate regressions for individual manufacturing industries.20
The results presented by Campa and Goldberg suggest the importance of splitting the sample by markup, since there are no instances of
significant effects of the exchange rate on any of their dependent variables for high-markup industries. But, for the low-markup subsample,
there is evidence of a significant effect of both the exchange rate interacted with exports and the exchange rate interacted with imported
intermediate goods on the number of jobs and overtime employment.
In addition, the coefficient on the product of the exchange rate and

Literature Review 71

exports is significant in the full-sample overtime hours regression. The
industry wage regressions include significant coefficients both on
exchange rate terms for the subsample of low-markup industries and
on the product of the exchange rate and exports for the full sample. The
overtime wage regression includes a significant coefficient on the
product of the exchange rate and exports for the low-markup sample
only.
This distinction in the pattern of significance, between high- and
low-markup industries, is also evident in the estimated employment
and wage elasticities derived from separate regressions on data for
two-digit industries. For example, the five largest estimated elasticities
(evaluated using average shares of exports and imported inputs) for
number of jobs with respect to the exchange rate are all in industries
that are classified as low markup. These industries include Leather and
Leather Products (elasticity = –0.20), Petroleum and Coal Products
(elasticity = –0.12), Primary Metal Products (elasticity = –0.09), Furniture and Fixtures (elasticity = –0.08), and Fabricated Metal Products
(elasticity = –0.07). These estimated elasticities are all significant at
the 5 percent level and represent the only significant estimated elasticities for total hours with respect to the exchange rate among the 20
industries. Likewise, these five industries, along with Textile Mill
Products, represent the full set of industries with a significant elasticity
of total hours with respect to the exchange rate. In fact, arranging
industries by the size of the estimated elasticities of total hours yields
the same order as in the case of the ranking by the elasticity of number
of jobs. But, for each industry, the estimated elasticity is larger for total
hours than for number of jobs, with significant estimates ranging from
–0.28 (for Leather and Leather Products) to –0.07 (for Textile Mill
Products).
Campa and Goldberg found relatively few industries in which
there is a significant effect of the real exchange rate on total employment as compared to the results of others, such as Revenga. Even
among industries in which Campa and Goldberg found significant
results, the estimated elasticities (evaluated at the mean level of the
interaction terms) are all less than Revenga’s estimate of an elasticity
of –0.23 for her pooled sample. There could be quite a few reasons for
these differences, including differences in both sample periods and
industries studied.21 Also, there are differences in estimation, notably
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the decomposition of the exchange rate by Campa and Goldberg. As
will be seen, the results we present in Chapter 6 are more supportive of
a role for the exchange rate in affecting total employment than is the
case with the results presented by Campa and Goldberg.
In another paper, Goldberg and Tracy (2000) analyzed the effect of
real exchange rate movements on employment and wages in the United
States using data disaggregated by two-digit industry as well as by
state. As in Campa and Goldberg, the key regressors are industry-specific import and export real exchange rates constructed by weighting
(separately for imports and exports) the bilateral real exchange rates of
U.S. trading partners in each two-digit industry for each year and measures of the importance of exports and imported inputs across industries and states. Goldberg and Tracy found that appreciations of the
dollar relative to the currencies of export partners are associated with
reductions in employment, while appreciations of the dollar relative to
the currencies of imported input providers are associated with
increased employment. Their results suggest, however, that there is
considerable heterogeneity in these effects across industries and states.
They found that employment is unambiguously responsive to exchange
rate movements in only 13 of the 20 industries examined.

INTERNATIONAL FACTORS AND GROSS FLOWS

The studies cited in the preceding section focus on changes in
aggregate net employment, either at the sector or at the industry level.
However, aggregate net employment masks the extensive volume of
gross job and worker flows underlying labor markets. Consequently, a
new literature has emerged recently with a small but growing number
of studies of the effects of international factors on labor-market flows.
In this section, we review this nascent literature on international factors
and gross labor-market flows in two parts. The first part focuses on
studies of job flows; the second part focuses on studies of worker
flows.
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Job Flows

Studies of job flows look for the effects of international factors on
job creation and destruction, ce and ed in Figure 4.1. Unfortunately,
data on cv and vd are not available. The job-flow approach assumes a
direct connection between international factors and the total demand
for labor at particular production sites or establishments.22 Individual
establishments will create and destroy jobs (i.e., expand or contract the
level of employment) in response to changes in international conditions.
The first analysis of job flows and international factors is Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996, chapter 3). They reported average rates
of U.S. manufacturing job flows for 1973 to 1986 by quintiles of fourdigit SIC industries sorted according to their exposure to international
trade (their table 3.5). Exposure is defined in terms of import penetration, the ratio of imports to imports plus domestic output, and in terms
of export share, the ratio of exports to domestic output. They found:
Strikingly, the table shows no systematic relationship between the
magnitude of gross job flows and exposure to international trade.
The only aspect of table 3.5 suggesting that international trade
reduces job security is the large rate of gross job destruction
among industries with a very high import penetration ratio . . . On
balance, the evidence is highly unfavorable to the view that international trade exposure systematically reduces job security. (pp.
48–49)

This apparent lack of a connection between international trade and
job flows largely is attributable to the long-run nature of their analysis.
They compared the 14-year averages of job flows and trade exposure,
but one would not necessarily expect to find a connection between
average job flows and average trade exposure. Factors determining
average trade exposure include resource endowments, geography,
transportation costs, exchange rate policies, and free trade political philosophies. In contrast, factors determining average job flows include
costs of hiring and firing workers, barriers to entry and exit of firms
from markets, the pace of technological change, product and process
innovation, and government labor-market policies. There is no wellestablished theoretical or empirical reason for a connection between

74 Klein, Schuh, and Triest

these two sets of underlying factors that determine the long-run averages.
On the other hand, there are good reasons to expect a correlation
between job flows and changes in international factors at higher frequencies. Changes in the exchange rate and changes in trade restrictions (tariffs, quotas, etc.) are likely to induce factor reallocation across
firms and industries, unless the changes are very small or very transitory. We would expect the year-to-year movements in job flows and
trade exposure to be closely correlated, and thus a time series analysis
would be more likely to reveal such correlation.
Gourinchas (1998) offered the first time-series analysis of international factors and gross job flows. He used vector autoregression
(VAR) models to estimate the effects of real exchange rates on job creation and destruction during the period of 1972 to 1988 using quarterly
job-flow data from Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh at the four-digit SIC
industry level. Industries are classified as traded, nontraded, or other,
using export share and import penetration ratios.23 He restricted his
sample to 103 of a possible 450 industries, focusing on the 68 industries that are the most involved in international trade (his “traded”
group) or the 35 industries least involved in international trade (his
“nontraded” group). An industry-specific real exchange rate is calculated for each of the 103 industries used in the regressions. These
industry-specific exchange rates are the weighted average of real bilateral dollar exchange rates, with weights reflecting the proportion of
trade with a particular country undertaken by that industry over the
entire sample period. He used the deviation from trend of the logarithm
of the level of industry-specific real exchange rates in the regressions.
Gourinchas reported that real exchange rates move job creation
and destruction in the same direction in traded industries but have little
or no effect on job flows in nontraded industries. A 10 percent appreciation (increase above trend) raises job destruction by 0.44 percent and
raises job creation by 0.17 percent in traded industries over three quarters, thereby reducing net employment by 0.27 percent and raising job
reallocation by 0.61 percent. A 10 percent depreciation produces
simultaneous declines in job destruction and creation of the same magnitudes, thereby reducing job reallocation by 0.61 percent. Thus, real
exchange rates have allocative effects on jobs whereby appreciations
stimulate job reallocation and depreciations inhibit job reallocation, the
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latter producing a so-called “chill” in reallocative activity. This result
contrasts with the typical conclusion from most previous studies of
U.S. job flows, which find that aggregate shocks tend to be dominant.
That is, job creation and destruction tend to respond to standard macroeconomic shocks in opposite directions, with job destruction rising relatively more than job creation falls. Consequently, Gourinchas’s work
is among the first to demonstrate the presence of a contemporaneous
allocative effect.24
In a closely related study, Gourinchas (1999) found that the real
exchange rate affects gross job flows even more in France than in the
United States, but he did not find evidence of contemporaneous allocative effects. He estimated an analogous VAR system using annual
French manufacturing data on net and gross employment for two-digit
industries from 1984 to 1992. Once again, Gourinchas identified a
selected sample of industries classified as tradable according to their
export shares and import penetration ratios. He found that a 10 percent
increase in the real exchange rate in tradable industries reduces job creation by 7.1 percent and increases job destruction by 2.4 percent, thus
reducing net employment by 9.5 percent.
These results for France differ from his U.S. results in three ways.
First, the job-flow responses are an order of magnitude larger in
France, reflecting both greater openness and more sensitivity to international factors. Second, job creation and destruction move in opposite
directions in France, rather than in the same direction. This response is
similar to the bulk of U.S. job-flow studies and suggests the real
exchange rates exert more important aggregate effects than allocative
effects in France. Third, job creation is more responsive than job
destruction, rather than vice versa as in the U.S. data.
Both Gourinchas studies offer dynamic heterogeneous-agent models to explain the empirical results. The model in Gourinchas (1998)
extends the matching framework of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
to include a tradable and nontradable production sector with a relative
price that represents the real exchange rate. Fluctuations in the real
exchange rate lower the job-matching rate, which induces a simultaneous increase in both job creation and destruction (and therefore job
reallocation) with a greater short-run response of destruction. This
dynamic pattern fits the U.S. data but not the French data, so the model
in Gourinchas (1999) introduces heterogeneous vintage capital, similar
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in spirit to the work of Caballero and Hammour (1996). Match-specific
capital and inefficient contracting prevent wages from adjusting sufficiently to unanticipated real exchange rate movements. Job destruction
thus rises immediately, and job creation falls somewhat before eventually rising as unemployed workers are rematched.
The results in this book build on our earlier work (Klein, Schuh,
and Triest 2003), which extended and modified Gourinchas’s results
for the United States. We used essentially the same data except that we
include all four-digit industries and explicitly account for the fact that
openness varies across industries and time. We also developed a multisector model of firms with heterogeneous exposure to international
trade. The model allowed us to derive estimating equations for job creation and destruction that control for a host of industry-specific variables not included by Gourinchas, in addition to aggregate variables
similar to those included in his VARs. Perhaps most importantly, we
showed that the growth rate, rather than the level, of the real exchange
rate influences job flows. Furthermore, we decomposed the exchange
rate into trend and cyclical components.
Our results show that for all U.S. industries, and controlling for
industry-level openness, changes in the growth of the real exchange
rate influence job destruction but not job creation. A 10 percent appreciation (increase in growth) raises job destruction by 0.33 percent and
lowers net employment by a similar amount over three quarters (job
creation falls 0.02 percent, but the response is insignificant). These
results, which are consistent with the bulk of previous job-flows studies, suggest that Gourinchas’s finding of an allocative effect for real
exchange rates appears to be attributable to his sample limitations,
omission of industry-level controls, and specification of the real
exchange rate.
However, by decomposing real exchange rates into trend and cyclical components, we showed that both aggregate and allocative forces
are at work through exchange rates. The responses of job flows in the
industry with median openness are markedly different for moderate
appreciations of the trend and cyclical components of the real
exchange rate.25 A moderate appreciation of the trend real exchange
rate has purely allocative effects—job creation and destruction both
increase by about 0.4 percent, so job reallocation rises about 0.7 percent, but net employment essentially is unchanged. This result is simi-

Literature Review 77

lar to the results reported by Gourinchas. In contrast, a moderate
appreciation of the cyclical component of the real exchange rate has
primarily aggregate effects—job destruction rises about 0.7 percent
and net employment declines by the same magnitude because the effect
on job creation is essentially zero. The aggregate effects dominate the
allocative effects when the model is estimated using the actual real
exchange rate. All job-flow responses are roughly three times larger for
the industry at the 90th percentile of the openness distribution.
Davidson and Matusz (2001b) also used the Davis, Haltiwanger,
and Schuh (DHS) job-flows data to conduct empirical tests of the ideas
advanced in their earlier work with Martin on trade and search generated unemployment.26 They argued that firms must pay compensating
wage differentials associated with job and worker turnover rates. Those
firms with low job destruction rates and high job creation rates will
have lower wages and thus have a comparative advantage in foreign
trade, which Davidson and Matusz define as net trade (exports minus
imports) normalized by the domestic market (production plus imports).
They reported evidence of a statistically significant negative correlation between average net trade and average job destruction and a somewhat weaker and less significant positive correlation between average
net trade and average job creation, at both the two-digit and the fourdigit industry level.27 In a related study, Magee, Davidson, and Matusz
(2001) inferred that the distribution of factor income is related to job
turnover rates by providing evidence that campaign contributions to
political action committees match up well with votes by politicians on
trade-related legislation.
Finally, a recent study of four European manufacturing sectors
reports little or no connection between international trade and proxies
of labor-market flows. Bentivogli and Pagano (1999) used data from
Eurostat’s Labor Force Survey to construct measures they call job creation, job destruction, and job reallocation. Job destruction is defined
as newly unemployed workers (relative to employment), job creation is
defined as net employment growth, and job reallocation is defined as
the sum of these two. Clearly, these measures are not the same as the
DHS plant-level measures of job flows, and they mix job- and workerflow concepts. For example, newly unemployed workers (flows eu and
nu in Figure 4.1) include not only workers whose jobs were destroyed
but also workers who became unemployed for other reasons. Ben-
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tivogli and Pagano estimated regression models of the flow proxies and
uniformly found that lagged exports to and imports from newly industrialized economies in Asia are completely insignificant in their regressions, while worker characteristics are very significant. They
concluded that recent increases in trade with Asian countries are not
responsible for adverse labor-market developments in Germany,
France, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
Worker Flows

Studies of worker flows look at the impact of international factors
on workers who report being displaced from employment: in Figure
4.1, these worker flows include ee, eu, and en. This approach assumes
a direct connection between international factors and the demand for
individual workers at particular establishments, which may or may not
engage in international trade. Workers will flow from employment in a
job at a particular establishment to some other state of the labor market
in response to changes in international conditions that affect that establishment.28 These studies use data on workers who report being laid off
(displaced) from particular employers.
The worker-flow approach has two distinct advantages in identifying the impact of international factors on labor markets. One is that it
can identify the impact at a more fundamental level than job flows,
specifically the flow of workers across jobs within establishments.
Also, by identifying individual workers, it offers the potential for following workers over time and observing the longer run effects of international factors on workers and labor markets.
However, the worker-flow approach also has two disadvantages.
First, it is more difficult to connect the international factors to specific
worker flows because workers flow out of employment for many reasons other than job destruction due to international factors. Unfortunately, there is insufficient information about workers’ employers in
the worker-flow data to be able to control for this problem. Second, the
worker-flow data depend heavily on workers’ ability to recollect historical circumstances and on their understanding of firms’ employment
decisions. Both of these difficulties may induce measurement error in
the worker-flow data that limits the ability to identify accurately the
link between international factors and worker flows.
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Two studies by Kletzer (1998a, 2000) considered the effects of
international factors on employment and found evidence that import
competition contributes to job loss or displacement. She used data from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Displaced Worker Surveys (DWS), a
supplement to the Current Population Surveys (CPS). The DWS ask a
panel of participants: “Have you lost a job in the previous 5-year
period due to plant closings, your employer going out of business, a
layoff without recall, or other similar reasons?” Workers answering
“yes” are a subset of all possible job separations, which also include
quits and other types of firings.29 Using econometric models, Kletzer
tested whether import competition is a significant contributor to
worker displacement and also whether export sales tend to reduce
worker displacements.
In both articles, Kletzer regressed the job displacement rate of
three-digit Commerce Industrial Classification (CIC) industries on,
among other variables, the price of imported goods for that three-digit
CIC industry. Her sample consisted of 70 industries from 1979 to the
early 1990s. The evidence in Kletzer (2000) is that export sales significantly lower displacement rates, but the results do not strongly support
the hypothesis that import prices are a significant determinant of displacement rates. Some industries with extensive import competition
exhibit extensive job displacement, but extensive job displacement also
occurs in other industries with little or no import competition. In
Kletzer (1998a), using a more restricted sample, the effect of import
prices on displacement rates is somewhat more significant, although a
measure of import share cannot be shown to significantly affect displacement rates, even within this sample. The effect of exports and,
especially, domestic demand on displacement rates, is shown to be
much stronger. Overall, the Kletzer results are valuable and interesting,
but they also highlight the limitations of the worker-flow approach
given current data availability.
The analysis of Goldberg, Tracy, and Aaronson (1999) is similar to
that of Kletzer but broader in terms of measured job displacement.
They used data from the CPS during the period of 1977 to 1997,
matching the response of civilian men (aged 18 to 63) from consecutive annual surveys. Respondents are denoted as “job changers” if,
between the time of one survey in March and the time of the subsequent survey the following March, they either had more than one
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employer or had a spell of unemployment. (Note that this definition of
job changers is more comprehensive than the displaced workers in
Kletzer’s work.) Goldberg, Tracy, and Aaronson reported that, across
broad industry groups and across the time periods 1977 to 1984 and
1986 to 1996, job changers represent between 15 and 20 percent of the
123,000 matched pairs in their sample.
Goldberg, Tracy, and Aaronson used these 123,000 observations to
estimate the effect of exchange rates on the probability of job change.
They used a limited dependent variable model in which the dependent
variable represents whether or not an individual was a job changer over
the course of a year. The regressors include characteristics of the individual (including education, race, age, and marital status), characteristics of the industry in which the individual was employed (including
industry fixed effects, industry-specific time trends, and industry-specific import and export exchange rates), and time-varying aggregate
regressors (including the real interest rate, Gross Domestic Product
[GDP] growth, and the unemployment rate). Their results suggest an
asymmetric effect of exchange rate movements on the probability of
changing jobs. There is evidence that, during periods of appreciation,
the exchange rate influences the probability of changing jobs in manufacturing; an appreciation of the export exchange rate lowers the likelihood of changing jobs, while an appreciation of the import exchange
rate raises the probability of changing jobs. Overall, Goldberg, Tracy,
and Aaronson reported that appreciations are associated with a small
reduction in job instability, although there is no significant effect of
depreciations on job stability, nor is there a significant effect when the
regression is constrained to have appreciations and depreciations enter
symmetrically.

Notes
1. For surveys of this literature, see Feenstra and Hanson (2003), and articles in the
summer 1995 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives (vol. 9, no. 3),
including Freeman (1995), Richardson (1995), and Wood (1995).
2. See also the studies by Riordan and Staiger (1993), Sener (2001), and Hoon
(2001a,b).
3. For surveys of this literature see Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), Davis and
Haltiwanger (1999), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999a), and Hall (1999).
4. For an overview of the search literature, see Mortensen and Pissarides (1999b).
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5. During the postwar period, the correlations between changes in employment and
unemployment are –0.52 on a monthly basis and –0.83 on a quarterly basis.
6. This point, and the subsequent discussion, apply equally to all factors of production, such as labor and capital, but we emphasize labor here.
7. See Matusz and Tarr (2000) for a complementary survey of this issue.
8. Estimates of both the welfare gains and the adjustment costs likely are underestimated significantly. Welfare gains from economic growth, economies of scale,
competition and antitrust, general equilibrium effects, and other miscellaneous
factors are omitted. For example, see Melitz (2002) for the latest evidence on the
beneficial impact of trade on productivity growth via reallocation. Likewise,
adjustment costs from hiring and firing workers, search, and the destruction of
human capital are omitted.
9. Magee called his estimates “ball park” and “rough,” so we use some rounding to
boil down the implications to “rounder” numbers without distorting the main
points. For example, the reported adjustment costs range from 0.85 to 0.96 percent of the total welfare gains, which we call “1 percent.”
10. Some analogous studies offer estimates for specific industries. Takacs and Winters (1991), which tries to account for some of natural labor turnover, obtained a
gain-to-cost ratio of 59 to 1 for removal of “voluntary” import restraints in the
footwear industry in the United Kingdom. De Melo and Tarr (1990) obtained a
gain-to-cost ratio of 65 for removal of the quotas in U.S. textiles, steel, and automobile industries.
11. Of course, free trade opponents have raised other important issues too, such as
concerns about the environment, inequality, and human rights.
12. Of course, labor-adjustment costs are not unique to international factors. All
forces that induce labor adjustment through job and worker flows generally will
entail these kinds of costs.
13. There are a few prior estimates, such as in Holt et al. (1960) and Oi (1962), but
these are relatively simple and they come from a very small number of firms.
14. Conventional wisdom would suggest that these firing costs are lower in the
United States, but these numbers are remarkably large for any relatively free-market economy.
15. This section discusses only studies of U.S. net employment because this literature
is extensive. There are many analogous studies of foreign net employment and
international factors as well. For example, see Dewatripont, Sapir, and Sekkat
(1999) for an in-depth study of European employment and international trade.
There is also a broader literature on globalization and international unemployment
rates, such as Wagner (2000).
16. 19.4 × (–0.23) × 0.20/6 = –0.15.
17. (–0.15) × 6 = –0.9.
18. This result is consistent with a relatively flat industry labor-supply schedule and a
relatively steep industry labor-demand schedule. In this case, changes in import
prices, which shift the labor-demand schedule, will have proportionally larger
effects on employment than on wages. The model we develop in Chapter 5, which
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forms the basis of the subsequent empirical analysis, assumes high worker mobility across industries.
It is worth noting, in this regard, that the correlation between nominal dollar
exchange rates and the respective real dollar exchange rates typically exceeds
0.90.
The industries characterized as low markup by Campa and Goldberg include the
following 11 industries: Food and Kindred Products (SIC 20), Textile Mill Products (SIC 22), Apparel and Mill Products (SIC 23), Lumber and Wood Products
(SIC 24), Furniture and Fixtures (SIC 25), Paper and Allied Products (SIC 26),
Petroleum and Coal Products (SIC 29), Leather and Leather Products (SIC 31),
Primary Metal Products (SIC 33), Fabricated Metal Products (SIC 34), and Transportation Equipment (SIC 37).
Campa and Goldberg noted that Revenga’s sample of industries, which, in 1980,
represented 72 percent of manufacturing imports but only 35 percent of manufacturing employment, was chosen to focus on the effects of import competition in
the United States and, therefore, is not representative of manufacturing as a
whole.
Labor demand may be affected directly, in establishments that engage in international trade, or indirectly, in establishments that do not engage in international
trade but compete with establishments that do.
See pp. 162–163 of his article for details.
Another is Davis and Haltiwanger (2001), which provided similar evidence for oil
price shocks but did not examine the influence of exchange rates.
A moderate appreciation is defined as two consecutive years of one standard deviation increases—about 10 percent in the cyclical rate and about 3.5 percent in the
trend rate.
This paper also used data on worker flows—job acquisitions (related to job creation) and job separations (related to job destruction)—published by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics until 1981. Because the methodology and results are similar to
those using job-flow data, we focus on these.
The regressions are very similar in spirit to the evidence in Davis, Haltiwanger,
and Schuh (1996), but with two important differences: 1) the correlations are tabulated at the detailed industry level rather than by quintiles of industries and 2) the
focus is on industries’ net trade, rather than industries’ import and export intensities.
Note that the level of employment (job flow) at the establishment may or may not
change along with the worker flow, depending on whether the establishment
retains the job and replaces the worker, destroys the job without creating a new
one, or destroys the job and creates a new one.
Kletzer also notes that an individual displaced from a job and rehired into a different job with the same employer is considered displaced. Also, worker displacement may understate actual job loss since it does not capture quits in anticipation
of layoffs, quits motivated by wage dissatisfaction or deteriorating working conditions, or changes in the rate of shutdown by firms.

5
Job Flows and the Exchange Rate
A Framework
The data presented in Chapter 3 demonstrate that even narrowly
defined industries exhibit simultaneous job creation and job destruction. The focus of this book is to determine the extent to which these
gross job flows reflect responses to changes in the international environment, in particular, to movements in dollar exchange rates or
changing trade restrictions. The data presented in Chapter 2 suggest the
potential importance of international factors for job creation and
destruction. As discussed in that chapter, the last quarter century has
been marked by both large medium-term swings in currency values
and persistent shorter run exchange rate volatility. Also, as shown in
that chapter, there is a growing and increasingly diverse exposure to
international competition among narrowly defined manufacturing
industries in the United States. This combination of widely fluctuating
exchange rates and diverse exposure to the effects of these fluctuations
may act together to generate job reallocation.
The particular way in which these factors interact to generate
simultaneous job creation and job destruction is the focus of this chapter. We begin the chapter with a discussion of how an idiosyncratic
change in the fortunes of one establishment can affect the amount of
labor employed by both that establishment and other establishments in
its industry. We focus on linkages among establishments due to their
competition for workers, although we would obtain similar results if,
instead, we considered competition among establishments for any
common pool of resources used in the production, or the marketing and
sale, of their products.1 We then consider how a change in the exchange
rate alters the distribution of labor across industries and, therefore, how
this contributes to job creation and job destruction. The change in the
exchange rate represents an aggregate shock, one that all establishments in all industries face simultaneously, although its consequences
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differ across industries depending upon the openness of each.2 As with
the idiosyncratic shock, the full effects of the change in the exchange
rate on employment in our model represent both direct effects on labordemand by establishments and the effects arising from competition for
workers among establishments.3
In developing our model, we have been mindful of the data available to us. For example, we assume that openness varies across industries but is the same among all establishments within an industry since
we have data on industry-level openness but not on the openness of
individual establishments. Thus, the model presented here is closely
linked to the framework used in our empirical analysis in Chapter 6. A
more formal presentation of the model, one that provides an explicit
framework for our empirical analysis, appears in Appendix B.

JOB FLOWS AND IDIOSYNCRATIC SHOCKS

The simultaneous job creation and job destruction that we document in the previous chapter suggests that there is a great deal of heterogeneity among establishments, even within narrowly defined
industries.4 It is important that a framework used to organize our thinking about the effects of the international environment on reallocation is
structured to reflect this heterogeneity. We introduce heterogeneity in
our model by assuming that each establishment within an industry differs from all other establishments in that industry because of an idiosyncratic shock to the demand for its product.5 This shock is distinct
from other factors affecting demand such as the exchange rate, domestic income, or foreign income.
Consider a situation where all establishments within an industry
sell a similar, but not necessarily identical, product. We also assume
that all establishments in an industry satisfy their labor needs by drawing from a common pool of workers.6 If one establishment enjoys a
particularly high level of demand for its product, then its managers will
attempt to hire more workers. But, if the overall employment of the
industry as a whole cannot vary, the expansion of workers employed
by one establishment must come at the expense of the number of workers hired by other establishments. In particular, the establishment with
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the expanding desire for workers bids up the industry-wide wage and,
in so doing, drives other establishments to shed workers. Thus, the
establishment enjoying the positive idiosyncratic shock exhibits job
creation while other establishments exhibit job destruction. If, across
the entire industry, all establishments faced a proportionately equal
positive demand shock then the industry wage would be bid up but
there would be no reallocation of labor across establishments and,
therefore, no job creation or job destruction in the industry. Thus, the
amount of reallocation in an industry is tied to the extent of heterogeneity among its establishments.
The logic outlined in the previous paragraph can be illustrated for
the case of an industry consisting of two establishments using Figures
5.1A and 5.1B. Each figure depicts labor-demand schedules for each of
the two establishments. The length of the horizontal axis represents the
fixed number of workers available for employment in either establishment A or establishment B, and therefore the total number of workers
available for both establishments is represented by the distance 0A0B.
The number of workers employed by establishment A is measured by
moving to the right from the origin labelled 0A while the number of
workers employed by establishment B is measured by moving to the
left from the origin labelled 0B. The two vertical axes represent both the
real wages paid by the establishments, W, and the value to the establishments of hiring an additional worker, the marginal product of
labor, which represents the increase in the number of units of output an
establishment can produce through the contribution of an additional
worker. The labor-demand schedule for each establishment reflects the
property of diminishing marginal product, whereby the marginal contribution of each worker to output is less than that of the worker hired
immediately before her. Thus, the labor-demand schedules have negative slopes from the perspective of the relevant set of axes, with the
labor-demand schedule for Establishment A represented by the line AA
and the labor-demand schedule for establishment B represented by the
line BB.
The interaction between these two establishments occurs in the
market for workers. The simplest way to depict this is to require that
both establishments pay the same wage. This reflects a situation where
workers are indifferent between working in either establishment and
can easily move from one establishment to another in response to wage
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differentials.7 The assumption of a common wage enables us to establish the equilibrium number of workers hired by each establishment
since this means that the value marginal products of labor will be the
same for each establishment. Thus the equilibrium occurs where the
two labor-demand schedules intersect. This equilibrium gives us both
the division of workers between the two establishments and the wage
paid by the two establishments. In Figure 5.1A, two labor-demand
schedules AA and BB intersect at the point labeled E. Establishment A
hires 0AL workers and establishment B hires 0BL workers (where the
number of workers hired by establishment B is measured by the distance leftward from 0B). The common wage paid by both establishments to their employees is given by 0AW = 0BW.
An expansion in the demand for the product of establishment A
shifts its labor-demand schedule out and to the right, to the schedule
A′A′ in Figure 5.1B. At the original wage, establishment A would now
like to hire 0AM workers while establishment B would continue to
desire to hire 0BL workers. However, 0AM + 0BL > 0A0B and, consequently, the establishments bid up the wage to 0AX = 0BX. In this new
equilibrium, given by the intersection of A′A′ and BB at the point E ′,
the number of workers hired by establishment A has risen to 0 A L′
while the number of workers hired by establishment B has declined to
0 B L ′. Thus, there is job creation by establishment A equal to LL′ and
job destruction by establishment B equal to L′L . There is, by assumption, no net change in employment (since, obviously, LL ′ = L ′L ), and
the total amount of reallocation equals twice the number of workers
represented by the distance LL′ .
It is straightforward to show that if each establishment faces a positive demand shock, the one with the proportionally larger increase in
demand will exhibit job creation while the other will exhibit job
destruction. This simultaneous job creation and job destruction occurs
even though, all else equal, both establishments would like to hire
more workers. The interaction of the establishments in the market for
labor ensures that all else is not held equal; rather, in this case, wages
are bid up as both establishments attempt to hire a greater proportion of
the fixed pool of workers. This pattern of simultaneous creation and
destruction need not hold in the more general case where a shift in the
industry-wide demand for labor elicits a supply response for the industry as a whole. For example, both establishments may expand employ-
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Figure 5.1A Labor Demand and the Distribution of Employment across
Establishments
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ment and exhibit job creation when they both face positive demand
shocks if there is a sufficient labor-supply response. In this case, there
is industry-wide job creation and no job destruction. We demonstrate
this, and other, generalizations of the model, in Appendix B.

THE ROLE OF AGGREGATE SHOCKS

Idiosyncratic shocks across establishments within an industry are
one possible explanation for simultaneous job creation and job destruction within that industry. Job creation and job destruction are also
affected by aggregate shocks. An aggregate shock is one that is common to all establishments, such as changes in the exchange rate or
changes in foreign income, but the consequences of a given aggregate
shock may differ across establishments depending upon their particular
structural characteristics. For example, a given change in the value of
the exchange rate has a bigger impact on establishments that are more
engaged in international trade, or face greater import competition, than
it has on establishments that are more internationally insulated.8 In constructing a framework for investigating the effects of the exchange rate
on job creation and job destruction, we assume that all establishments
within a given industry share a common level of openness and this distinguishes these establishments from establishments in all other industries. As mentioned in Chapter 2, available data allow us to calculate
openness at the level of four-digit SIC industries, but we do not have
data that allow us to calculate openness for individual establishments.
Thus, our assumption about the homogeneity of openness among
establishments within an industry and the heterogeneity of openness
across industries leads to a model that can be directly utilized in our
empirical analysis.
We begin by considering the effect of the exchange rate on the reallocation of employment across industries, that is, on net job creation in
one industry that comes at the expense of net job destruction in another
industry. The analysis here is very similar to that discussed above for
idiosyncratic shocks, with the exception that the labor-demand schedules represent the overall demand for labor by all (in this case, both)
establishments in each industry. The top panel of Figure 5.2 represents
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Figure 5.2 Job Flows in Response to a Depreciation

the labor-demand schedules for two industries, industry 1 and industry
2. The structure of this figure is analogous to that of Figure 5.1A. The
intersection of the two industry-level labor-demand schedules I1I1 and
I2I2, shows the initial distribution of labor across the two industries,
with 01H workers in industry 1 and H02 workers in industry 2, as well
as the common wage in each industry of 01W = 02W.
A change in the exchange rate alters the demand for workers in
both industries. A depreciation raises the number of workers all establishments would like to hire at any wage, while an appreciation reduces
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the number of workers all establishment would like to hire at any wage.
The effect of a given depreciation is depicted by the shifts of the labordemand schedule for industry 1 to I1′ I1′ and of the labor-demand
schedule for industry 2 to I 2′ I 2′ . The amount that each industry’s
labor-demand schedule shifts reflects the size of the depreciation,
which is, of course, the same for both industries, as well as each industry’s level of openness. As depicted in the diagram, industry 1 is more
open than industry 2 and, therefore, its labor-demand schedule shifts
by more. The new intersection, D ′ , differs from the original equilibrium, D, in that the wage paid in both industries has been bid up to 01Y
= 02Y and the number of workers in industry 1 has increased to 01 H ′
while the number of workers in industry 2 has fallen to H ′02 .
The lower panel of Figure 5.2 shows what happens in each of the
two establishments in each of the two industries. This lower panel consists of two adjoining diagrams of the type depicted in Figure 5.1. The
axes for the two establishments that constitute industry 1 are initially
defined by Z1, 01,A, 01,B, H while the axes for the two establishments that
constitute industry 2 are initially defined by H, 02,B, 02,A, Z2 (where 01,B
and 02,B represent the same point on the horizontal axis). The four dotted lines in the lower panel represent the establishment-level labordemand schedules, before the exchange rate depreciates. At this equilibrium the number of workers employed by establishment A in industry 1 is 01,Am, by establishment B in industry 1 is m01,B, by establishment A in industry 2 is 02,Ap, and by establishment B in industry 2 is
p02,B.
The exchange rate depreciation shifts the axis that divides the
lower panel between the establishments in industry 1 and industry 2 to
the right from H to H ′. The new sets of axes for industries 1 and 2 are
now Z1 ,01, A ,01,′ B , H ′ and H ′,0′2,B ,02, A Z 2 , respectively (where 01,′ B and
0′2,B represent the same point on the horizontal axis). The four labordemand schedules shift from the dotted lines to the solid lines. All four
schedules shift out (with respect to the appropriate origins) due to the
depreciation of the exchange rate. In addition, the labor-demand schedules for establishment B in industry 1 and establishment B in industry 2
move because of the change in the relevant axes arising from the shift
of the dividing line between the industries from H to H ′. As a consequence of the depreciation, the wage rises from 0W to 0Y. Employment
among the four establishments changes to 01,An for establishment A in
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industry 1, n01,′ B for establishment B in industry 1, 02.Aq for establishment A in industry 2, and 0′2,B q for establishment B in industry 2.
There is job creation by the two establishments in industry 1, the relatively more open industry, and job destruction by the two establishments in industry 2, the relatively more closed industry.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL

The model presented above offers two types of determinants of
establishment-level job flows, idiosyncratic shocks and aggregate
shocks. In this section we draw together some of the lessons of the
model. The intuition discussed here complements the formal presentation of the model in Appendix B. The formal model provides us with
an explicit framework for our empirical analysis, while the intuition
developed here aids our interpretation of the results presented in the
next chapter.
We can overlay the consequences of a particular pattern of idiosyncratic shocks, which are unobservable, with the consequences of
exchange rate movements for creation and destruction rates across
industries to frame our approach to the data. In the model presented
above, idiosyncratic shocks are responsible for simultaneous job creation and job destruction within an industry. The source of simultaneous job creation and destruction is a general equilibrium effect rather
than an assumed pattern of shocks that mimics the pattern of creation
and destruction across establishments. The exchange rate alters the creation and destruction pattern within an industry. Establishments in relatively open industries will tend toward greater job creation and less job
destruction in the presence of an exchange rate depreciation while
these effects will be reversed in industries that are relatively closed to
international competition.9
One implication of the model is the importance of an industry’s
level of openness for determining the consequence of a change of the
exchange rate on its level of creation and destruction. Openness can
serve as a lens through which the exchange rate affects an industry,
with more open industries exhibiting both a greater increase in creation
and a greater decrease in destruction in response to a depreciation, and
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a greater increase in destruction and a greater decrease in creation in
response to a depreciation. In the model developed here, the relatively
closed industry actually has a qualitatively different response to a
change in the exchange rate as compared to the relatively open industry.
Our interpretation of the model can be more broad than this, however. It is reasonable to consider the preponderance of manufacturing
industries as more open than the vast majority of service industries.10
The empirical analysis presented in the next chapter draws only on the
experience of manufacturing industries. Therefore, we might expect
that a depreciation generally fosters job creation and reduces job
destruction among the industries included in our empirical analysis,
and conversely for an appreciation, even while these effects are scaled
by openness.
While the effects of openness are explicitly included in the discussion in this chapter, we have not focused on the potential for heterogeneity across industries due to differences in their trade patterns and,
consequently, differences in their respective trade-weighted real
exchange rates. As discussed in more detail in the next chapter, our
empirical analysis does explicitly account for heterogeneity in the pattern of trade across industries, utilizing industry-specific real exchange
rates calculated as weighted averages of a set of bilateral real exchange
rates with the weights reflecting the bilateral trade patterns of an industry.
Finally, we can also move beyond the model’s use of the real
exchange rate as the sole determinant of the cost of foreign goods relative to the cost of domestic goods. Define a tariff-inclusive real
exchange rate, qT , as

qT = (1 + τ ) q
where q is the conventional real exchange rate defined above. Taking
the total differential of the above expression and then dividing the left
side by qT and the right side by (1 + τ ) q gives us
dqT dq
d
=
+ T .
qT
q (1 + τ )
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The terms dqΤ /qΤ and dq/q are approximately equal to the percentage changes in qT and q, respectively, while dτ/(1 + τ) is proportional to
the percentage change in the tariff rate. In this way, we see that a proportional change in a multilateral tariff rate operates in the model in a
way that is identical to a proportional change in the real exchange rate.
Tariff rates are often changed in ways that are uneven across industries,
however, and this introduces another source of cross-industry heterogeneity in our model. Our discussion of the effects of NAFTA on job creation and job destruction in Chapter 7 draws on the correspondence
between tariff changes and real exchange rate changes, as well as the
implications of this for job flows as presented in the model here.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented a framework for thinking about the
manner in which the real exchange rate may influence gross job flows.
The model discussed in this chapter attempts to reflect some of the
empirical regularities offered in Chapter 3, especially the pervasive
heterogeneity of the exposure to international competition across
industries. The model is also constructed in a way that will be useful
for our empirical analysis by making assumptions on establishmentlevel and industry-level variation that are consistent with the available
data.
The model presented here focuses on two sources of gross job
flows, idiosyncratic shocks that reshuffle the distribution of jobs across
establishments within an industry and aggregate shocks that alter the
distribution of jobs across industries. The main lesson of the model for
our empirical analysis is that job creation is generally fostered by an
exchange rate depreciation while job destruction generally rises in the
face of an appreciation. The model also illustrates the importance of
openness for influencing the extent to which these general results hold
in a particular industry. In fact, the model shows that some industries
that are relatively closed may exhibit job-flow responses contrary to
those in industries that are relatively open.
As with all modeling, the theoretical possibility of a particular outcome does not ensure its actual occurrence. In the next chapter we test
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whether the real exchange rate does, in fact, lead to significant job
flows. The discussion in this chapter has provided us with a framework
for approaching this empirical issue.

Notes
1. Although, by focusing on a common pool of workers, we have a direct effect of
the idiosyncratic shock on labor. Had we focused on a common pool of another
resource, the effect on labor would depend upon whether labor and that resource
were substitutes or complements in production. For a discussion of the relationship between the demand for labor by firms and their demand for other factors of
production, see Hamermesh (1993, pp. 36–42).
2. The independent effects of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks on gross job flows
have been studied by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), among others.
3. As shown below, the interaction among establishments within an industry in the
market for labor, along with a relatively fixed amount of labor within an industry,
gives rise to simultaneous job creation and job destruction. Of course, we could
just present a simpler model in which we assume that the pattern of idiosyncratic
shocks among establishments within an industry yields simultaneous job creation
and job destruction. However, we believe that a model with general equilibrium
wage effects highlights important and relevant interactions.
4. Recall that the basic unit for the creation and destruction data set is the establishment. Any given establishment will be counted as having only job creation or
only job destruction in a particular year; there are no data on simultaneous job creation and job destruction within a particular establishment. The framework we
develop here is consistent with this, with any single establishment exhibiting
either job creation or job destruction but not both creation and destruction.
5. Alternatively, we could assume that all establishments within an industry differ in
their exposure to international competition and, therefore, a change in an aggregate variable, such as the exchange rate, would have different effects across those
establishments. We do not pursue this modeling strategy, however, because we
want to match our theoretical model to our empirical approach and the most disaggregated measure of openness available to us is at the four-digit SIC industry
level, not at the establishment level. As discussed below, our model does assume
differences in openness across industries.
6. We can motivate the assumption that all establishments draw from a common
pool of workers by appealing to the presence of industry-specific skills among
workers. This means that a particular industry employs people from occupational
pools of workers that are distinct and segmented from the occupational pools of
other industries. More generally, we could assume that some workers, such as
secretaries, custodians, and bookkeepers, do not have industry-specific skills
while others, such as engineers, sales representatives, and line workers, could
only move from one industry to another at some cost of retraining. This weaker
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7.

8.

9.

10.

assumption would generate results that are qualitatively similar to the results in
the model we present.
Relaxing this condition through a cost of relocation or by introducing nonpecuniary benefits of working in one or both firms does not alter the basic results of the
analysis.
The discussion in Chapter 2 shows that distinctive patterns of trade across industries give rise to divergent industry-specific exchange rates. In this chapter we
consider only a common “exchange rate” that is the same across all industries,
although an extension to industry-specific exchange rates would be straightforward. Our empirical analysis does, in fact, utilize industry-specific exchange
rates.
In the model developed above, the exchange rate enters through its role in affecting demand, rather than supply. Campa and Goldberg (2001) developed a model
in which the exchange rate also affects the price of imported intermediate goods,
along with the prices of exports and imports. Potentially, this could lead to a situation where a depreciation, by raising input prices, drives down the demand for
labor. This effect would augment the effects outlined in our model.
Manufacturing’s share of total U.S. trade was relatively steady during our sample:
0.81 in 1975, 0.79 in 1985, and 0.78 in 1995 (see Table B-104 in the Economic
Report of the President 2000, February 2000, p. 426).

6
Regression Implementation
and Results
The model presented in Chapter 5 offers a theoretical framework
for understanding how changes in the real exchange rate contribute to
job creation or destruction within an industry as well as to the reallocation of jobs across industries. But, of course, theory alone cannot be
used to determine whether, in fact, changes in the real exchange rate
actually have an important role in the determination of job creation and
job destruction. This is essentially an empirical issue, although one that
must be guided by both a coherent theoretical framework and an understanding of the relevant characteristics of the data used in the analysis.
In this chapter, we present quantitative estimates of the effects of
movements in the real exchange rate on job creation and job destruction.
The manner in which we undertake the analysis in this chapter
reflects lessons learned from earlier chapters in this book. The basic
form of our analysis, especially with regard to the specification of the
regression equation, draws heavily on the framework presented in
Chapter 5. Our analysis is also shaped by our understanding of the jobflow and exchange rate data, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The
divergence of industry-specific multilateral real exchange rates, shown
in Chapter 2, underscores the potential importance of matching the job
flows of a particular industry with an exchange rate that matches its
trading patterns, rather than using an aggregate real exchange rate for
all industries. The divergence of openness among the four-digit SIC
industries that constitute particular two-digit SIC industries, discussed
in Chapter 3, leads us to control for openness directly rather than estimating separate regressions for each two-digit SIC industry.
The empirical analysis in this chapter also introduces a consideration that we have only alluded to, the importance of the permanence
of exchange rate changes for generating job flows. A range of models
that include adjustment costs suggest that exchange rate changes that
are perceived as permanent will have different effects from those that
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are perceived as temporary.1 While we cannot directly gauge the perceived permanence or actual exchange rate changes, we can attempt to
estimate the permanent and temporary components of actual exchange
rate changes and then use these separately in our analysis.2 As shown in
this chapter, we find that these different components have distinct
effects on job creation and job destruction and these differences have
important implications for the nature of job flows.
In the next section of this chapter we discuss the manner in which
we undertake our empirical analysis. This discussion focuses on the
choices we made as we moved from a theoretical framework to an
empirical analysis. Section 2 then presents the results of our empirical
analysis. The concluding section of this chapter offers some interpretations of these results. Details of the data used in this analysis are presented in Appendix C.

EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION

The model presented in Chapter 5 offers some insights regarding
the relationship between the exchange rate and gross job flows. Most
primarily, the model presented in Appendix B links changes in the
exchange rate (rather than its level) to rates of job creation and job
destruction, and this is the specification we use. A central result of the
model is that an exchange rate depreciation, all else equal, contributes
to an increase in the rate of job creation and a decrease in the rate of job
destruction among relatively open industries, while an exchange rate
appreciation has the opposite effect on these relatively open industries.
Therefore, we would expect to find this pattern of effects among manufacturing industries since they tend to be more open than other sectors
of the economy, such as the service sector. The model also suggests
that openness enters in a particular fashion, interacted with both the
exchange rate and foreign output. Accordingly, our regressions include
the product of the exchange rate and openness.
The data presented earlier in this book also offer insights on how to
proceed with our empirical analysis. For example, the statistics presented in Chapter 2 show that, while there is tremendous diversity in
the importance of imports and exports across U.S. manufacturing
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industries, very little of this heterogeneity is related to membership in
particular two-digit, or even three-digit, industries. Therefore, it may
not be warranted to estimate separate regressions for each of the 20
two-digit industry groups since that assumes a degree of homogeneity
within those groups that is likely not present. Instead, our regression
uses data on all 442 industries and, as mentioned above, controls for
differences in openness across industries by including the product of
openness and both the real exchange rate and foreign output. Our sample uses annual data for the period 1975 to 1993, giving us more than
8,000 industry-year observations.3
Based upon these considerations, we draw on the model presented
in Appendix B and specify our regression equation as
1

(

 i ,t − s E
 i ,t − s
JFit = ∑  β1,sCi ,t −1− s + β 2, s Di ,t −1− s + β 3, s Ω
s =0 

)

+ β 4, s Z i ,t − s + β 5, sVs  + (αi + ν t + ε it )

where i indexes four-digit SIC industries, t indexes years, ^ denotes
growth rates, Z i ,t − s is a vector of industry-specific variables, and Vs is a
vector of aggregate variables.4 The dependent variables are the four
job-flow rates; the job creation rate, the job destruction rate, the rate of
job reallocation, and the net employment rate, which are represented as
JFit = {Cit , Dit , Rit , N it } . Lagged values of Cit and Dit, as well as the
other explanatory variables, are included as regressors to account for
possible dynamic adjustment. The components of the error term of the
regression (αi + vt + εit) represent the effects of unmeasured influences
on job creation and destruction at the industry, aggregate, and timevarying industry levels. We specify αi as a fixed (nonstochastic) effect,
and treat vt and εit as stochastic.5
The coefficients of central interest to us are those represented by β3
which demonstrate the impact of current and lagged values of the percentage change in the industry-specific real exchange rate, interacted
with the level of industry openness, on job flows. Both elements of the
 it E
 it , reflect information
product of the regressor for this coefficient, Ω
 it , is
specific to industry i. The industry-specific real exchange rate, E
constructed by weighting bilateral real exchange rates by the trade
shares of industry i. Trade shares are averaged over the preceding two
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years and then lagged to avoid potential endogeneity problems.6 The
 it , is a five-year moving average of
openness variable for industry i, Ω
the ratio of total trade (exports plus imports) to total market sales
(domestic sales plus imports) for that industry. The use of a moving
average minimizes the influence of transitory fluctuations in openness.
The moving average of openness is lagged one period such that, for job
flows from period t, its most recent value is from period t – 1. This
allows us to avoid any potential problems due to the possible influence
of job flows on measured openness.
As we address the data using the framework developed in the previous chapter, it is important to recognize that the static nature of the
model skirts a potentially important issue. In the face of hiring and firing costs, establishments’ employment responses to exchange rate
changes will likely depend upon their perception of whether those
changes are temporary or permanent. We would expect a greater
response of workers and establishments to perceived permanent
changes in the exchange rate than to those exchange rate movements
that are thought to be merely transitory. Furthermore, it is reasonable to
expect an asymmetry between the responsiveness of job creation and
job destruction to temporary changes in the exchange rate. Employees
can be discharged nearly immediately after an establishment has determined that it is optimal to do so, albeit with some firing cost, but
expanding employment often requires considerable planning, screening of new employees, installation of new equipment, and sometimes
erection of new structures. In addition, there may be fixed costs, periods of learning, and other barriers to entering markets that differ from
the costs of scaling back operations in these markets. These types of
job creation costs would not likely be incurred for job creation that was
expected to be transitory, such as that associated with temporary shifts
in the value of the real exchange rate. At the same time, it is common
for establishments to engage in transitory job destruction by temporarily laying off workers and then recalling them later.
These factors argue for including separately in the regression the
perceived permanent component of the change in the exchange rate
and its perceived temporary component. The actual implementation of
this idea, however, is not straightforward. At a minimum, it is difficult
to estimate a model of the determination of the exchange rate at annual
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intervals. Compounding this difficulty is that of modeling perceptions
of exchange rate movements as permanent or transitory.
One possible recourse is to decompose the exchange rate into its
trend and cyclical parts and then to identify the trend as the “permanent” change and the change in the cyclical part of the exchange rate as
its “transitory” movements. This decomposition is based on defining
the actual real exchange rate of industry i, Eit, as the sum of its trend
and cyclical components,

Eit = EitT + EitC ,
where the superscript T denotes the trend component and the superscript C denotes the cyclical component.
We implemented this approach by first fitting the log level of each
industry real exchange rate to linear and quadratic time trends. We
found an extraordinarily wide variety of trends among the four-digit
industry real exchange rates—including opposite signs across industries in both the linear and quadratic parts. We then calculated the
cyclical component as the residual between the actual industry
exchange rate and its trend component.7 This decomposition of the
exchange rate proves to be important in our regression analysis as we
find distinct effects for the coefficients on the trend and cyclical components of the exchange rates, with the differences corresponding to
the types of distinctions we might expect given the discussion above.
Our regression specification also reflects the fact that, as discussed
in the theoretical model presented in Chapter 5, a range of variables
other than the exchange rate influence job creation and job destruction
 it , where
rates. Accordingly, we include industry-specific variables, Z

 itY ∗it ), Y it, Ψ
 it = [(Ω
 Qit , Ψ
 Git 1 , Ψ
 Git 2 , Ψ
 Wit ].
Z

 it represent the prices of inputs other
Some of the variables in Z
 p in the model in Chapter 5.
than labor, variables represented by G
In our regression specification, these include the industry-specific
real prices of output, energy, and materials, Ψ Qit = ( PitQ / Pt Q ) ,
G
MAT
Q
Ψ Git 1 = ( PitEN /PitQ ) , and Ψ it 2 = ( Pit /Pit ) , respectively. The aggregate (total manufacturing) real wage also is included, and repre-
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sented by Γ t = (Wt / Pt Q ) .8 Yit is domestic industry demand. The
industry-specific foreign demand, Yit∗ , is constructed using tradeweighted foreign output data for each trading partner in a manner
analogous to the industry real exchange rates. The model presented
in Appendix B shows that, as with the real exchange rate, foreign
output should be interacted with openness.9
Another set of variables in the regression specification is included
to ensure that any significance attributed to industry-level real
exchange rates is not merely reflecting a correlation between exchange
rates and aggregate variables that also influence gross job flows. We
include in our econometric specification the aggregate explanatory
variables

Vt = [Nt , ρt ],
where Nt is total manufacturing net employment growth and
ρt = it f − π t is the ex post real federal funds rate. Total manufacturing
net employment captures aggregate real shocks to the traded goods
sector. The real federal funds rate captures monetary policy shocks.
These aggregate variables capture the main aggregate, macroeconomic
determinants of industry-level job flows. It is reasonable to assume that
these variables are exogenous to any particular industry and, therefore,
to discount any concerns of four-digit SIC industry-level job flows
contemporaneously affecting the real federal funds rate or manufacturing net employment.

REGRESSION RESULTS

In this section we present the results of our regression analyses.
The first set of results, reported in Table 6.1, is based on a specification
that includes the interaction of the four-digit SIC industry-specific real
exchange rates and openness, as well as the other control variables discussed above. The second set of results, in Table 6.2, replaces the actual
industry-specific real exchange rate with its two separate components,
reflecting the estimated trend and cyclical parts of the real exchange
rates. In all of these tables, there are separate columns, one for each of
the different types of job flows (net employment, Nit; job creation, Cit;
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job destruction, Dit; and job reallocation, Rit). The reported point estimates represent the sums of coefficients for periods t – 1 and t – 2 for
the regressors Ci and Di, and for periods t and t – 1 for all other regressors.10 Only the coefficients on the growth rates of the exchange rates
interacted with openness are shown in Table 6.2 since the other coefficients were very similar across the two specifications.
The important role played by the change in industry-specific real
exchange rates, interacted with openness, for gross job flows and net
job flows is shown by the results in Table 6.1. An appreciation of the
real exchange rate leads to a significant decline in net employment
growth. This response is typical of the results reported in the literature
on the effect of real exchange rates on net employment cited in Chapter
4. But, using gross job-flow data, we are able to gain a more complete
understanding of this effect on net employment. A decrease in net
employment can come about through a reduction in job creation, an
increase in job destruction, or some combination of the two. The
results in Table 6.1 suggest that an appreciation affects net employment
solely through a significant increase in job destruction, with no change
in job creation. Job reallocation also increases significantly but only
enough to accommodate the net employment change.
There are important implications of the relative responses of job
creation and job destruction to changes in the exchange rate since these
two components of job flows likely have significantly different implications for worker flows, unemployment, human capital accumulation,
and wages—factors that are fundamentally important for calculating
the welfare costs of labor adjustment to international competition. In
particular, job destruction is closely linked to the dislocation of workers from jobs, and the evidence indicates that dislocated workers typically suffer severe losses of human capital and permanent income.11
Moreover, Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) showed that job
destruction tends to be permanent and occurs disproportionately in
larger, older, high-wage plants. Thus, job destruction is likely to
involve permanent dislocation of high-wage and/or older workers,
human capital destruction, and permanent income loss—all of which
are likely to lead to higher structural unemployment. In contrast, had
the empirical results suggested that net employment responses to
exchange rate appreciations arose through lower job creation rates,
these effects would likely have a smaller impact on workers and wel-
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Table 6.1 Baseline Job-Flow Regression Results
Variable

Ci

Description
Gross job creation

Di

Gross job destruction

 i E i
Ω

Openness × real
exchange rate
Openness × real foreign
GDP
Real domestic sales

 i Y *i
Ω

Yi
 Qi
Ψ
 iEN
Ψ

Real output price

 iMAT
Ψ

Real materials price

W
Ψ

Aggregate real wage

N

Aggregate net
employment growth
Real federal funds rate

ρ

Real energy price

Nit
–0.10
(0.07)
0.10
(0.07)
–0.35**
(0.15)
0.07
(0.25)
0.12**
(0.03)
0.07
(0.06)
–0.02
(0.02)
0.02
(0.04)
–0.14**
(0.04)
0.78**
(0.09)
–0.21**
(0.10)

Dependent variable
Cit
Dit
0.03
0.05
(0.04)
(0.04)
0.17**
0.02
(0.04)
(0.04)
–0.02
0.33**
(0.06)
(0.13)
0.07
0.01
(0.11)
(0.20)
0.04**
–0.08**
(0.01)
(0.02)
0.05
–0.02
(0.03)
(0.03)
0.03**
0.06**
(0.02)
(0.02)
0.01
–0.00
(0.02)
(0.03)
0.06*
0.21**
(0.03)
(0.06)
0.40**
–0.34**
(0.05)
(0.10)
0.07
0.30**
(0.05)
(0.10)

Rit
0.16**
(0.03)
0.16**
(0.03)
0.30**
(0.14)
0.06
(0.19)
–0.05**
(0.01)
0.03
(0.03)
0.09**
(0.02)
0.01
(0.03)
0.28**
(0.08)
0.03
(0.12)
0.39**
(0.12)

R2
0.26
0.22
0.21
0.13
NOTE: Estimated by ordinary least squares with annual data over the period 1975 to
1993 (8,376 industry-year observations) and fixed effects for four-digit industries.
Estimates for N (net employment), C (job creation), D (job destruction), and R (job
reallocation) are sums of the coefficients from the t – 1 and t – 2 values; all other estimates are the sums of coefficients from the t and t –1 values. Standard errors are in
parentheses and are corrected for aggregate regressor bias. * and ** denote significance at the 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively.
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fare. Lower job creation raises the duration of unemployment and,
through this channel, slows the accumulation of human capital, but this
is probably not as economically significant as the effects of job
destruction.
For reasons discussed in the previous section, a more complete
analysis of the effects of the exchange rate on job flows recognizes the
possibility that these effects can vary depending upon whether the
changes in the exchange rate are perceived to be permanent or temporary. As discussed above, we implement this idea through the inclusion
of two separate components of the industry-level real exchange rates in
our regression specification, the trend component and the cyclical component. The results presented in Table 6.2 show that net and gross job
flows respond quite differently to changes in the growth of the trend
and changes in the cyclical components of the industry real exchange
rates. An appreciation of the trend real exchange rate leads to significant and roughly equal increases in job destruction and job creation
rates. Consequently, job reallocation also increases significantly in
response to an appreciation of the trend component of the industrylevel real exchange rate, but there is no change in net employment
growth. In sharp contrast, an appreciation of the cyclical component of
the real exchange rate yields quantitatively similar results to those
reported in Table 6.1,with the job destruction rate increasing, the job
creation rate unaffected and net employment growth declining.
The statistical significance of these results is matched by their economic relevance. We estimate the quantitative effects of changes in
industry-level real exchange rates on net and gross job flows using
coefficients presented in Table 6.2. This exercise proceeds by holding
constant all other variables, including monetary policy (as measured by
the real federal funds rate), changes in domestic and foreign income,
and changes in overall net manufacturing employment. Each of these is
a significant determinant of gross job flows and would likely be correlated with an appreciation; therefore, this exercise considers the pure
effect of an exchange rate appreciation rather than the likely behavior
of job-flow rates during the period when the exchange rate is appreciating, a period when other factors would likely also be driving rates of
creation, destruction, reallocation, and net employment.
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Table 6.2 Job-Flows Regression Results with Exchange Rate
Decomposition
Dependent variable
Explanatory variable

 Eˆ (from Table 6.1)
Ω
i i

 Eˆ T (trend)
Ω
i i
 Eˆ C (cyclical)
Ω
i i

Nit

Cit

–0.35**

–0.02

(0.15)

(0.06)

0.03

0.70**

(0.29)

(0.17)

–0.45**

–0.10

(0.16)

(0.06)

Dit
0.33**
(0.13)
0.78**
(0.30)
0.36**
(0.13)

Rit
0.30**
(0.14)
1.42**
(0.39)
0.25*
(0.14)

NOTE: Estimated by ordinary least squares with annual data over the period 1975 to
1993 (8,376 industry-year observations) and fixed effects for four-digit industries.
Estimates for N (net employment), C (job creation), D (job destruction), and R (job
reallocation) are sums of the coefficients from the t – 1 and t – 2 values; all other estimates are the sums of coefficients from the t and t – 1 values. Standard errors are in
parentheses and are corrected for aggregate regressor bias. * and ** denote significance at the 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively.

Table 6.3 summarizes the responses of job-flow rates (in percentage points) to a real exchange rate appreciation representing two consecutive one standard deviation increases in the real exchange rate.
These changes amount to 10.8 percent (5.4 percent per year) for the
cyclical rate and 3.4 percent (1.7 percent per year) for the trend rate.
Responses are shown for the 10th, 50th (median), and 90th percentiles
of industry openness over all years (0.02, 0.14, and 0.42, respectively)
and are not reported in those cases where the coefficients are not significant.12
The results presented in Table 6.3 demonstrate the economically
meaningful effect of changes in industry-level real exchange rates on
rates of job creation and job destruction. We estimate that a sustained,
one standard deviation appreciation of the cyclical component of the
industry-level real exchange rate raises job destruction and reallocation, and lowers net employment growth, by more than one-half percentage point in an industry with median openness. This response is
significant when compared with a time-series standard deviation of job
destruction of 2.8 percent (the average job destruction rate in manufac-
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Table 6.3 Job-Flow Responses to a Real Exchange Rate Appreciation

i
Ω
Ci

Di

Ri

0.02

0.0

0.0

0.1

50

0.14

0.3

0.4

0.7

 Eˆ T
Ω
i i

90

0.42

1.0

1.1

2.1

 Eˆ C
Ω
i i

10

0.02

–0.1

0.1

0.0

 Eˆ C
Ω
i i

50

0.14

–0.7

0.5

0.4

 Eˆ C
Ω
i i

90

0.42

–2.0

1.6

1.1

Percentile

Value

 Eˆ T
Ω
i i

10

 Eˆ T
Ω
i i

Ni

NOTE: The table reports cumulative responses over a two-year period to two consecutive annual one standard deviation increases in the real exchange rate (5.4 percent per
year for the cyclical rate and 1.7 percent per year for the trend rate). All estimates are
in percentage points. Standard errors are the same as in Table 6.2. Responses are omitted where coefficient estimates are insignificant at the 10 percent level.

turing in our sample is 10.2 percent). Thus, real exchange rate fluctuations account for a substantial fraction of the cyclical movements in job
flows. Real exchange rate movements are also responsible for the
divergence in job flows across industries. The results in Table 6.3 show
that the estimated job-flow responses are about three times larger for a
highly trade-intensive industry, one at the 90th percentile of openness,
than for an industry at the median level of openness. The job-flow
responses of an industry at the 90th percentile of openness, which is
about two percentage points, is large in both relative and absolute
terms.
An appreciation of the trend component of the real exchange rate
also leads to large estimated job-flow responses. A sustained, one standard deviation appreciation of the trend component of the industrylevel real exchange rate raises job creation and job destruction rates in
an industry with median openness by 0.4 percentage point, and the job
reallocation rate increases by 0.7 percentage point. This reallocation
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response is significant when compared with the time-series standard
deviation of reallocation of 1.9 percent (the average job reallocation
rate in manufacturing in our sample is 19.0 percent). Thus, trend real
exchange rate fluctuations account for a substantial fraction of the variation in reallocation. As with changes due to the cyclical component of
the industry-level real exchange rate, movements in the trend component of the real exchange rate lead to divergent responses across manufacturing industries. The job-flow responses to a change in the trend
real exchange rate are about three times larger for an industry at the
90th percentile of openness than for an industry at the median level of
openness.
Although the main focus of this section is the real exchange rate, it
is worth mentioning the results pertaining to other regressors. Industry
domestic demand is a very significant determinant of all four categories of job flows, but industry foreign demand, conditional on the real
exchange rate and other variables, is totally insignificant. The three
aggregate regressors are generally quite significant. The aggregate real
wage, net employment growth, and the real federal funds rate significantly affect industry-level net employment and job destruction. The
real wage and the real interest rate are significant in the job reallocation
equation, and the real wage and net employment growth are significant
in the job creation equation. The significance of the real exchange rate
is especially noteworthy given the significance of these aggregate
regressors. The industry-specific real price of energy significantly
affects job creation, job destruction, and reallocation, but not net
employment, a result consistent with that found by Davis and Haltiwanger (2001), who focused on the effect of oil prices on job reallocation. Finally, the only important lagged job flow is destruction in the
creation equation. This finding suggests that an adverse effect on jobs,
distinct from those effects represented by other variables in the regression, first depresses demand and then creation responds with a lag as
the economy recovers.13

Regression Implementation and Results 109

CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS

We have argued in this chapter, as well as elsewhere in this book,
that a full accounting of the welfare effects of labor-market adjustment
requires going beyond measuring net employment changes. Rather, we
need to consider what occurs at the job creation and the job destruction
margin. For example, the implications of a given change in net employment on people’s lifetime earning profiles depend upon the way in
which this change reflects movements in the job creation rate and the
job destruction rate. Therefore, it is important to recognize, as shown
by the results in Table 6.1, that the effects of industry-level real
exchange rate changes on net employment occur solely through their
effect on job destruction rather than job creation. It is also important to
recognize that the effects of exchange rate changes on particular industries depend upon their level of openness. The estimates presented in
Table 6.3 illustrate how exchange rate changes can lead to job flows,
not only between manufacturing sectors and the rest of the economy,
but also across manufacturing sectors which vary widely in their exposure to international factors.
While these results give us an idea of the overall consequences of
exchange rate movements on gross job flows, the different effects of
the trend and cyclical movements in the exchange rate on both gross
job flows and net employment provide important insights on employment dynamics. These results complement other evidence on job
flows. Our finding that changes in the trend component of the industrylevel real exchange rate lead to significant effects for job destruction
and job creation rates but no change in net employment growth is consistent with others’ conclusion that gross job flows are primarily permanent whereas net employment changes are primarily transitory. For
example, Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) reported that more
than one-half of job creation and nearly three-fourths of job destruction
represent permanent (at least two years) establishment-level employment changes while, in contrast, most net employment changes over
the business cycle are short-lived.
This interpretation of the results on the trend and cyclical
components of the exchange rate hinges on the interpretation of these
components as permanent or transitory. In a statistical sense, this
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interpretation seems reasonable since growth in the trend component is
persistent and does not change sign frequently. Whether our simple
decomposition is reasonable in an economic sense is unclear without a
formal model of exchange rates and expectation formation. It is well
known that exchange rate movements are extremely difficult to model
and predict. Thus, significant changes in exchange rates are likely to be
viewed as some mix of permanent versus transitory changes.
The welfare implications of the results presented in this chapter
must also take into account the fact that some jobs destroyed by a dollar appreciation may have been only marginally profitable and slated
for eventual elimination even if the real exchange rate remained stable.
However, the timing of job destruction does have an impact on the welfare of displaced workers. Workers are likely to have an easier time
finding suitable reemployment when job destruction is gradual and diffuse than when an external shock causes job destruction to spike and,
consequently, a glut of displaced workers are searching for new jobs
simultaneously. For this reason, acceleration of job destruction caused
by a temporary appreciation of the exchange rate can have adverse
consequences on economic welfare.

Notes
1. See, for example, Dixit (1989) and Krugman (1988).
2. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Campa and Goldberg (2001) and Gourinchas (1998)
also decomposed the exchange rate and used the separate components as regressors in their analyses.
3. The use of 442 four-digit SIC industries as well as the use of annual data represent
two ways in which our empirical analysis is distinguished from that of Gourinchas
(1998), who restricted his sample to the 103 industries he identified as the most or
least involved in international trade and who used quarterly data.
4. Recall that the gross job-flow data represent March-to-March changes whereas all
of the other data correspond to changes over the calendar year. Thus, period t jobflow data match most closely with period t – 1 other data, so we make this timing
adjustment before estimating the model. About a one-quarter mismatch remains,
but it does not appear to seriously affect the timing of relationships between variables at annual frequencies.
5. The presence of vt implies nonindependence of the regression error term across
observations for any given year. Our estimated standard errors correct for this.
Failure to correct for nonindependence of regression errors arising from unmeasured aggregate effect in panel regressions with aggregate regressors can result in
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6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.
12.

13.

substantial understatement of the standard errors associated with those regressors;
see Kloeck (1981) or Moulton (1990).
We use essentially the same methodology as Gourinchas (1998) in constructing
the exchange rates; see, in that article, pages 165–166, especially footnote 16.
Given that the trade variables in openness and multilateral exchange rates are
lagged, the only potential source of endogeneity with respect to international
competition is in contemporaneous (time t) bilateral exchange rates. However, at
our highly disaggregated level of industrial detail (four-digit SIC), it is highly
unlikely that industry-level activity influences bilateral dollar exchange rates.
Nevertheless, as discussed below, we explored instrumental variable estimation
for robustness.
The quadratic term in the trend allowed us to account for important covariances
between the trend and cyclical parts, as well as between the level and growth rate
of each of these parts. We are unable to use time-series techniques, such as the
Beveridge-Nelson decomposition, to decompose real exchange rates into permanent and transitory components because 20 years of time-series observations are
insufficient to use these techniques.
As discussed in a footnote below, we also estimated the regressions using an
industry-specific real wage as a robustness check. Industry-specific wages have
the potential econometric drawback of being endogenously determined with
employment, but the results for the exchange rate do not depend upon which wage
measure we used.
Endogeneity is a potential problem for many of these industry-specific variables,
but our results are not sensitive to corrections for endogeneity, as we explain in
the next subsection. Also, our results are robust to the use of the aggregate real
wage rather than the industry-specific real wage. Details on these variables are
included in Appendix C.
In order for each equation to include its lagged dependent variable, we impose the
testable restrictions that β1 = –β2 in the Nit equation and β1 = β2 in the Rit equation.
Estimates of the coefficients of the unrestricted Nit regression can be calculated by
subtracting the Dit regression coefficients from the Cit regression coefficients;
similarly, estimates of the unrestricted Rit regression coefficients can be calculated
by summing the coefficients of the Cit and Dit regressions. Performing this exercise reveals that the restrictions have little or no effect on the coefficients on variables other than Ci and Di.
For references, see the surveys by Fallick (1996) and Kletzer (1998b).
By 1993 these percentiles were 0.02, 0.21, and 0.53, respectively. Thus, the estimated sensitivity of job flows to real exchange rate movements has increased significantly over time, and the effect has become more diverse over manufacturing
industries.
We conducted a number of robustness checks of the results presented in Tables
6.1 and 6.2 but do not report them because none of the checks had any qualitative
effect on the results (and even the quantitative effects were quite small). The
robustness checks included the following alternative specifications: 1) time
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effects rather than the aggregate variables, Vt; 2) the subsets of industries identified by Gourinchas (1998); 3) inclusion of real exchange rate levels; and 4) inclusion of industry-specific real wages rather than the manufacturing real wage.We
also tried estimating the models using instrumental variables (IV) estimation
rather than ordinary least squares to control for the potential endogeneity of contemporaneous bilateral real exchange rates and industry-specific variables. The
types of instrument sets we tried included the Hall-Ramey instruments used by
Gourinchas, lagged industry-specific variables, and various macroeconomic variables that should be exogenous to industries. The IV point estimates varied widely
across instrument sets and often yielded insignificant estimates (both common
problems with IV estimation), but our thorough search turned up no specification
that altered our qualitative results.

7
Job Flows and Trade
The Case of NAFTA
Although we have focused on the effect of real exchange rate
movements in this book, the real exchange rate is but one of a number
of factors that affect the international environment facing establishments. The degree of international competition facing establishments
depends upon the extent to which international markets are open and
free from government-imposed restrictions on trade. Establishments’
efforts to export will be adversely affected by tariffs and quotas
imposed upon them by foreign governments. Establishments’ domestic
sales are promoted through the protection from international competition afforded them by their own governments.
The world trading system has progressed by fits and starts toward
more openness since the end of World War II. These movements
toward freer trade have occurred both at the multilateral level, through
the various rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), and through regional agreements like the 1989 Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) between the United States and Canada and, more
recently, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These
trade negotiations have lowered tariff rates and reduced quota restrictions on industries in member countries. By lifting these politically
imposed impediments to trade, agreements such as NAFTA increase
the volume of both imports and exports. Our econometric estimates
suggest that the increased openness of the economy leaves patterns of
labor demand more sensitive to fluctuations in real exchange rates.
Trade agreements also have a direct effect on labor demand, however,
as plants and firms expand or contract in response to the new trading
environment.
This chapter demonstrates that much of our analysis of the effects
of real exchange rate fluctuations is relevant to understanding how
trade liberalization affects labor markets. The first section discusses the
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similarities and differences between trade liberalization and real
exchange rate movements. We then turn to analysis of a recent trade
liberalization: implementation of NAFTA. Following a brief general
analysis of NAFTA, we focus on case studies of how NAFTA affected
three industries: textiles and apparel, chemicals, and automobiles.

ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION

Trade liberalization may generate economic effects that are much
like permanent changes in real exchange rates. An important common
element is that trade liberalization and real exchange rate movements
both result in changes in the prices of goods produced in the United
States relative to goods produced abroad. For U.S. companies producing goods for export, lower tariffs have an effect that is similar to a permanent depreciation of the dollar relative to the currency of the
countries that have reduced tariffs on goods produced in the United
States. Both tariff reductions and depreciation reduce the prices
charged in the other countries for goods produced in the United States,
but tariff reductions differ from a depreciation in that they also reduce
the prices in the United States of goods produced by other members of
the trade agreement relative to domestically produced goods. So, from
the standpoint of foreign firms that export their goods to the United
States, implementation of a trade liberalization is much like a permanent real appreciation of the dollar.
In the model presented in Chapter 5, heterogeneity across establishments within industries combined with the general equilibrium
effects of changes in exchange rates could lead some establishments to
increase employment in response to an exchange rate movement while
other establishments within the same industry may reduce their
employment. A similar mechanism could result in simultaneous job
creation and job destruction within industries following implementation of a trade agreement. Although establishments within an industry
in which the United States has a comparative advantage would tend to
experience an increase in the demand for their products following a
general trade liberalization, some establishments would experience a
greater increase than others as a result of heterogeneity. For example,
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some establishments may be producing products which are already
being marketed abroad, while others may not yet be producing products for export. As a result, some establishments’ derived demand for
labor schedules would shift out more than would other establishments’
labor-demand schedules. As the industry’s total labor demand
increases, wages of the industry’s workers would tend to be bid up,
resulting in a backward movement along establishments’ labordemand schedules. The net effect might be for overall industry
employment to increase but for employment at some establishments
within the industry to decrease.
One likely source of heterogeneity over establishments within an
industry is the stage of production the plant is engaged in. Although the
United States might have a comparative advantage at some aspects of
production within an industry, other countries may have a comparative
advantage in other aspects. Feenstra and Hanson (2003) noted that
increased openness may be associated with a shift in the production of
less skilled labor intensive intermediate goods to lower wage countries.
This effect of trade might result in reallocation of resources largely
within, rather than between, industries.1 Employment at domestic
plants producing intermediate goods would decrease, but employment
at other establishments within the same industry might simultaneously
increase. Trade liberalization would increase the profitability of specialization according to comparative advantage, and thus tend to promote within-industry reallocation.
The high degree of heterogeneity across industries in their exposure to international trade, which we document in Chapter 2, is as
important to understanding the effects of trade liberalization as it is to
understanding the effects of exchange rate movements. The magnitude
of the impact of trade liberalization on an industry depends on its exposure to trade and the degree to which trade barriers for its output and
inputs are reduced. Industries which experience the largest reductions
in tariffs, and those which are initially the most open, will be the most
affected by trade liberalization. In considering the level of an industry’s initial exposure to trade, however, the effect of the initial level of
tariffs and trade restrictions on the initial level of openness must be
taken into account. Tradable goods sectors with high tariffs (or other
politically imposed barriers to trade) may initially appear to have little
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exposure to trade, but they may potentially experience greatly
increased trade as tariffs are reduced.
Although the economic effects of trade liberalization are similar in
many ways to the effects of movements in the real exchange rate, our
econometric estimates cannot be directly used to predict the effects of
trade liberalization on job creation and job destruction. As noted
above, trade liberalization is equivalent to a simultaneous depreciation
of the dollar from the standpoint of exporters and an appreciation of the
dollar from the standpoint of importers, and so it does not match the
type of exchange rate movements which our model estimates are based
on. Moreover, the degree and sources of heterogeneity over plants
within industries applicable for analysis of the effects of trade liberalization may be quite different from those relevant to analysis of movements in real exchange rates.
An important difference between trade liberalization and exchange
rate swings is that trade agreements result from explicit policy decisions, and the resulting political debate is sometimes acrimonious. In
contrast, an appreciation of the dollar generally takes place without any
explicit policy action. Industry groups may lobby for a weak dollar policy or ask for special assistance to counter the effect of the appreciation
on their competitive position, but there is typically relatively little, if
any, discussion of exchange rate management policy, at least in the
United States.
The controversy over trade liberalization is generally focused on
negotiations over new trade agreements. The fierce opposition to
NAFTA is a case in point. Labor unions promised political repercussions for congressmen who voted for its ratification. The NAFTA
debate made its way into American living rooms in November 1993
when Vice President Al Gore debated its merits with Ross Perot, whose
prediction of a “great sucking sound” raised concerns about the migration of jobs from the United States to Mexico. Six years later, the streets
of Seattle played host to protesters who paralyzed the city while the
WTO, the successor to the GATT, met there. Reflecting on this episode,
Jay Mazur, the President of the Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and
Textile Employees and Chair of the AFL-CIO International Affairs
Committee, wrote in Foreign Affairs: “. . . the labor movement’s message from Seattle could not have been clearer: The era of trade negotiations conducted by sheltered elites balancing competing commercial
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interests behind closed doors is over . . . Globalization is . . . hurting too
many and helping too few” (2000, p. 79). Given the prominence of
NAFTA in the recent debate over trade policy, we focus on this trade
agreement in the remainder of this chapter.

AN OVERVIEW OF NAFTA

The infamous Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 brought U.S. tariffs to their highest levels up to that time. This American protectionism
prompted retaliatory tariff acts from other countries. These rounds of
tariffs are believed to have contributed to both the severity of the Great
Depression and its international transmission.
Trade policy in the post–World War II era reflects the hard lessons
learned from the interwar period. Trade liberalization has been a goal
of most industrial countries and, increasingly, of developing countries
as well. This liberalization has proceeded on two fronts, through multilateral agreements and through regional trading agreements involving
smaller sets of countries. Multilateral trade liberalization progressed
through rounds of negotiations under the auspices of the GATT. The
latest round of negotiations, the 1986 to 1994 Uruguay Round, led to
the creation of the WTO. Alongside this multilateral track, nations
have also negotiated trade arrangements among more limited sets of
countries. These arrangements can be found all over the globe, with
“trade clubs” in Europe (among members of the European Union who
enacted the 1992 “Single Market”), Asia (including the Association of
South East Asian Nations, ASEAN), South America (including MERCOSUR, the abbreviation for MERcado COmún del SUR, a trade
agreement among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay), and
North America (NAFTA).
The NAFTA treaty expanded the 1989 United States–Canada Free
Trade Agreement by bringing Mexico into a free trade area.2 The treaty
was signed by the United States, Canada, and Mexico in December
1992 and, after being ratified by the legislatures of the three countries,
its implementation began on January 1, 1994. Among other provisions, NAFTA calls for the elimination of all tariffs on industrial products traded among the United States, Canada, and Mexico by 2004.3
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The main effect of NAFTA is on trade between the United States and
Mexico, because there was already virtually free trade between the
United States and Canada and trade between Canada and Mexico is relatively limited. The tariff reductions undertaken by Mexico exceed
those of the United States since, before NAFTA, Mexican tariffs on
United States imports were about two-and-a-half times larger than U.S.
tariffs on Mexican imports.4 Mexico eliminated tariffs on almost half
of all industrial goods imported from the United States in January 1994
and, by the beginning of 1999, 65 percent of all U.S. exports of industrial products to Mexico were tariff free. NAFTA also led to the elimination of nontariff barriers and trade-distorting restrictions such as
local content requirements that limited the access of U.S. manufacturers to Mexican markets.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH RELATED TO THE ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF NAFTA

It is difficult to conclusively link NAFTA to the creation or
destruction of jobs in the United States. As is always the case, the
world does not offer controlled experiments whereby one and only one
feature of the economy is altered while all else is held equal. This difficulty is especially acute here because of other contemporaneous
events. Perhaps most importantly, Mexico suffered a financial crisis in
December 1994, when speculative pressure forced a 50 percent devaluation of the peso. As Krueger (1999) emphasized, this depreciation had
a much larger impact on the relative price of Mexican goods than did
the tariff reductions mandated by NAFTA, which will average only 15
percent even after the reductions are phased in completely.
In the wake of its financial crisis, Mexico suffered an economic
crisis; its economy contracted by 7 percent over the first nine months
of 1995, although it subsequently rebounded. The United States
enjoyed strong growth throughout the second half of the 1990s for reasons not related to NAFTA and, consequently, the employment growth
of this period in any given sector partially reflects the overall trends in
the U.S. economy. Further complicating any attempt at isolating the
effect of NAFTA is the fact that, beginning in 1995, the United States
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implemented tariff cuts that were agreed to in the Uruguay Round of
the GATT and were unrelated to NAFTA. Thus, the United States
would have reduced tariffs on Mexican products even in the absence of
NAFTA.5
Despite the potentially confounding effects of these factors, as well
as others, efforts have been made to determine the consequences of
NAFTA. At the aggregate level, a study by DRI/McGraw-Hill (now
Global Insight) concluded that NAFTA increased U.S. exports to Mexico by $12 billion per year and Mexican exports to the United States by
$5 billion per year. The U.S. Commerce Department estimated that the
export gains due to NAFTA support 90,000 to 160,000 jobs in the
United States. Furthermore, NAFTA had little effect on the overall
level of U.S. imports from Mexico, because the pre-NAFTA tariffs
imposed by the United States on Mexican goods were generally low
and, therefore, their removal was not of great consequence. Finally, the
feared “great sucking sound” seems to have been little more than the
tiniest of slurps, since U.S. direct investment in Mexico declined
between 1994 and 1997 while its direct investment to the rest of the
world increased. A study by the U.S. International Trade Commission
concluded that U.S. direct investment in Mexico had minimal impact
on aggregate investment at home.6 Recent overviews of the economic
effects of NAFTA by Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder (2001), and
by Krueger (1999) concluded that the overall impact of NAFTA on the
U.S. economy has been relatively small.
One would expect that the impact of NAFTA would differ across
geographic areas within the United States as a result of differences in
industrial specialization. Some areas may have a concentration of
industries that would benefit from the increased opportunities for
exporting, while others may have a concentration of industries vulnerable to competition from lower wage areas. Coughlin and Wall (2001)
found that implementation of NAFTA is associated with changes in the
distribution of exports over states. They estimated that overall U.S.
merchandise exports increased by close to 8 percent as a result of
NAFTA, but that the change varied widely over states. Thirteen states
increased exports by 20 percent or more as a result of NAFTA, while
the effect was negative for 12 states. The wide variation in the change
in exports over regions suggests that the impact on local labor markets,
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and associated magnitude of job reallocation, exceeded that suggested
by the national average of 8 percent export growth.
One expected benefit of trade liberalization is lower production
costs. As competitive pressure increases, less productive plants need to
either improve productivity or shut down. In some cases, the expanded
market may also make it possible to realize greater economies of scale.
Free trade in raw materials and intermediate products reduces the cost
of the inputs into production, resulting in lower costs. Trefler (2001)
focused on the effect of the 1989–1996 Canada–U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (that preceded NAFTA) on Canadian manufacturing.7 He
found that industries which experienced large tariff reductions suffered
a 15 percent decline in employment. Offsetting this, however, is a large
increase in labor productivity associated with turnover of low-productivity plants and increased technical efficiency at surviving plants.
Tybout and Westbrook (1995) examined the effect of trade liberalization in the 1980s on Mexican manufacturing. They found that average
cost decreases were largest in relatively open manufacturing industries.
For export-oriented industries, the average cost decreases were associated with decreased input prices. In the case of industries with import
competition, productivity improvements played a significant role.
Scale effects were relatively unimportant in explaining productivity
improvements.
One of the principal concerns of opponents of trade liberalization
is the effect of trade on the distribution of wages. Although workers in
high-wage countries are viewed as most at risk, workers in protected
sectors of less developed countries may also be adversely affected.
Revenga (1997) found that trade liberalization has been associated
with real wage decreases in Mexican manufacturing. Some of the economic rents arising from trade protection had accrued to workers in the
form of higher wages, and these were dissipated as the degree of protection was decreased. Hanson and Harrison (1999) found that the
Mexican trade liberalization resulted in an increase in wage inequality.
The liberalization in trade was especially strong in low-skill industries,
exposing Mexican producers to competition from countries with more
abundant supplies of unskilled labor.
It is surprisingly difficult to find a direct link between protection
from trade and wages in the United States. Gaston and Trefler (1994)
examined how trade protection affects U.S. manufacturing wages.
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They found that protection is associated with lower wages, holding
worker characteristics constant.

SECTOR-SPECIFIC EFFECTS

Eventually, NAFTA will lead to the full liberalization of trade
among the United States, Canada, and Mexico.8 All tariffs among these
countries will be eliminated by 2004 for industrial products and by
2009 for all other products. NAFTA also will bring about the elimination of nontariff barriers and other distortions to trade, such as quotas
and licenses.
This section considers the effects of NAFTA for three key manufacturing sectors experiencing significant trade liberalization: the textile and apparel industries (combined), the chemical industry, and the
automobile vehicle industry. In these industries, NAFTA led to the
reduction of large Mexican tariffs on imports from the United States
and Canada, as well as to the reduction of tariffs on Mexican exports to
the United States and Canada, both of which were lower than the Mexican import tariffs initially. We look at the extent of tariff reductions
and elimination of nontariff barriers in these sectors, as well as their
possible effects on trade.
In this section, we adopt a more narrative approach than we utilized in our analysis of the effects of real exchange rate movements on
job creation and job destruction. Given the limited time span since the
implementation of NAFTA began, and the significant macroeconomic
developments that occurred during the same time period, the fruitfulness of formal econometric analysis may be very limited.9 What we can
do is look at net employment levels for narrowly defined industries and
review reports of industry activity with an eye toward the potential
effects of NAFTA on gross job flows. Specifically, we examine the
correlation between developments in the foreign trade activity of
industries and their labor market behavior. The foreign trade measures
for each industry are:
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Export Share =

Import Penetration Ratio =

Exports
Total Sales
Imports
.
Total Sales + Imports

These measures are constructed for both multilateral and bilateral
trade. Multilateral trade includes all exports or imports in the industry
to all countries, whereas bilateral trade includes only trade between the
United States and Mexico. Finally, we also look at the ratio of the bilateral trade measures to the multilateral trade measures to ascertain the
relative importance of NAFTA trade to worldwide trade for the industry.
Our approach presents us with a result that is a subtext of the entire
book, the diverse response within industries to a change in the international environment. This result offers evidence that “globalization” is
both helping and hurting, though whether it is helping too few and
hurting too many, as in the view cited above, necessarily depends upon
a weighting of the relative welfare gains and losses across individuals.
Before turning to the industry analyses, we offer a brief overview
of macroeconomic conditions in Mexico, which are important to bear
in mind when evaluating the effects of NAFTA. Figure 7.1 plots the
real growth rate of Mexican GDP and the real exchange rate between
the Mexican peso and U.S. dollar (adjusted for consumer prices) for
the period 1980 to 2002. The most notable feature pertinent to our analyses is the Mexican crisis of 1994–1995, during which the real peso
devalued sharply and GDP growth plunged to its lowest level in the
sample period. Because the crisis unfolded at precisely the same time
NAFTA was implemented, it is extremely difficult to identify the separate effect of NAFTA during the crisis. However, real GDP growth
rebounded fairly quickly and was robust throughout the remainder of
the 1990s. The real peso took the rest of the decade to return to its precrisis level, but it appreciated fairly steadily during that time.
The trend behavior of Mexican real GDP growth and the real peso
are also important for interpreting the effects of NAFTA. Since the late
1980s, both real GDP growth and the real peso have been relatively
strong on average, especially compared with the rest of the 1980s. This
general strength probably contributed to higher Mexican multilateral
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Figure 7.1 Macroeconomic Developments in Mexico (Real GDP growth
Q1:1981–Q3:2002, Real exchange rate Q1:1980–Q4:2002)
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imports and exports in all industries, on average, and this probably
translated into higher bilateral U.S. exports to Mexico and bilateral
U.S. imports from Mexico as well.
To summarize, both the cyclical effects of the Mexican crisis and
the trend robustness of the Mexican macroeconomy are important factors that influenced Mexican multilateral trade in the years surrounding
NAFTA. Thus, we might expect to see a long-run trend increase in
U.S.–Mexico bilateral trade as well. Also, there may be a cyclical
influence from the Mexican crisis, most likely manifesting itself as a
decline in U.S. bilateral exports to Mexico. Indeed, we find both of
these effects in the trade data. Any separate effects attributable to
NAFTA would appear over and above the effects of the macroeconomic developments.
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Textiles and Apparel

The U.S. textile and apparel industries (SICs 22 and 23) are often
viewed as susceptible to the destruction of low-wage jobs through
international competition. In 1996, U.S. average hourly earnings in
these industries were relatively low: $9.62 per hour for textiles and
$7.67 per hour for apparel, compared with $12.00 per hour for all manufacturing. Nevertheless, the relatively low earnings in these industries
are significantly higher than the earnings of textile and apparel workers
in less developed countries with which the United States trades, such as
Mexico. Thus, U.S. textile and apparel jobs potentially are threatened
by imports and by the relocation of plants abroad. Concern about the
welfare of workers in these industries may have contributed to the relatively high tariff protection afforded textile and apparel firms before
NAFTA.
Table 7.1 provides an overview of the changes in tariffs and trade
rules for the textile and apparel industries as a result of NAFTA. The
Table 7.1 NAFTA Changes for Textiles and Apparel
Country
Mexico

Category
Tariff

Rule

United States

Tariff

Change
Developments
Eliminated 20% apparel U.S. textile and apparel exports
and 15% textile tariffs
to Mexico increased from less
mostly by 1998 and
than $1.6 billion in 1993 to
completely by 2002.
$2.8 billion in 1996.
Allowed domestic sales During 1995 financial crisis,
by maquiladora
Mexico placed 35% tariffs on
plants.
non-NAFTA goods.
Eliminated 9.1% average U.S. importers shifted from
tariff by 2000 on:
Asian to NAFTA imports.
95% of fabric imports,
From 1993 to 1996, Canadian
83% of made-up textile and Mexican share increases
imports,
from 6% to 14% of total U.S.
99% of apparel imports. textile and apparel imports.
Benefits U.S. industry
because NAFTA members
use more U.S. supplies than
Asian competitors.
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primary impact of the agreement was to eliminate the substantial tariffs
on these products levied by both the United States and Mexico by the
year 2002. Mexico also removed some trade barriers for NAFTA partners but raised tariffs on non-NAFTA partners.
Prior to NAFTA, the average U.S. tariff on imports of Mexican
textile and apparel products was the highest among 22 industrial categories. Thus, U.S. firms in these two sectors faced the largest reductions in protection due to NAFTA among all U.S. manufacturers.
Mexico had even higher tariffs in these industries before NAFTA, so
Mexican firms in these sectors faced even more dramatic changes in
their trade with NAFTA partners. However, to some extent the policy
changes toward non-NAFTA partners offset the NAFTA changes. 10
For historical perspective, Figure 7.2 plots U.S. employment in the
textile and apparel industries since 1939. Employment declined fairly
steadily in both industries for many years—both in absolute terms and

Figure 7.2 U.S. Employment in the Textile and Apparel Industries (1939–
2001)
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as a share of manufacturing employment. These negative trends reflect
a variety of long-run technological factors, international trade, and
other forces that obviously cannot be attributed to NAFTA.11 Moreover, the sources of the trends differ between the two industries.
Textile employment has trended downward since World War II.
The main driving force has been revolutionary technological advances,
which have led to labor productivity growth of twice the rate for all
manufacturing. At least partly because of this innovation, the textile
industry faced only mild competition from foreign textile producers.
From 1970 to 1988, textile imports as a proportion of domestic consumption rose modestly from 4.6 percent to 6.8 percent. Within this
industry, firms that adopted the technological advances would have
been relatively free from foreign competition, while those firms that
did not—or could not—keep up with technology likely declined and
destroyed jobs at a faster rate.
In contrast, technological innovation in the apparel industry was
much less dramatic and much more incremental. Apparel employment
did not peak until the early 1970s, when the industry began to experience stiff competition from foreign apparel producers, particularly
those in developing countries with very low wages. From 1970 to
1988, apparel imports as a proportion of domestic consumption jumped
from 5.2 percent to 26.1 percent and employment began a trend
decline, perhaps because of the adverse effects of increased trade via
imports.
The question at hand for both industries is whether NAFTA could
be responsible for employment effects above and beyond those attributable to other factors such as trend developments, macroeconomic
conditions in the United States and Mexico, and non-NAFTA trade
changes. This question is difficult to answer definitively for these
industries given the range of factors involved, but also because of the
mixed employment responses. Following the implementation of
NAFTA on January 1, 1994, textile employment continued to decline
at about the same long-run trend rate as it did before NAFTA. In contrast, employment in the apparel industry appears to have declined at a
much faster rate than before NAFTA, dropping about 40 percent since
1994. The timing and magnitude of the apparent change in the apparel
employment trend suggest the possibility that it may be related to
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NAFTA, but one would want corroborating evidence from foreign
trade data.
Figure 7.3 portrays the dramatic changes in U.S. international trade
of textile and apparel products.12 Since the early 1970s, the multilateral
import penetration ratio (left scale) has risen steadily by almost sixfold, to nearly 35 percent in 2001.13 The multilateral export share was
essentially flat until the late 1980s, when it began increasing steadily,
and it has approximately tripled since then. Although multilateral
imports have risen somewhat faster in the second half of the 1990s,
there is no apparent change in either measure that seems obviously
connected with the implementation of NAFTA.
A closer look at the bilateral trade shares between the United States
and Mexico, also shown in Figure 7.3 (right scale), reveals changes
that are likely to be connected with NAFTA.14 The most notable development is a sharp increase in the share of U.S. exports to Mexico since
the late 1980s. As Krueger (1999) explained, changes in trade between
the United States and Mexico before the implementation of NAFTA
may reflect anticipation of its passage, but it is more likely that the
changes primarily reflect general trade liberalization and favorable
macroeconomic developments in Mexico since the late 1980s. Nevertheless, the pace of increase in the bilateral export share quickened significantly since 1994 and may reflect a boost by NAFTA. Most of this
faster increase in bilateral exports to Mexico occurred in the textiles
industry. The share of U.S. bilateral imports from Mexico is small and
did not change as much, but there also appears to be evidence of a significant increase in the upward trend since the implementation of
NAFTA.
Whether or not NAFTA was significant enough to affect total U.S.
multilateral trade in textiles and apparel, it does seem to have contributed to changes in the bilateral composition of such trade. Figure 7.4
illustrates the compositional shift by plotting the shares of bilateral
U.S.–Mexico trade in total U.S. multilateral trade. The shares of U.S.
textile and apparel trade with Mexico have been increasing rapidly
since the mid 1980s; the bilateral export share roughly tripled to about
30 percent, and bilateral import share roughly quadrupled to about 2
percent. In both cases, the reorientation of exports and imports toward
firms trading with Mexico quickened shortly after NAFTA took effect.
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Figure 7.3 International Trade Shares in the Textile and Apparel
Industries, U.S. Multilateral and Bilateral U.S.–Mexico
(1972–2001)
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Figure 7.4 Ratio of U.S.–Mexico Bilateral to U.S. Multilateral Trade in
the Textile and Apparel Industries (1972–2001)
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NAFTA seems to have contributed to the shift in American purchases of textiles and apparel from the Far East to North America,
making Mexico and Canada the top two suppliers of textiles and
apparel for the United States. In 1993, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
Korea together accounted for 39 percent of U.S. textile and apparel
imports, while Mexico and Canada accounted for 7 percent. By 1996,
these percentages shifted to 30 percent for China, Hong Kong, Taiwan,
and Korea and 14 percent for Mexico and Canada. This shift, toward
firms that tend to use more American products as inputs, was welcomed by the textile industry.
In 1999, Doug Ellis, CEO of Southern Mills, Inc., in Atlanta and
president of the American Textile Manufactures Institute (ATMI), was
quoted as saying that Asian economies “. . . are still trying to export
their way out of their difficulties and, to our detriment, the U.S. is the
one they rely on as a buyer of first and last resort.” He continued that,
because of the use of U.S. textile products in Mexican and Canadian
apparel manufacture, “If it weren’t for NAFTA, our exports would be
in much worse shape.”15 A September 1997 news release by the ATMI
echoes this theme, stating “. . . in terms of textile and apparel trade, our
NAFTA-forged relationship with Mexico is truly symbiotic, truly
mutually rewarding.”16
Note well, however, the disparity in bilateral export and import
shares. Although the import share increased more in percentage terms,
the import share is an order of magnitude smaller than the export share.
In fact, the small share of textile and apparel imports from Mexico suggests that it is unlikely that NAFTA itself stimulated enough new
imports to threaten many jobs in the textile and apparel industry overall. Individual U.S. textile and apparel firms, however, would have
been affected relatively more or less if their trade with NAFTA partners was disproportionately high or low.
To the extent they exist, any employment effects of NAFTA are
manifested in the net and gross job flows depicted in Figure 7.5.17 Net
employment in the textile and apparel industries has been declining at a
much faster rate during the NAFTA period. This net employment
reduction probably has been accomplished mostly by an increase in the
rate of job destruction, which is estimated to have been at high levels
normally associated with past recessions and other major manufacturing contractions. Job creation, on the other hand, has steadied at, or just
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Figure 7.5 U.S. Gross Job Flows in the Textile and Apparel Industries
(1973–2002)
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slightly below, its long-run average. Together, these developments
brought about a significant increase in the rate of job reallocation
among textile and apparel plants.
Linking trade-related changes in the textile and apparel industries
to net employment change is tricky at best, and we have only a short
sample of data for the post-NAFTA period. Because the share of
imports of textiles and apparel from Mexico is very small, the effect of
NAFTA on net employment in this industry is almost surely small as
well. Many other factors, some of which were non-NAFTA traderelated issues, also likely played important roles. Competition from
non-NAFTA countries and the high value of the dollar have been problems for domestic industries, and competitive pressure will likely further increase in the near future with the expiration of quota restrictions
on textile imports from China.18
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Although the net employment effect of NAFTA probably was very
small, it is possible that NAFTA and other trade-related changes in
Mexico may have contributed more to gross job flows. This conclusion
depends importantly, though, on the assumption that sufficient heterogeneity exists among textile and apparel plants. If plants differ enough
in their extent of participation in international trade and in the countries
with which they trade, we should expect the trade changes to induce
gross job flows. The compositional shift toward trade with Mexico,
evident primarily from the substantial increase in the share of exports
going to Mexico, may tend to induce job creation in plants exporting to
Mexico and job destruction in plants exporting to other countries.
What remains hard to explain, solely based on trade developments,
is the asymmetry between creation and destruction in the late 1990s.
The multilateral trade gap (exports less imports) for textiles and
apparel has grown steadily during the past 3 decades, as is apparent
from Figure 7.3. Undoubtedly, this ongoing shift in the relative importance of domestic producers has put downward pressure on employment in the industry, but it is unclear why domestic producers
responded more on the destruction margin. Perhaps Foote’s (1998)
argument regarding nonconvex employment adjustment in declining
industries is applicable here. In any case, the apparent relative success
of U.S. textile and apparel producers who export to Mexico suggests
that they may have experienced unusual increases in job creation.
Other more subtle factors may help explain the relative importance
of job destruction. As Bernard and Jensen (1995) note, exporters tend
to be larger, more technologically advanced, and have higher labor
productivity. Thus, a shift in employment toward these producers
could, on average, induce a reduction in total industry employment that
would be accomplished primarily by job destruction in plants relatively
unengaged in foreign trade. A more subtle explanation may arise from
differences in the types of textile and apparel products traded among
NAFTA partners. For example, if products traded among NAFTA partners were more “sophisticated” and required higher levels of technology and capital intensity, then the compositional shift could also
motivate the job flows we observe. Of course, without more specific
data, these explanations remain merely speculative.

132 Klein, Schuh, and Triest

Chemicals and Allied Products

The chemical and allied products industry (SIC 28) is the third
largest U.S. export sector. Its production workers enjoy the highest
average wages of any manufacturing sector, about $17 per hour in
1996, reflecting the use of well-trained and highly skilled production
workers in an increasingly complex industry. The industry is also quite
diverse, manufacturing over 50,000 different substances, and this
diversity is reflected in the attributes of its subsectors. For example, the
shares of production workers in the two largest subsectors, drugs (SIC
283) at 50 percent and plastic materials and synthetics (SIC 282) at 67
percent, differ significantly from the 60 percent average for all chemical industries.
Table 7.2 summarizes the changes in tariffs and trade rules pertaining to the chemical industry due to NAFTA. Prior to NAFTA, average
chemical tariffs were relatively low compared with the other industry
Table 7.2 NAFTA Changes for Chemicals and Allied Products
Country
Mexico

Category
Tariff

Rule

Rule
Rule

United States Tariff

Change
Developments
Average reduced from
10.2% in 1992 to 4.0% in
1996.
Eliminated import
U.S. chemical exports to
Mexico increased from $3.4
licenses on chemicals,
rubbers, plastics, and
billion in 1993 to $5.1 billion
pharmaceuticals.
in 1996.
Agreed to protect process
patents.
Initiated competitive
U.S. exports of petrochemicals
bidding for Pemex
to Mexico grew more than 75
(government oil) and
percent to $1.2 billion from
CFE (government
1993 to 1996.
electricity) contracts.
Average reduced from
Mexican chemical exports to
1.0% in 1992 to 0.5%
United States increased from
in 1996.
$0.6 billion in 1993 to $1.4
billion in 1996 (although it is
unlikely that this small tariff
reduction caused the
increase).
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tariffs discussed in this chapter. Nevertheless, the agreement cut average tariffs in both countries by half or more. Tariff reduction in Mexico
was more important, as Mexican tariffs were 10 times larger than U.S.
tariffs. But, these averages mask a range of reductions across subsectors. For example, about one-fourth of all chemical products had
entered Mexico duty free before NAFTA, while tariffs on certain pharmaceuticals were as high as 20 percent. The new, lower Mexican
chemicals tariff reflects the immediate elimination of 20 percent tariffs
on close to one-half of U.S. pharmaceutical exports to Mexico.
Equally importantly, NAFTA required Mexico to adopt several
changes in rules that significantly liberalized trade. For example, it
eliminated import licenses and terminated the virtual monopoly held
by the Mexican government on petrochemical production. The latter
change opened Mexican petrochemical markets to U.S. and Canadian
firms, leading to cross-border vertical integration with Mexican firms
supplying basic and primary products for manufacture in the United
States into high value-added secondary petrochemicals. The effects of
NAFTA on other chemical industries likely were mixed. Some sectors
were little affected for technological reasons. For example, prepared
paint is costly to transport relative to its price. This leaves little scope
for supply from distant firms; indeed, the U.S. paint market comprises
many small to medium-sized firms that are geographically dispersed.
Figure 7.6 plots the history of employment in the chemical industry since 1939. Employment grew steadily until the 1970s, when it leveled off at a little above 1 million workers. This time-series pattern is
similar to that of total manufacturing employment, except that chemicals employment rose faster in the earlier period, while its manufacturing share has stabilized more recently. In particular, note that
chemicals employment has changed little during the post-NAFTA
period, hovering at about its average for the past three decades.
As in most industries, foreign trade has been increasing in importance for chemicals, as shown in Figure 7.7. Total multilateral exports
and imports (left scale) have trended upward since the early 1970s,
with exports doubling to more than 16 percent and imports more than
tripling to about 13 percent by 2001. During the NAFTA period both
multilateral exports and imports have continued to increase. Exports
have increased in line with their long-term trend, but imports have
risen significantly faster since NAFTA. However, because the NAFTA
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Figure 7.6 U.S. Employment in the Chemical Industry (1939–2001)
1.2

1.0
NAFTA

Millions

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0
1939 1943 1947 1951 1955 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Figure 7.7 International Trade Shares in the Chemical Industry, U.S.
Multilateral and Bilateral U.S.–Mexico (1972–2001)
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changes pertaining to U.S. chemical imports from Mexico were modest, it seems unlikely that the increasing propensity to import chemicals
is attributable to NAFTA. This conclusion is supported by developments in the bilateral trade shares (right scale), also shown in Figure
7.7. Imports from Mexico have not increased at a significantly faster
pace like the multilateral imports did. Exports to Mexico have nearly
doubled since NAFTA and may have been influenced at least in part by
the trade liberalization, but it appears that bilateral exports to Mexico
began to increase faster even before NAFTA.
The shares of bilateral trade to Mexico confirm this assessment. As
can be seen in Figure 7.8, U.S. chemical imports from Mexico (right
scale) peaked shortly after NAFTA, then declined, and now are at
about the same level they were at before NAFTA, but they seem to be
about in line with their long-run upward trend. These relatively minor
changes probably stem from the fact that U.S. tariffs on Mexican
chemicals averaged only 1 percent before NAFTA. In contrast, U.S.
exports to Mexico seem to have risen more rapidly since NAFTA (left
scale). Exports of chemicals to Mexico were approximately 6 percent
of total exports of chemicals until NAFTA but have risen to about 10
percent since then. This increase of more than 50 percent compares
favorably to the 37 percent increase in exports to non-NAFTA countries during the same period, and Mexico became the third largest foreign destination of U.S. chemical exports by 1998 (Canada is the
largest). However, the increases in bilateral export shares, both relative
to industry sales and to total industry exports, are relatively modest and
not too far out of line with trend increases since the mid 1980s, when
other developments stimulated trade with Mexico. Thus, NAFTA
seems to have shifted trade within the chemicals toward Mexico without significantly affecting overall trade, just as it did in textiles and
apparel.
Given the lack of significant changes in employment and trade, it
seems unlikely that NAFTA generated much change in job flows in the
chemical industry. Figure 7.9 confirms this conjecture. Gross job flows
in the chemical industry have been relatively stable near their long-run
averages during the NAFTA period. Thus, there is little evidence, from
either gross job flows or net employment change, that NAFTA caused
much reallocation of jobs beyond the normal churning in this industry.
Apparently the NAFTA changes were not large enough to bring about
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Figure 7.8 Ratio of U.S.–Mexico Bilateral to U.S. Multilateral Trade in
the Chemical Industry (1972–2001)
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Figure 7.9 U.S. Gross Job Flows in the Chemical Industry (1973–2002)
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significant employment adjustments overall. Furthermore, the shifts of
trade in chemicals toward Mexico apparently occurred within establishments, rather than between establishments, and did not entail many
job changes.
Automobiles

The automobile industry (SIC 371) dominates trade among Canada, Mexico, and the United States.19 Automobiles and automobile
products represent not only the largest component of all three bilateral
trade relationships, but also the largest component in each direction for
all six bilateral trade flows among these three countries. Overall, the
auto industry accounts for 40 percent of North American trade (Weintraub and Sands 1998).
The liberalization of the North American automobile trade began
in 1965 with the Canada–U.S. Automotive Products Trade Agreement
(APTA), also known as the Auto Pact. This agreement increased the
number of U.S. vehicles and components allowed to be sold in Canada.
It led to the integration of the automotive industries in the United
States and Canada, with Canadian plants taking over a disproportionate
share of vehicle assembly, and U.S. sites largely responsible for
research and development, product engineering, and the production of
high-valued parts (Kumar and Holmes 1998). NAFTA represents an
effort to extend this vertical integration to Mexico.
Prior to NAFTA, Mexican policy primarily had been directed
toward preventing the integration of its auto industry with U.S. firms.
The Mexican government issued a series of Auto Decrees, beginning in
1962, that segmented the domestic auto market and awarded rights to
manufacture for each segment. The fifth Auto Decree, issued in 1989,
liberalized domestic production but retained barriers to exports from
the United States. Along with continued tariff protection, this decree
included a “trade balancing” requirement for Mexican assemblers that
mandated their export sales as a function of their import purchases.
This provision made investment in Mexico the only viable way for
U.S. auto firms to sell in the Mexican market. The Mexican government encouraged production for export with the 1989 Maquiladora
Decree. Maquiladora plants, sited in Mexico near the U.S. border,
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manufactured and assembled products that were exported to the United
States (Doh 1998).
Table 7.3 provides an overview of the changes in tariffs and trade
rules for the automobile industry due to NAFTA.20 NAFTA eventually
eliminates all of the protectionist aspects of the Mexican Auto Decrees.
Table 7.3 NAFTA Changes for Automobiles
Country
Category
Change
Developments
CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS
Mexico
Tariff
Immediate reduction
U.S. light auto exports to
from 20% to 10% with
Mexico increase from 17,000
elimination by 1998 for units ($0.24 billion) in 1993
light trucks and by 2003 to 91,000 units ($1.3 billion)
for cars.
in 1996.
Rule
Allow domestic sales by Greater economies of scale
because manufacturers no
maquiladora plants.
Rule
Eliminate trade balancing longer need to simultaneously
manufacture same models in
rules.
different countries.
Quota
Eliminate import quotas.
United States Tariff
Immediate elimination
Mexican light auto exports to
of 2.5% tariff on cars;
U.S. increased from $11.1
immediate reduction
billion in 1993 to $22.9
from 25% to 10% on
billion in 1996.
light trucks and
elimination by 2004.
HEAVY AND MEDIUM TRUCKS
Mexico
Tariff
Eliminate 20% tariff by
2003.
Rule
Eliminate trade balance
and local content
requirements by 1998.
Rule
Mexican companies can
lease vehicles.
United States
and Mexico

Rule

U.S. heavy and medium truck
exports to Mexico increase.

Mexican vehicle operation and
maintenance markets opened
to U.S. providers.
Liberalized restrictions on Mexican fleets must be
land transportation
modernized to meet U.S.
between United States
safety and environmental
and Mexico.
standards, creating a new
market for U.S. suppliers.
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All Mexican tariffs and most nontariff barriers associated with North
American trade in cars and trucks are to be eliminated. Likewise, all
U.S. tariffs on cars and light trucks will be removed.
These changes create an essentially frictionless, integrated automobile market in North America. Given the dominance of U.S. automobile manufacturers in NAFTA countries, this integrated market
suggests that the impact of trade on U.S. employment may be quite different in the automobile industry than in other industries that are not
integrated. Conceivably, the liberalization of automobile trade between
the United States and Mexico may actually increase both trade and
employment in the industry if liberalization improves the cost efficiency and productivity of the industry, or if it stimulates total demand
for automobiles.
Figure 7.10 plots the history of employment in the automobile
industry since 1939. Automobile employment fluctuated widely
between 600,000 and 1 million throughout most of the historical
period. During the late 1950s and early 1960s employment declined
but subsequently rebounded following APTA. During the 1980s and
early 1990s, foreign competition, especially from Japan, and labor-saving technological innovations contributed to much slower employment
growth. During the post-NAFTA period, however, employment rose
significantly, and even its share of total manufacturing employment
increased. Thus, the question arises: are the changes in NAFTA linked
in any way to this surge in auto employment?
The importance of total foreign trade in the auto industry has not
changed much during the NAFTA period, as can be seen in Figure
7.11. Multilateral exports and imports (left scale) were relatively flat
during this period, and neither trade measure ended up much above its
previous historical high. The recent slower growth of multilateral trade
contrasts with the steady trend increase in both multilateral exports and
imports during the prior two decades, particularly in imports, which
peaked in the mid 1980s.
However, Figure 7.11 shows that bilateral trade with Mexico (right
scale) has increased dramatically since the 1980s and especially during
the NAFTA period. Bilateral imports from Mexico approximately tripled since NAFTA, from less than 2 percent to nearly 6 percent. Bilateral exports to Mexico also increased after NAFTA, approximately
doubling from less than 2 percent to nearly 4 percent. The figure
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Figure 7.10 U.S. Employment in the Automobile Industry (1939–2001)
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reveals that bilateral trade with Mexico began increasing long before
NAFTA—at least since the late 1980s, or earlier—so NAFTA cannot
be responsible entirely for the shift toward trade with Mexico in the
auto industry. Nevertheless, the rate of increase jumped sharply for
imports immediately following NAFTA, and for exports more
recently, so there may be some effect of NAFTA in addition to the economic factors underlying the trend increase.
The trend increase in bilateral U.S.–Mexico trade has significantly
altered the composition of trading partners for the auto industry, as
shown in Figure 7.12. As recently as the late 1980s, bilateral exports to
and imports from Mexico accounted for less than 5 percent each of
multilateral trade. But, by 2001, bilateral exports accounted for nearly
one-fourth of multilateral exports, and bilateral imports accounted for
nearly one-fifth of multilateral imports. Consequently, the importance
of both the exchange rate between the Mexican peso and U.S. dollar
and of U.S. establishments involved in trade with Mexico has
increased greatly for total multilateral trade in automobiles.
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Figure 7.11 International Trade Shares in the Automobile Industry, U.S.
Multilateral and Bilateral U.S.–Mexico (1972–2001)
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The period immediately following NAFTA seemed to open trade.
Exports of autos from the United States to Mexico rose 584 percent, to
$1.3 billion, between 1993 and 1996 (an increase in units from 17,000
to 91,000). Trade also increased in the other direction, with U.S.
imports of automotive products from Mexico rising from $11.1 billion
in 1993 to $22.9 billion in 1996. This figure includes an increase in
auto exports from Mexico to the United States from $3.7 billion in
1993 to $11.3 billion in 1996. Industry analysts estimate that, on average, over half of the value of the content of vehicles exported to the
United States from Mexico is produced in the United States. Mexican
imports in the mid 1990s helped American manufacturers when they
faced capacity constraints, especially for sport utility vehicles and light
trucks.21
NAFTA also seems to be affecting the division of production
between the United States and Mexico in much the same way that the
Auto Pact altered the division of production between Canada and the
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Figure 7.12 Ratio of U.S.–Mexico Bilateral to U.S. Multilateral Trade in
the Automobile Industry (1972–2001)
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United States. This restructuring enabled U.S. manufacturers to realize
economies of scale in production. For example, the consolidation of
production that can be achieved under NAFTA enabled Ford to relocate production of its Thunderbird and Cougar models from Mexico to
Lorain, Ohio. Production at the Ford plant in Cautitlin, Mexico, was
shifted to the Contour and Mystique models. This change in production
patterns allowed Ford to realize economies of scale that it could not
enjoy when forced to produce certain models simultaneously in the
United States and Mexico.
Turning to the gross jobs flows of the automobile industry,
depicted in Figure 7.13, we see little evidence of substantial changes
during the NAFTA period. Relative to their history, gross job creation
and destruction have been relatively stable since the mid 1980s when
trade in automobiles began shifting toward Mexico, except for the
usual increases during the two most recent mild U.S. recessions. In
fact, job reallocation actually tended to decline throughout the NAFTA
period before the U.S. slowdown in the early 2000s.
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Thus, even though NAFTA probably had a very significant effect
on the composition of foreign trade, the reorientation of trade toward
Mexico does not appear to have had a significant effect on employment
or job reallocation in establishments in the U.S. automobile industry.
Despite significant increases in the shares of U.S. trade with Mexico,
the data show little sign of much reshuffling of employment across U.S.
auto plants through job creation and destruction. Perhaps because of the
unique structure of the North American auto industry, which exhibits
strong links between auto producers in each country and U.S. auto companies, or because of the role of unions in the automobile industry, trade
liberalization does not induce the same kinds of job reallocation it does
in other industries.
Net employment growth was relatively strong following NAFTA,
however, and it may be that trade liberalization contributed in part to
overall growth in the U.S. auto industry that increased the demand for
labor. One should bear in mind that U.S. real GDP and household
wealth grew spectacularly well during this period, and these developFigure 7.13 U.S. Gross Job Flows in the Automobile Industry (1973–2002)
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ments may be the sole explanation for the strong growth in auto
employment. Nevertheless, the technological and market-structure
advantages offered by NAFTA for this industry likely helped boost
overall auto employment somewhat on the margin.
Summary of Industry Results

Multilateral international trade increased in all three industries
since the mid to late 1980s. It now accounts for nearly one-third of
activity in the chemicals industry and nearly one-half of the activity in
the other two industries. The increase in multilateral trade was greatest
in textiles and apparel, where it increased by about one-half. However,
there is very little evidence that multilateral trade increased more as a
result of NAFTA, with the possible exception of textiles and apparel
imports. Instead, it appears that multilateral trade is experiencing a
trend increase for other reasons.
Bilateral trade between the United State and Mexico also increased
in all three countries since the mid to late 1980s. However, these data
seem to clearly point to a substantive influence of NAFTA on trade
within the industries. In particular, NAFTA appears to have substantially altered the composition of trade by shifting U.S. exports and
imports in these industries toward Mexico and away from other countries. Although the shares of bilateral U.S.–Mexico exports and imports
are relatively small fractions of total industry activity, these bilateral
exports and imports account for sizable fractions of total exports and
imports in these industries. As of 2001, they account for about twofifths in the auto industry, one-third in textiles and apparel, and about
one-eighth in chemicals. Since NAFTA, the share of bilateral U.S.–
Mexico trade doubled in the auto industry and increased almost as
much in textiles and apparel.
These trade developments represent important examples of how
changes in international factors can affect activity within an industry
but without affecting overall industry activity. In this regard, NAFTArelated changes are analogous to the within-industry effects of real
exchange rates studied earlier in this book. Attempts to observe the
impact of NAFTA using industry-level (or more aggregated) data will
have difficulty because, even at the level of industry detail examined
here, the impact is subtle at best. To get a clear picture of the effects of
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NAFTA, one must examine the trade and employment patterns for specific countries and domestic establishments.
Despite strong evidence of a reallocation of bilateral trade toward
Mexico in these industries, we do not observe clear evidence of the
impact of trade on employment and gross job flows in these industries.
During the NAFTA period, employment rose in autos, fell in textiles
and apparel, and was roughly unchanged in chemicals. Obviously,
these divergent employment experiences are not explained well by
either the multilateral or bilateral trade developments in these industries. But, even the gross job-flows data do not offer clear evidence that
the within-industry reallocation of trade toward Mexico induced
greater job reallocation, with the possible exception of the textiles and
apparel industry.
Why hasn’t the reallocation of trade toward Mexico induced by
NAFTA produced clearer evidence of greater job reallocation? Two
explanations seem the most promising. The most obvious one is that
bilateral trade with Mexico is simply too small a share of total industry
activity to have a large aggregate impact—even by the 2000s, bilateral
trade (exports and imports) accounts for less than 10 percent of each
industry’s total activity. A second, and more subtle, explanation is that
the reallocation of trade toward Mexico simply may have occurred at
the individual establishment level rather than across establishments. In
other words, most establishments that trade may have changed their
trading partners but not the level of their total trade, rather than establishments that deal with Mexico expanding and establishments that
deal with the rest of the world contracting. Corroboration of this
hypothesis requires examining establishment-level bilateral trade data,
which are not available (to our knowledge).

CONCLUSION

Major trade agreements, such as NAFTA, that liberalize trade by
reducing tariffs and other nontariff barriers to trade can significantly
affect both trade and labor-market flows. These trade agreements alter
the cost of trade between countries significantly. In the case of
NAFTA, the price changes were as much as 20 to 25 percent for tariffs,
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and the implicit cost reduction was even greater with regard to other
trade barriers. Thus, in a sense, trade liberalization potentially has similar effects to those coming about through exchange rate variation.
Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to identify the precise manner in
which trade liberalization affects trade and employment demand. Trade
agreements make discrete, and often large, changes in tariff rates and
other barriers.
These difficulties were amplified in the case of NAFTA, particularly regarding trade between the United States and Mexico, because
the agreement was primarily bilateral in nature. The United States and
Canada already had enacted the Canadian Free Trade Agreement, so
most of the changes affected trade between the United States and Mexico. NAFTA reduced tariffs and other barriers to trade between the
United States and Mexico significantly. However, the proportion of
U.S. trade with Mexico was often small compared with total U.S. trade,
so the NAFTA changes could only have modest effects at best. Moreover, U.S. trade with both Mexico and the rest of the world had been
increasing long before NAFTA. Thus, it is hard to attribute much of a
role to NAFTA in U.S. net employment changes.
The bilateral nature of the NAFTA changes did seem to alter the
composition of U.S. exports and imports, raising the share of trade with
Mexico relative to the rest of the world. Even in this regard, the extent
of the compositional shift was fairly small. Nevertheless, in principle,
compositional changes in trade patterns across trading partners could
have increased gross job creation and destruction among U.S. plants if
exporters and importers were sufficiently segmented in their trading
markets. The fact that we find little evidence of higher job reallocation
among U.S. plants suggests either that the NAFTA changes were not
significant for overall labor demand or that trade with foreign countries
is not sufficiently segmented across plants to bring out shifts in labor
demand among plants.
To sum up, in principle, trade liberalization can be linked to net
and gross job flows by significantly altering the costs of exports and
imports among trading partners. In practice, however, NAFTA does
not appear to have induced much change in either net or gross job
flows in the United States. Clearly, this conclusion is preliminary and
tentative, as additional research is needed to more properly ascertain
the connection between job flows and impediments to trade.
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Notes
1. Whether the reallocation is mostly between or within industries depends on the
degree to which the establishments producing intermediate goods are classified in
the same industry as the final goods producers.
2. NAFTA also expanded upon the Maquiladora 9802 Program which, since 1966,
has allowed U.S. firms to establish plants in northern Mexico that export to the
United States without U.S. or Mexican restrictions on trade.
3. A few tariffs on U.S. exports of agricultural products to Mexico are to be phased
out over a 15-year period rather the 10-year period scheduled for phasing out tariffs on industrial products. For a more complete description of the provisions of
NAFTA, see the U.S. Department of Commerce’s NAFTA homepage at: <http://
www.mac.doc.gov/nafta/nafta2.htm>.
4. For example, Davis and Kowalczyk (1998) estimated that the average Mexican
tariff rates in 1991 for products classified as Chemicals and Related Products was
11.1 percent, and for Manufactured Goods it was 13.2 percent while the average
U.S. tariff rates for these products were 4.8 percent and 6.7 percent, respectively.
See table 8.1, p. 238, in their article.
5. It is worth noting, however, that NAFTA may have had an effect on the policy
response of the Mexican government to the 1995 financial and economic crises.
In the wake of financial and economic crises in 1982, the Mexican government
imposed quotas and duties of up to 100 percent on American products. It is conceivable that a similar policy may have been pursued in 1995 were it not for
NAFTA. In fact, in response to the 1995 peso crises, the Mexican government
raised tariff rates on goods from non-NAFTA countries.
6. These estimates and statistics, including the results of the DRI/McGraw Hill
study, are cited in chapter 1 of the report by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (1997).
7. Other research on the effects of the Free Trade Agreement includes Gaston and
Trefler (1997), who showed that the agreement accounted for only a small share
of overall Canadian job losses between 1989 and 1993, and Hein and Sims
(2000), who focused on the effect of the agreement on U.S. wine exports to Canada.
8. See U.S. Department of Commerce, NAFTA homepage, <http://www.mac.doc.
gov/nafta; documents 3001.htm and 3002.htm>.
9. There are also issues of data availability. The gross job-flow data from the LRD
currently are not available for years after 1993, but we estimate the data plotted in
the graphs for the period 1994 to 2001 using industry-level gross job flow constructed with employment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. See Haltiwanger and Schuh (1999) for details.
10. Data on average tariff rates for selected industries in 1992 and 1996 are from the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (1997), page 32. This document is also
the source of the information in Tables 7.2 and 7.3.
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11. For more about this and our other assessments about employment in these industries, see Murray (1995).
12. The National Bureau of Economic Research World Trade Database (WTDB),
which is our main source of historical trade data, provides data for the textile and
apparel industries combined only through 1992. Consequently, we supplement the
WTDB with data for 1993 to 1999 that also combine the two separate industries.
13. Trade data for 2000 and 2001 come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). The BEA trade data are classified by the new NAICS industry system and
thus not exactly comparable to the trade data classified by SIC. To correct for this,
we use NAICS-based data to impute estimates of the SIC-based data for these
industries.
14. We calculate bilateral trade shares by dividing the value of the industry’s imports
(exports) between the U.S. and the specified country by the value of the industry’s
total multilateral imports (exports).
15. McClenahen (1999).
16. See website <http://atmi.org/newsroom/naftare1.html>.
17. Job flows through 1993 are from Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) and
Schuh and Triest (1998). Gross job flows after 1993 are imputed using industry
job-flow data constructed from BLS employment data on four-digit industries.
See Haltiwanger and Schuh (1999) for more details. The imputation formula
comes from a linear regression model of plant job flows on BLS industry-level
job flows and total manufacturing net employment growth, similar in spirit to that
used by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996). Net employment growth data
after 1993 come from the BLS employment data and thus are not imputed.
18. See Morse (2001).
19. By “automobile” we mean motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts and equipment,
a definition that includes trucks, buses, trailers, and motor homes.
20. For details, see Doh (1998).
21. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (1997), chapter 2.

8
Policy Implications
This book begins with a reference to the protests at the ministerial
meetings of the WTO in Seattle in November 1999. It is noteworthy
that these protests occurred when the United States was in the eighth
year of a record-setting economic expansion and when the unemployment rate stood at 4.1 percent, the lowest rate in two decades. Of
course, these protests were attended by a relatively small number of
people, but concerns with the displacements caused by international
trade were prevalent at that time. This is striking, for if ever we were to
expect unalloyed support for free trade, we would expect it at a time of
low unemployment during a boom that was fueled, in no small part, by
the export performance of American firms.
Part of the puzzle regarding why opposition to globalization was so
strong in the late 1990s when the unemployment rate was so low is
resolved by the analysis of job reallocation we present in this book.
The U.S. manufacturing sector is characterized by pervasive churning
of jobs, and our econometric estimates suggest that the increase in the
real exchange rate that accompanied the late 1990s boom contributed
to this process. Job destruction results in the displacement of workers
and the attendant loss of job-specific skills. While displaced workers
probably have an easier time finding suitable new employment during
a boom than during a bust, they are still likely to suffer significant economic and emotional losses. Job loss can be devastating to a worker
with substantial job-specific human capital, and it may seem to
threaten the worker’s way of life. It is understandable that policies that
seem to threaten job stability engender substantial opposition. Our
emphasis on gross, rather than net, flows highlights the fact that job
loss is much greater than previously thought, although job gain is much
greater too.
Of course, international trade is only one of many factors that
affect job churning. Technological change also contributes to new
opportunities and new challenges that bring about job creation and
destruction. But trade seems to hold a special place in terms of the public’s willingness to have the government intervene. The Program on

149

150 Klein, Schuh, and Triest

International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) reports that, across time, polls
regularly find that about two-thirds of respondents agree with statements like “The United States should tax foreign goods imported in
this country in order to protect American jobs and wages.” It would be
hard to imagine a similar level of public support for quashing technological advance in order to preserve jobs.
In part, this difference of attitude may be because the benefits of
technological change are readily apparent in the form of new products
and production processes. In contrast, international trade generates
benefits which are important but less obvious to the casual observer.
Technological change may also seem inevitable, while trade seems
more easily controlled by policy.
There is some evidence that the public is willing to support trade
liberalization as long as it is accompanied by policies to attenuate the
negative effects on displaced workers. For example, surveys conducted
by PIPA have found that while only 18 percent of respondents favor
free trade in the absence of programs to help workers who lose their
jobs, 87 percent favor free trade if it were combined with major efforts
to educate and retrain Americans to be competitive in the global economy.1 The public apparently understands that trade is beneficial but
that it entails significant adjustment costs.
One of the goals of this book has been to gain a better understanding of some of the adjustment costs which underlie the political opposition to free trade. This chapter begins with a brief summary of the main
results presented in this book and then turns to a discussion of policies
which might ameliorate the adjustment costs faced by workers.
Exchange rate management, tariffs, and worker-assistance policies are
discussed, but we argue that exchange rate management is largely
infeasible and tariffs are counterproductive. Worker-assistance policies
have a mixed record, but we believe that they are the most promising
area for future policy initiatives. To be clear, we are proponents of
trade liberalization, but we think it is desirable to address the adjustment cost issue both to build political support for free trade and for
social welfare reasons.
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SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS
Increased Openness

Underlying the public concern about the effects of trade is the
trend toward increased integration of the United States in the world
economy. A simple but important fact documented in Chapter 2 is that
openness has become pervasive across U.S. manufacturing industries.
Although nearly all manufacturing industries have become more open
over time, there are large differences in the importance of international
trade across industries. There are also substantial differences across
industries in the movements over time of trade-weighted industry-specific real exchange rates.
The increased volume of international trade is greatly beneficial
and enables us to enjoy a higher overall standard of living than we
could otherwise attain. However, the vulnerability of some workers to
economic loss is heightened by trade liberalization and openness.
Some workers lose out as a result of international competition, and an
important goal of policy is to help insure workers against such potential losses.
The Importance of Gross Job Flows

Gross job flows in U.S. manufacturing are large. As Chapter 3 documents, in over half of the years of our sample, the rates of job creation
and job destruction summed to over 20 percent. The relatively small
changes in the number of manufacturing jobs masks the tremendous
amount of job reallocation which is constantly occurring across establishments.
The magnitude of the rates of job creation and job destruction varies substantially both over time and across industries. Surprisingly,
however, the heterogeneity in the gross job-flow rates is not associated
with major industry groups. Even when we adopt a very fine categorization of industries (using four-digit SIC codes), we find that most of
the variance in job creation and job destruction is within, rather than
between, industries. So, it is not the case that only certain broad sectors
are characterized by pervasive reallocation of jobs.
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The high rates of job creation and job destruction are very relevant
for understanding the adjustment costs associated with increased international trade. Job reallocation can occur in response to any change in
relative prices, including those associated with trade liberalization and
movements in real exchange rates. Reallocation can entail significant
adjustment costs, even when there is little or no change in net employment. Workers lose the value of job-specific skills and often earn less
at their new jobs. Moreover, the process of searching for a new job
entails time, money, and psychic costs, and it may require geographical
relocation.
The Sensitivity of Gross Job Flows to Real Exchange Rate
Movements

The theoretical framework presented in Chapter 5 demonstrates
that a change in the real exchange rate may simultaneously cause both
job creation and job destruction, and Chapter 6 presents econometric
results that suggest that real exchange rate movements have a substantial impact on job churning. The econometric model decomposes real
exchange rates into trend and cyclical components. An appreciation of
the cyclical component of the real exchange rate increases job destruction and reduces net employment growth, but it has essentially no
effect on job creation. In contrast, an appreciation of the trend component of the real exchange rate increases both job creation and job
destruction, but it has little effect on net employment growth.
Although trend real exchange rate changes have little effect on net
employment, substantial adjustment costs are incurred as workers and
other resources are reallocated across places of employment. But, this
reallocation may enhance economic efficiency if the exchange rate
movement results from differentials across countries in productivity
growth or other factors affecting comparative advantage. In this case,
the resulting job-market churning is similar to that which accompanies
technological change: painful to workers whose jobs are destroyed but
a necessary component of economic growth. Policies may be needed to
help workers who suffer losses due to the decreased value of their
human capital, but those policies should be aimed at facilitating rather
than hindering reallocation.3
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EXCHANGE RATE MANAGEMENT

It may be tempting for some to conclude from our analysis of the
effects of real exchange rate movements on gross job flows that
exchange rate management policies should be adopted to promote
employment stability. This conclusion, however, does not follow from
our results. First, it should be noted that exchange rate management is,
at best, a difficult goal. Foreign exchange market intervention is not
especially efficacious. Policies that are more effective in altering
exchange rates, such as monetary policy, have consequences beyond
those in foreign exchange markets. And fixed exchange rates are not
fixed permanently; one can find many examples, such as in Europe in
the early 1990s and in Latin America and Asia in the later part of the
1990s, where fixed exchange rates were abandoned under pressure
from market forces.
Exchange rate management, to the extent that it can be successful,
will mitigate otherwise temporary changes in exchange rates, for
example, by serving to prick an unsustainable speculative bubble. But,
our analysis suggests that, while this may be an important goal for
some reasons, the effects of such short-term exchange rate movements
on job creation and destruction are likely to be small.
The role of macroeconomic policies in generating movements in
the cyclical component of real exchange rates is not fully understood
and deserves further study. Cyclical appreciations of real exchange
rates are associated with increased rates of job destruction, without an
offsetting increase in job creation, and so may be desirable to avoid.
Although it is possible that a fuller understanding of the relationship
between macro policies, real exchange rate movements, and job
destruction will eventually yield better policies, such improvements
will be difficult to achieve. One stumbling block is that the relevant
real exchange rates vary by industry due to differences in trading patterns. So, in any given time period, some industries may be experiencing effective appreciations while others are experiencing depreciations.
It is important to remember that the job destruction associated with
cyclical real exchange rate fluctuations is just one of many forces
affecting the demand for labor. Although increased openness increases
the exposure of U.S. workers to potential job losses due to exchange
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rate appreciations, it may also decrease the degree of risk through other
channels. For example, the impact of a domestic drop in the demand
for goods and services will be dampened in an open economy with
more stable global demand. For a large diversified economy such as
the United States, it is possible that increased openness may actually
help to dampen cyclical fluctuations.

TARIFFS AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY

An alternative policy prescription to shield workers from the
effects of international competition is to provide protection, in the form
of tariffs, quotas, or subsidies, to industries that seem to be the victim
of stiff international competition. Railing against protectionism is an
age-old duty of economists, who cite the costs to consumers of supporting inefficient producers. The analysis presented in this book offers
another reason for casting doubt on the utility of protectionist policies:
they are poorly targeted. Our analysis in Chapter 2 shows that there is
pervasive heterogeneity across manufacturing sectors with respect to
openness. Also, we show that job creation and job destruction can vary
widely across establishments within narrowly defined industries.
The high degree of heterogeneity within industries in the exposure
to trade argues for caution in considering trade-related policies aimed
at particular industries. It is difficult to fine-tune policies so that they
affect some detailed-level industries and not other closely related
industries. Moreover, such policies may create allocative inefficiencies
by directing resources toward activities in which the United States no
longer has a comparative advantage. In some cases, policies designed
to protect an industry suffering from competition from abroad may
actually harm closely allied industries which are successfully competing with their foreign competitors.
A case-in-point is the imposition of steel tariffs by the United
States in March 2002. Large domestic producers had a substantial cost
disadvantage relative to foreign producers. The cost disadvantage was
partly due to the run-up in the real exchange rate during the 1990s
boom years. Other factors, however, such as underfunded pension liabilities, also contributed to the cost disadvantage. And global steel-
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making overcapacity was putting financial pressure on steel makers in
many countries.
Although some major domestic steel manufacturers have been
helped by the tariff, it is quite ironic that other domestic steel manufacturers were actually hurt by the tariff. Some of the most adversely
affected plants have been domestic steel mills that process imported
steel products because the tariff increased the price of their inputs into
production. One result of this unintended consequence has been political pressure to grant exemptions from the tariffs, and exemptions from
the 30 percent tariff on hot-rolled steel were quickly granted to South
Korean and Australian producers, with a combined market share of
nearly 20 percent, who shipped their steel for further processing to
mills located in the United States (King 2002). Firms that use imported
steel that is not exempt from the tariff will likely become less competitive with foreign rivals, and job destruction may result. The end result
is that some domestic steel jobs will have been saved, although perhaps
only temporarily, at the expense of jobs in other industries.
Additional spillover effects from the imposition of tariffs may
come from the reaction of other countries. Soon after the steel tariffs
were announced by the Bush administration, press reports indicated
that retaliatory measures were being considered by the European
Union and by Japan, reinforcing fears that the United States may have
sparked a new round of trade wars that could prove especially damaging during a period of worldwide economic weakness.4 Even if a fullblown trade war does not break out, protectionist actions such as these
hurt efforts to maintain, much less expand, a liberalized world trading
system. The effects of rising protectionist barriers will be felt widely,
not least among those in the developing world who could most benefit
from access to markets in industrial countries (Stevenson 2002).
An argument sometimes made in favor of tariffs is to preserve jobs
in an industry that is temporarily not competitive, for example during a
period when the dollar is temporarily higher than normal. Cyclical
appreciations of the real exchange rate, which our econometric results
show are associated with increased job destruction but no offsetting
increase in job creation, may be largely independent of any changes in
long-run comparative advantage. But the argument in favor of using
tariffs to prevent job destruction associated with temporary movements
in real exchange rates presumes that we are able to distinguish between
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permanent and temporary changes. In practice, we are largely unsuccessful at doing so within the time frame in which policy must be formulated. Moreover, any tariffs imposed in response to a real
appreciation which is perceived as temporary may be politically difficult to remove after the appreciation is reversed.
It is also difficult to gauge what changes in real exchange rates
would be needed to return domestic establishments to profitability. For
example, we do not know when, if ever, the dollar will depreciate
against the currencies of other steel-producing countries to the point
where the domestic steel industry is again profitable. So, it is not
apparent that the steel tariffs will have a positive long-run impact, and
the short-run effect of higher production costs and retaliation from
other countries is decidedly negative. Although tariffs seem to enjoy
political support, the 2002 steel tariffs demonstrate why most economists think increased tariffs are a bad policy option.
Trade liberalization agreements can be viewed as the antithesis of
the policy of using tariffs to protect vulnerable industries. Our analysis
of the effects of NAFTA is instructive here. As discussed in Chapter 7,
there were special concerns about the effect on the textile and apparel
sector of reducing protection from Mexican goods because this sector
seemed especially vulnerable to competition from low-wage Mexican
workers. But employment in the textile industry was declining over the
past half-century for reasons more closely associated with technological change than with international trade. Furthermore, as reported in
Chapter 7, the textile trade association stated that trade with Mexico
was “truly mutually rewarding.” Thus, while it is possible that some
establishments in the textile sector were hurt by trade liberalization, the
overall effect may have been beneficial, even for this industry.
As pointed out in Chapter 7, trade liberalization and permanent
changes in real exchange rates involve similar shifts in relative prices,
and both can be expected to result in job reallocation. The practice of
phasing in tariff reductions as trade agreements are implemented is
likely to have the beneficial result of allowing the reallocation to proceed gradually and relatively predictably. Adjustment costs would then
likely be lower than they would be with immediate implementation.
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WORKER ASSISTANCE POLICIES

Exchange rate management and tariffs are unattractive candidates
for buffering workers from the dislocating effects of trade. To protect
the welfare of displaced workers, as well as to maintain political support for free trade, however, it is important to identify more desirable
policies for reducing adjustment costs incurred by workers. Policies
aimed at directly aiding displaced workers seem to be the most promising direction for policy initiatives, although, as we discuss below, difficult issues arise in designing such policies.
Currently, the main policy aimed at helping workers who suffer
unemployment due to international trade is the Trade Adjustment
Assistance (TAA) Act, established under the Trade Act of 1974. This
policy applies to workers who can demonstrate that their job loss was
largely due to increased imports. Its most recent version extends the
period of time workers can collect unemployment insurance if they are
enrolled in an approved training program. A similar program was created specifically for workers whose job loss can be largely traced to the
effects of NAFTA. These trade adjustment assistance programs, however, are not viewed as successful. The bipartisan U.S. Trade Deficit
Review Commission surveyed the state workforce agencies that
administer the TAA programs and reported that 19 state agencies found
the programs “inadequate” and another 19 reported that these programs
needed improvement. Furthermore, the program includes disincentives
for undertaking training and, even if this were not the case, there is little evidence that the training is effective (Froning 2001).
It is difficult to design programs that buffer workers from adjustment costs associated with international trade. How to effectively target such programs is particularly problematic. In practice, it is often
impossible to determine whether job displacement is due to international trade, technological change, shifts in intranational comparative
advantage, changes in consumer tastes, mistakes by an establishment’s
or firm’s management, or some other factor. The econometric analysis
presented in Chapter 6 is able to statistically identify a link between
real exchange rate movements and gross job flows, but it does not
allow us to determine exactly which particular jobs are destroyed or
created due to a change in real exchange rates. Providing greater com-
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pensation for job displacement due to trade-related factors than that
due for other reasons is likely to lead to efforts by affected workers and
firms to make the case that they are “victims” of international trade.
From a broader welfare perspective, it is hard to make the case that
job displacement due to trade-related factors should be treated differently from job displacement resulting from other factors not under
workers’ control. In either case, workers suffer an economic loss that it
would be desirable to insure against. Perhaps the best case for special
policies targeted at trade-related displacement is that such policies may
be needed to win political support for trade liberalization,5 but this
argument is not entirely convincing. Such policies may publicize the
role of trade in job destruction by explicitly labeling some job losses as
trade related, and they may also leave some workers bitterly disappointed when they experience job loss which is ruled not to be trade
related, but which they perceive to be due to international competition.
More general policies aimed at helping workers suffering losses from
job displacement may be more effective at promoting political support
for free trade. Clearly, additional research is needed on this topic.
In addition to the targeting problem, incentive issues arise in
designing programs to assist displaced workers. The magnitude of the
economic loss observed to be suffered by displaced workers is partly
dependent on choices made by the workers. Those who search most
intensively for a new job, and who are most flexible regarding type of
work, working conditions, and location, will tend to be reemployed
sooner and with a smaller loss of earnings compared to displaced
workers who search less intensively or who are more discriminating
regarding nonpecuniary job attributes. Because search intensity is very
difficult to measure, and the choices open to workers are generally not
observable, policies cannot be conditioned on these aspects of behavior. As a result, policy designers need to take into account the possible
distortions to behavior which worker assistance policies may generate.
A promising alternative to TAA has recently been proposed by
Lori Kletzer and Robert Litan (2001). They proposed that two benefit
programs, wage insurance and subsidies for health insurance, be available to all displaced workers, not just those displaced for reasons
related to international trade. Wage insurance would replace, for eligible workers, some fraction of their wage loss for up to two years,
beginning when workers found a new job. Kletzer and Litan argued
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that the most effective form of job training occurs on the job and this
program would effectively subsidize retraining on the job. Subsidizing
health insurance would help alleviate an important source of anxiety
due to job loss.
These ideas are catching on. The Senate passed a bill in May 2002
that, along with providing the president with fast-track trade authority,
also includes a pilot trade-specific wage insurance program that compensates 50 percent of the wage loss of qualifying workers (up to
$5,000 maximum per year) for two years from the date of unemployment and that pays 70 percent of health insurance costs for workers
displaced due to import competition.6

CONCLUSION

Worker assistance programs are aimed toward reducing the adjustment costs associated with trade. The analysis presented in this book
supports the view that adjustment costs are significant and should be
addressed, but it also offers some hope they are not an insurmountable
barrier to garnering support for free trade. The adjustment costs facing
a particular worker include the loss of job-specific skills she suffers
when she moves from one establishment to another, and these can be
disaggregated into establishment-specific skills and industry-specific
skills. We have shown in Chapter 3 that there is pervasive heterogeneity in job creation and destruction across establishments within an
industry. Thus, workers may be able to maintain jobs that take advantage of industry-specific skills, even when moving from one establishment to another. This could minimize the amount of retraining needed
for displaced workers. It would also mean that the most relevant type
of retraining is that undertaken by an establishment for its employees,
as opposed to off-site retraining aimed at increasing employment
potential for workers in a particular industry.
Another consideration concerning adjustment costs has to do with
timing. Adjustment costs are likely higher for any displaced worker at
a time when many other displaced workers are also looking for
employment. Thus, large exchange rate swings may generate job
destruction simultaneously across sectors. But, as discussed in Chapter
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2, there is actually quite a bit of heterogeneity in industry-specific
exchange rates. Therefore, we may not see as much of a simultaneous
effect of a given change in the trade-weighted dollar exchange rate as
we would expect if we were not aware of this diversity in the bilateral
trade relationships across industries.
The analysis in this book has not addressed the issue of the geographic location of job creation and job destruction. Moving from one
location to another represents another substantial adjustment cost, and
perhaps barriers to workers’ willingness to move to new opportunities.
Regional development issues also arise. Geographic areas which specialize in economic activities in which the United States does not have
a comparative advantage would suffer a decline as trade is liberalized.
Such issues clearly warrant further study.
One difficulty in designing effective programs to address the costs
borne by displaced workers is our lack of knowledge regarding the displacement process. We are able to statistically identify a link between
real exchange rate movements and job destruction, but we know relatively little about the characteristics of the jobs destroyed and the
workers displaced. The development of micro-level data sets containing matched information on establishments and workers holds the
promise of increasing our understanding of the displacement process
and may allow the development of programs better targeted at reducing
the adjustment costs associated with trade. We return to this point, and
develop it more fully, in the next chapter.
One must recognize, however, that targeting programs to address
adjustment costs associated with international trade is likely to remain
very difficult. It is both more feasible, and also arguably more desirable, to address the problems of labor-market adjustment more generally, without trying to determine if displacement occurs due to factors
associated with international trade or instead due to technological
change, intranational shifts in comparative advantage, or some other
factor. The primary argument in favor of separate policies to deal with
trade-related displacement is political—that such policies are needed to
build support for free trade. But it seems likely that political opposition
to free trade could also be muted by policies that address the more general problem of adjustment costs faced by displaced workers. This discussion points to the need for a deeper understanding of the sources of
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the political opposition to free trade and what policies would be effective in attenuating it.
In conclusion, the traditional case for free trade is strong, but political reality, as well as economic considerations of costs and benefits,
demand an accounting of adjustment costs as part of the calculus of
determining the net benefits from trade. Adjustment costs are better
understood through an analysis of gross job flows than by studying
changes in net employment alone. Therefore, analyses like the ones
presented in this book should be a key part of the way we approach our
understanding of the effects of trade on labor markets.

Notes
1. See <http://www.americans-world.org/digest/global_issues/intertrade/
summary.cfm>.
2. Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) pointed out that the importance of idiosyncratic factors makes it difficult to design and evaluate targeted industrial and commercial policies.
3. All of the arguments in this subsection also apply equally to the sensitivity of
gross job flows to changes in trade restrictions and agreements.
4. Examples include Winestock and King (2002) and King and Zaun (2002).
5. This point is made by Bhagwati (1988) and by Fung and Staiger (1996).
6. Workers would need to be over 50 years old and earn less than $50,000 per year to
qualify for the wage insurance program. Qualifying workers would be given the
option of participating in the program in lieu of signing up for ordinary TAA benefits.

9
Directions for Future Research
This book is part of a new and growing literature that embarks on
the ambitious task of analyzing the effects of international factors on
gross, rather than net, labor-market flows. Our contribution focuses on
gross job flows while others, like Kletzer (1998a), analyze gross
worker flows. As we argue throughout the book, gross flows research
offers a more complete evaluation of the labor-adjustment costs associated with changes in international factors than does research that considers net labor-market flows.
The study of gross labor-market flows is a complex and ongoing
endeavor. Our efforts to incorporate international dimensions are
merely one aspect of a much broader research program. Thus, our work
is one of many steps toward the goal of understanding how labor markets work and what factors—international and others—influence them.
While the analysis presented in this book represents an important step
toward a more complete understanding of the intricate relationship
between international factors and labor markets, there are questions we
are unable to address, largely due to limitations imposed by the
unavailability of data.
In the remainder of this chapter, we discuss how the development
of new data sets would enable researchers to obtain a more complete
and accurate understanding of the connection between labor markets
and international factors. We emphasize the importance of developing
joint measures of gross job flows and gross worker flows at firms and
establishments, as well as the importance of generating micro-level
international trade data for these sites. This new data development
would enable researchers to undertake a much more precise analysis of
labor adjustment costs, in general and especially those associated with
international factors. A deeper understanding of these adjustment costs
is needed before we can confidently draw firm and reliable conclusions
about net welfare gains from trade. A fuller assessment of the source of
adjustment costs and their size will also serve as a critical input to the
design of improved government policies.
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MATCHING JOB AND WORKER FLOWS

Recent research has taken an important step toward a more complete evaluation of the costs of adjustment to international factors by
moving beyond net changes and examining the substantial gross flows
that pervade labor markets. Studies such as this book, which look at the
effects of international factors on gross job flows, along with complementary studies of the effects of international factors on gross worker
flows, reveal that international factors generate far more churning in
labor markets than was previously demonstrated. But there are still
many unknown dimensions of gross labor flows.
Future research on this issue must take the additional step of studying gross job and worker flows jointly. Neither our study, nor studies
based only on worker flows, provide a complete picture of the effects
of international factors on labor markets. The main reason, as we noted
earlier, is that gross job and worker flows are not the same because jobs
and workers are heterogeneous. In reality, jobs are heterogeneous
within establishments, a fact we are forced to ignore because of data
limitations. Thus, in principle, jobs within an establishment can be created or destroyed, necessitating workers, changing establishments.
Moreover, heterogeneous workers can match with or separate from
establishments for many reasons other than changes in international
factors.
Another reason to study gross job and worker flows jointly is that
they are determined jointly. Our analysis is partial equilibrium in that it
focuses on labor demand, as are studies of worker flows that try to infer
labor demand from worker dislocations. At a minimum, future research
must study labor-market flows in a general equilibrium setting that
includes labor supply and especially human capital accumulation decisions, such as investment in firm-specific capital.
Studying job and worker flows jointly makes longitudinal issues
important. To ascertain the ultimate consequences of job- and workerflow activity, one must follow the fortunes of individual workers and
jobs over time. For dislocated workers, for example, we want to know
how long they are unemployed, what unemployment benefits they
receive, where they move, what job(s) they accept in the future, what
training they receive or invest in, and what their subsequent wage pro-
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file is. Likewise for jobs that are destroyed because of international
factors, we want to know whether the job was permanently or temporarily destroyed, whether it was replaced by a substitute job in the same
establishment or another establishment, and whether it was matched to
another (presumably lower wage) worker.

DATA DEVELOPMENT

Perhaps the single most critical shortcoming to the analysis of net
welfare gains from trade is the unavailability of sufficient data for the
task at hand. Data deficiencies primarily arise in two areas: matched
job- and worker-flow data, and plant- and firm-level export and import
data.
Labor Data

Development of microeconomic longitudinal databases linking
specific workers and employers with detailed information about each is
an absolute necessity. In the United States, there is not yet an equivalent of the French database used by Abowd, Corbel, and Kramarz
(1999). Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996, chapter 8) advocated the
development of such databases through the combination of several
existing databases from the U.S. Census Bureau and U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS). There has been some encouraging progress on
this issue since then, but more is required.
The fundamental limitation to the development of a satisfactory
database has been the lack of a coordinated focus on longitudinal data
collection. The Census Bureau tends to focus on employers, collecting
data with rich detail on firm and establishment characteristics but little
information on worker characteristics. In contrast, the BLS tends to
focus on workers, collecting rich detail on worker characteristics but
relatively little information on employer characteristics. Unfortunately,
the sampling techniques and employer identification techniques used
by the Census and BLS are not exactly the same so it is difficult to link
data from the two agencies. Nevertheless, efforts have been made to
develop linked employer–employee databases that could be used to
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provide a better understanding of the effects of international factors on
gross labor flows.
One of the most promising extant data sources is the BLS 202 data
set, which contains information on nearly all U.S. employers who participate in the unemployment insurance (UI) system and the employees
who work for them. Although the definition and tracking of employers
is not fully satisfactory, the BLS 202 UI database offers the opportunity
to construct job and worker flows jointly, as in Burgess, Lane, and
Stevens (2000). In addition, these data are being used by the BLS to
produce regular statistics on job and worker turnover.1 However, the
BLS 202 UI data cannot track all worker flows among states of the
labor force, as can be done with the Current Population Survey (CPS)
data. But, CPS data do not track individual workers for long enough
periods of time or provide enough reliable details about employers.
And the Displaced Worker Survey (DWS), which pertains to only a
portion of the CPS, has many limitations, as pointed out by its users.
Pioneering work has begun to combine Census and BLS data
sources. Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer (1999) combined five different Census and BLS data sets, but limitations on data availability and
matching significantly reduced the scope of the panel. Recently, an
even more comprehensive effort has begun to bear fruit. The Census
Bureau’s ambitious Longitudinal Employer–Household Dynamics Program has yielded a longitudinal data set melding the BLS 202 UI data
with Census Bureau economic and demographic data that emulates the
French database. The analysis of the relationship between human capital, technology, and productivity by Abowd et al. (2002) using this
database demonstrates its potential for related analyses of international
factors and gross labor flows.
However, acquiring all the necessary information for evaluating
the characteristics of workers and firms or establishments involved in
gross labor flows may require more than combining existing data
sources. Instead, it will likely be necessary to develop new sources of
data designed to measure the relevant issues. Efforts to understand the
influence of workplace practices and information technology are an
excellent example of this kind of response. Black and Lynch (2001)
used data from a special Census telephone survey called the Educational Quality of the Workforce National Employers Survey (EQWNES) that recorded “information on how employers recruit workers,
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organize work, invest in physical capital, and utilize education and
training investments” p. 436). Many of these data are closely related to
the proper measurement of labor-adjustment costs. Other data could be
acquired in a similar fashion, though it would be best to have this information on a longitudinal basis rather than a one-time survey.
Despite the important progress in developing matched employee–
employer databases, it remains a patchwork approach to achieving the
desired goal. The real innovation most needed is a fundamental change
in the approach to data collection. New surveys must be designed and
data collection efforts marshalled to develop longitudinal databases
that are well-suited to the needs of researchers, economic and other.
This will require either innovative new cooperation and joint funding
among government agencies—perhaps stimulated by new congressional legislation—or private organizations to rise up and fill the void.
International Trade Data

This pioneering work developing gross flows data is encouraging,
but there remains a second fundamental shortcoming of existing data
on exports and imports. A half century ago, when the development of
U.S. economic data was in its heyday, international trade amounted to
less than one-tenth of GDP. By the turn of the twenty-first century, it
amounted to more than one-fourth. Perhaps because U.S. international
trade used to be relatively unimportant, and almost surely because
international trade poses special measurement problems, existing trade
data are inadequate for the kind of longitudinal data analysis required
to properly assess the impact of international factors on gross labor
flows.
The core problem is that it generally is not possible to identify the
firms and establishments that originally produce output for export or
those that ultimately consume or distribute the output that is imported.
Two factors generate this problem. One is that U.S. collection of foreign trade data centers on the ports where goods and services enter and
exit the country rather than the firms and establishments engaged in
trade.2 The other factor is that the U.S. data collection agencies do not
track interfirm or interestablishment trade well in the domestic economy.3 This deficiency is exacerbated by the fact that, for both exports
and imports, goods and services are often distributed through multiple
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firms or establishments (often in multiple industries) between the port
of entry or exit and the final or original domestic destination. As a
result, it is extremely difficult to identify the foreign trade of particular
establishments or firms that export and import.
For exporters, the difficulties are somewhat less severe. The Census Bureau obtains export data from the Shipper’s Export Declaration
(SED), which now makes some effort to identify some characteristics
of the original exporting firm. The State Export Data Series is constructed using information from the origin of movement (OM) and
exporter location (EL), which was introduced beginning in the 1980s.4
However, this information does not identify the origin of production of
the exported output, much less the firm or establishment. Often the
producer and exporter are not the same, and the exporter does not necessarily keep track of the distribution trail. In fact, original producers’
output even may be exported without their knowledge. Unfortunately,
the Census Bureau discontinued two data programs that generated this
kind of information.5
Despite these limitations, some efforts by the Census Bureau yield
information about exporting firms and establishments. One is the
annual Profile of U.S. Exporting Companies.6 The other is data from
the economic censuses. The Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Research
Database (LRD) contains export data for some plants in the database,
which has been used by Bernard and Jensen (1995).
For importers, the problem is far more severe. Neither the LRD,
nor any other microeconomic database we are aware of, contains information about imports at the plant level. In the U.S. data system, after
imports arrive at the port of entry their subsequent destination is not
tracked to specific firms or establishments. The type of product and
country of origin provide some implicit information about destination
and use of imports, but implicit information is inherently approximate.
One critical distinction regarding imports that cannot be made is
whether imports are input materials or final products. Changes in
exchange rates have opposite effects on firms and establishments
depending on these two import types. Another critical distinction is
whether imports are capital goods for investment in domestic production. The import product type data are informative here, but they are
not able to identify which firms and establishments are installing these
imported capital goods. Finally, a complicating development is the glo-
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balization of U.S. corporations and the emergence of multinational corporations. These changes raise the degree of difficulty in measuring the
effects of international factors on domestic labor markets.
The inability to track exports and imports to specific firms and
establishments severely limits the accuracy with which we can
attribute job- and worker-flow movements to international factors. Perhaps it is inherently too difficult to fully track international trade to
individual employment locations. But, improvements in the statistical
system can be made that would improve our ability to be able to accurately observe the effects of trade on labor markets.
Consequently, we advocate the development of data and procedures to link the international trade data to the firms and establishments
that are the original producers of exports and final users of imports.
Such efforts will require the collection of more information on trade
between domestic firms and establishments. One approach to achieving part of this goal would be to obtain the employer identification (EI)
number from the original producer of exported output using the SED
by requiring exporters to track the origin. In fact, almost any modification to achieve the desired goal will require the tracking of similar
kinds of identifying information.

MEASURING LABOR-ADJUSTMENT COSTS

Historically, researchers have underestimated the magnitude of
labor-adjustment costs. A key reason is the lack of adequate data, as we
pointed out in the preceding section. If progress can be made toward
developing more adequate data sets, then progress can be made in calculating more complete estimates of labor-adjustment costs. In this
section, we raise some of the issues and questions that could be
addressed with such data.
Most studies of labor-adjustment costs focus on net employment
change rather than on the gross flows of jobs and workers in dynamic
market economies. However, gross flows are much larger than net
flows. Thus, the first, and perhaps most straightforward, question is
simply whether the direct costs of adjustment are proportional to net
flows or gross flows. If the latter, then adjustment costs associated with
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job creation and destruction will be much larger than existing estimates
of adjustment costs based on net employment change. Some adjustment costs, such as worker training associated with job creation and
severance pay due to job destruction might be (linearly) proportional to
the gross flows. But other costs, such as advertising associated with job
creation and hiring, may have scale economies, and there may be fixed
costs, such as those associated with personnel departments.
A second critical area of measurement is the evolution of human
capital of the specific workers who are involved in job- and worker
flows. The critical question is: When a job is destroyed and a worker is
laid off, how much firm-specific human capital is destroyed? The
answer to this question is fundamental to assessing how much that particular worker’s permanent income is reduced, not just how much
income is lost during spells of unemployment.7 Calculation of this
change requires information on the worker’s lifetime wage profile and
job tenure, as well as education and occupation.
Another aspect of adjustment costs is the cost of job and worker
relocation, which does not appear to have been measured in the literature at all. For dislocated workers, there are search costs associated
with finding a new job. These may not be large in cases where workers
do not have to move out of their local labor markets, but when they
must move to another geographic location the costs could be much
larger. In the worst cases, such as the episode of crisis in steel-producing regions during the early 1980s, the net worth of workers can plummet when economic depression slashes property values—the primary
saving vehicle for many blue-collar workers. For firms that shut down
lines of operation, or even entire plants, and rebuild in other regions,
the costs may be large too, as the U.S. auto industry discovered during
the 1970s and 1980s.8 Many firms find that, when they change the geographic location of their operations, their workers will not relocate with
them, forcing them to hire and train an entirely new workforce.
There is yet another area of labor-adjustment cost that is probably
very real but not measurable even with the new data we propose, so we
only mention it in closing. Job destruction, regional economic deterioration, and worker geographic relocation can bring significant social
and even psychological costs to displaced workers and their families.
Unfortunately, these costs typically are viewed as outside the domain
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of economic analysis and therefore typically are not included in assessments—empirical or theoretical—of labor-adjustment costs.

SUMMARY

A major contribution of our research is to raise the point that international factors have a much more intensive and extensive impact on
the labor market than previously believed. This naturally raises the
question whether the costs of labor adjustment might be much more
intensive and extensive than previously thought. However, our
research does not answer that question because it is only the first step
toward being able to address the issue—studying gross rather than net
flows. In particular, we find that changes in real exchange rates and
trade policies have economically significant effects on gross job creation and destruction.
We suspect that these internationally generated gross job flows
influence gross worker flows as well. However, we have not demonstrated that they do or, if so, how. If international factors do affect
worker flows, they likely also affect human capital investment, wages,
and worker welfare. And, if so, the labor-adjustment costs associated
with changes in international factors are probably more intensive and
extensive than previously thought. However, the lack of adequate data
precludes the study of both job and worker flows, and thus limits our
ability to draw conclusions about labor-adjustment costs at present.
More research and measurement are needed in these areas.
At present, in the absence of all necessary information, we can
only surmise that the net welfare gains to free trade, and to freer trade,
may be different than previously estimated. However, if data are collected and research is conducted along the lines suggested in this chapter, there is encouraging room for significant improvement in our
understanding of the magnitude and nature of labor-adjustment costs
and net welfare gains from trade.
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Notes
1. The BLS is using the data to construct quarterly gross job flows for the entire
economy, which are expected to be released in late 2003. New data from the Job
Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) have also been developed using
2002 data. For more information, see <http://stats.bls.gov/jlt/home.htm>.
2. The classification of exports as “free alongside ship” (f.a.s.) and imports as “customs, insurance, and freight” (c.i.f.) reflects this approach
3. This yields the so-called double-counting problem where the sales of one domestic producer becomes the inputs of another producer. Current data do not fully and
adequately account for this hurdle in constructing value added.
4. For more information, see <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/aip/elom.html>.
5. These were “Exports from Manufacturing Establishments” from 1983 to 1991 and
“Selected Characteristics of Manufacturing and Wholesaling Establishments That
Export” in 1991 and 1992. Note that the former occurred during the large run up
of the dollar and vocal debate about its effects.
6. For more information, see <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/aip/edbrel9899.pdf>.
7. Incidentally, if the destruction of a job-worker match also destroys human capital,
then calculations of lost income during unemployment should not use the preunemployment wage but rather the post-unemployment wage. This latter method
will reduce the estimate of adjustment costs somewhat, but is unlikely to offset the
full present value of lost income that appears to occur with much job displacement.
8. This capital relocation issue is closely tied to the labor relocation decision but
quite complex and beyond the scope of our discussion.

Appendix A
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) System
The U.S. Office of Management and Budget developed the SIC system to
group industries into categories based upon their major product. This system
defines 20 two-digit manufacturing industries, SIC 20 to SIC 39. These 20 industries are further subdivided into 143 three-digit manufacturing industries
ranging from SIC 201 to SIC 399. These industries are, in turn, further subdivided into 447 four-digit industries ranging in number from SIC 2011 to SIC
3999. Table A.1 presents the SIC numbers and the industry names for the 20
two-digit SIC manufacturing industries.
Table A.1 Two-Digit SIC Industries
SIC
20
21
22
23
26
27
28
29
30
31

Nondurable goods industries
Food and kindred products
Tobacco manufacturers
Textile mill products
Apparel and other textile products
Paper and allied products
Printing and publishing
Chemicals and allied products
Petroleum and coal products
Rubber and plastics products
Leather and leather products

SIC
24
25
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Durable goods industries
Lumber and wood products
Furniture and fixtures
Stone, clay and glass products
Primary metal products
Fabricated metal products
Machinery, except electrical
Electrical machinery
Transportation equipment
Instruments and related products
Other durable goods

To give a sense of the further disaggregation of industries at the three-digit
and four-digit level, we consider the two-digit industry Furniture and Fixtures
(SIC 25). This industry is disaggregated into a set of five three-digit industries:
SIC 251, Household Furniture; SIC 252, Office Furniture; SIC 253, Public
Building and Related Furniture; SIC 254, Partitions, Shelving, Lockers, and
Office; and SIC 259, Miscellaneous Furniture and Fixtures. Each of these
three-digit groups is comprised of one or more four-digit groups. For example,
SIC 251 is comprised of six four-digit groups: SIC 2511, Wood Household
Furniture, except Upholstered; SIC 2512, Wood Household Furniture, Upholstered; SIC 2514, Metal Household Furniture; SIC 2515, Mattresses, Foundations, and Convertible Beds; SIC 2517, Wood Television, Radio, Phonograph,
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and Sewing Machine Cabinets; and SIC 2519, Household Furniture, Not Elsewhere Classified.
For a full online listing of SIC industries, refer to the U.S. Department of
Labor website: <http://www.osha.gov/oshstats/sicser.html>.

Appendix B
A Formal Economic Model of the Effect
of Exchange Rate Changes on Job Creation
and Job Destruction
This appendix presents a more formal version of the model described in
Chapter 5.1 The model begins with a specification of the cost function for the
pth establishment in industry i as

(

)

C W p , G p ; Q p = W pα G (p

1−α )

Qp

where Wp is the wage paid by that establishment, Gp is the unit cost of its nonlabor input, and Qp is its output. By Shepard’s lemma, the demand for labor by
this establishment, Lp, is the partial derivative of the cost function with respect
to wages, that is

Lp =

(

∂C W p , G p ; Q p

) = αW α −1G (1−α )Q
p

∂W p

p

p.

The total differential of the logarithm of the above equation is

 = −(1 − α )W
 + (1 − α )G
 +Q
.
(B1) L
p
p
p
p
 = d ln Z .
where we use the notation that, for any variable Z, Z
We assume that the demand for the product of the pth establishment in industry i is
k

− µΩ ∗βΩ
(B2) Q p = ApY β ∏  E j i Y j i 
j =1



ω ij



where Ap is an idiosyncratic demand shock facing this establishment, Ej is the
real exchange rate with country j, (representing the price of the establishment’s
product divided by the domestic-currency price of the potential substitute product sold by competitors from country j), Y is a measure of domestic income, and

Y j∗ is a measure of income in country j. The idiosyncratic shocks mentioned in
the chapter are the realizations of the variable Ap. The model described in the
chapter assumes that both the trade weights, ω ij , and the openness parameter,
Ωi (with 0 ≤ Ωi ≤ 1), are common to all establishments in industry i and, there-
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fore, the product ω ij Ωi shows the openness of all establishments in industry i
with respect to trade with country j. The total differential of the logarithm of
Equation (B2) is equivalent to


i 
i ∗
(B3) Q p = Ap + β Y − µΩi ∑ ω j E j + βΩi ∑ ω j Y j .
j

j

To simplify notation, define the difference in the logarithm of the tradeweighted exchange rate for all establishments in industry i as

E
i =

k



∑ ω ij E j
j =1

and the difference in the logarithm of the trade-weighted foreign output as


Yi∗ =

k



∑ ω ij Y j∗ .
j =1

Using these definitions, and substituting Equation (B3) into Equation (B1), we
get the labor-demand equation for the pth establishment







∗

(B4) L
p = − (1 − α ) W p + (1 − α ) G p + Ap + β Y − µΩi Ei + βΩi Yi .

This is the log-difference of the labor-demand schedules presented in the
figures in Chapter 5. Note that the coefficient on the log-difference of the wage
is negative (that is, the labor-demand schedules are downward sloping) and that
the schedules shift with a change in either the idiosyncratic shock, Ap, or the
aggregate shocks, represented by the log-difference in the exchange rate, but
also by the log-difference in overall foreign or domestic output. There is a pos
itive effect of a depreciation of the trade-weighted real exchange rate ( E
i < 0)
on labor demand, all else equal.
In the model, we assume that all establishments within the ith industry pay
the same wage, Wi, so Wp = Wi for all establishments in industry i. We can
weaken the assumption that the wage is the same across all industries by assuming some substitutability among workers in the ith industry and workers in
the rest of the economy such that the labor-supply equation facing the pth establishment in the ith industry is
γ

W 
L p =  εi  ,
Γ 
where Γ is the prevailing wage in the “rest of the economy,” γ is a measure of
labor-supply elasticity (γ > 0 ) , and ε is a measure of the cross-elasticity of la-
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bor supply between the ith industry and the rest of the economy, with ε ≥ 0 .
This specification gives us the total differential of labor supply facing the pth
establishment,

(

)




L
p = γ Wi − ε Γ .


 
Assume that G
and Yi∗ are all equal to zero, in order to focus on the role
p ,Y ,
of the real exchange rate and note that all establishments in industry i pay the
same wage, to obtain a simple form of the labor-demand Equation (B4)





L
p = Ap − (1 − α ) Wi − µΩi Ei .

Define ϕ p as the relative employment size of the pth establishment in the ith industry, an industry with n establishments, where
i

n

∑ ϕ ip = 1 .

p =1

Then the industry-wide change in employment is

L
i =

n



∑ ϕ ip Lp .

p =1

Define the weighted average of the proportional change in the demand shock

among the n establishments in industry i, Ai, as

Ai =

n


∑ ϕ ip A
p

p =1

Set overall labor-demand in the ith industry equal to labor supply in that indus


try to solve for W
i as a function of Ei ,Γ, and Ai , and then use these values to

solve for L p , to obtain
 =  A
 −k
 − (1 + k ) µΩ E

(B5) L
Ai  − kεγ Γ
p
p
i i




where k = (1 – α)/(1 – α + γ) and 1 ≥ k ≥ 0 . The pth establishment will exhibit


job creation if L
p > 0 and job destruction if L p < 0 . This solution shows that
job creation or destruction by a particular establishment depends upon an idiosyncratic shock specific to that establishment, 
Ap , an aggregate shock specific
Ai , and the change in
to the industry of which the establishment is a member, 

 . The likelihood that an establishment exΓ
value of aggregate variables, E
and
i

hibits job destruction rises with E
i , that is, with a larger appreciation of the ex-
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change rate.
The rates of job creation and job destruction in an entire industry can be
calculated as the weighted average of the rates of job creation and job destruction for the establishments in that industry. Call the set of establishments that
expand employment in a given period M + and those that contract employment
M –. Define

Φ+ =

∑

p∈( M + ∪ M − )

ϕ p and Φ − =

∑

p∈( M + ∪ M − )

ϕp

where Φ + ≥ 0, Φ − ≥ 0 and Φ + + Φ − = 1 . Continuing with our assumption that
  , and  are all equal to zero, the industry rates of job creation and job
Yi
G
p, Y
destruction are

(

)

 −k
 − (1 + k ) µΩ E

Ci = ∑ ϕ p  A
Ai − kεγ Γ
i i
 p
p∈M +

(

)

 + (1 + k ) µΩ E



= −φ+ kεγ Γ
i i + k Ai + ∑ ϕ p Ap

(

p∈M +

)

 −k
 − (1 + k ) µΩ E

Di = − ∑ ϕ p  A
Ai − kεγ Γ
i i
 p
p∈M −

(

)

 + (1 + k ) µΩ E



= φ− kεγ Γ
i i + k Ai + ∑ ϕ p Ap .
p∈M −

These results suggest that an appreciation of the exchange rate is associated with less job creation and greater job destruction, holding constant other factors. These results also suggest that for two industries that are identical but for
their respective values of openness (Ω ), the effect of the exchange rate on both
job creation and job destruction is more pronounced in the industry that is more
open.

Note
1. This model is presented in Klein, Schuh, and Triest (2003).

Appendix C
Data Sources
The data used in this book come from the following sources.
1) Gross job flows. Data on gross job creation, destruction, and reallocation were developed by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) and updated by the U.S. Census Bureau. The data are available annually and
quarterly for the period 1972 to 1993 at the four-digit SIC industry level. The data can be downloaded from http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/
haltiwanger/download.htm.
2) Multilateral trade. Data on multilateral exports and imports were developed by Abowd (1990) and updated by Feenstra (1996, 1997). The data
are available annually for the period 1972 to 1994 at the four-digit SIC
industry level. The data can be downloaded from http://data.econ.ucdavis.edu/international/home.html.
3) Other manufacturing data. Data on sales (shipments), prices, wages,
productivity, and other manufacturing activity come from the NBERCES Manufacturing Industry Database developed by Bartelsman and
Gray (1996) and Randy Becker. The data are available annually for the
period 1958 to 1996 at the four-digit SIC industry level. The data can
be downloaded from http://www.nber.org/nberces.
4) Bilateral trade. Data on bilateral exports and imports come from the
World Export and Import Database developed by Statistics Canada using United Nations data and distributed by the NBER and University of
California at Davis. See Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997) and Feenstra (2000) for documentation. The data are available annually for the
period 1970 to 1997 at the four-digit SIC industry level. The data and
Feenstra paper can be downloaded from http://data.econ.ucdavis.edu/
international.
5) International data. Data on nominal bilateral exchange rates, aggregate
producer prices, and real GDP (volume index) by country are from International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS).
The data are available annual and quarterly for various sample periods
depending on the country. The data were obtained via Haver Analytics
and supplemented by various IFS yearbook publications.1

179

180 Klein, Schuh, and Triest

6) Other U.S. macro data. Data on interest rates, inflation, manufacturing
employment, aggregate multilateral exchange rates, and other U.S.
macroeconomic variables come from Haver Analytics.
Job creation rates and job destruction rates are calculated from establishment-level net employment changes. We choose to conduct our analysis at the
industry level rather than at the establishment level because this allows us to
match the job flow data with industry-level international trade data and fourdigit industry data on real exchange rates that we constructed (following the
methodology in Gourinchas 1998).
NOTATION AND DATA DEFINITIONS

Table C.1 reports the notation and definitions of variables. The openness
variable is defined as
+M
X
 it = (1/ 5) ∑5s =1  Y i+,tX− s i+,tM− s  .
Ω
 i,t − s i,t − s i,t − s 

The industry-specific multilateral real exchange rate is defined as
Eit =

Ji

∑ ωijt Eijt ,
j =1

where j indexes trading partners (countries), Ji denotes the set of partners, ωijt
denotes trade share weights, and Eijt denotes bilateral real exchange rates. The
trade share weights are defined as



X ij ,t − s + M ij ,t − s
.
Ji
 ∑ j =1 X ij ,t − s + M ij ,t − s 

ωijt = (1/ 2)∑ 2s =1 

Note
1. The yearbook data are required because the latest price index data do not have a
sufficient number of decimal places for many countries that experienced hyperinflation.
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Table C.1 Notation and Data Definitions
Variable
Definition
Units
Data sourcea
C
Gross job creation
%
1
D
Gross job destruction
%
1
Ej
Bilateral exchange rate
FCU/$
5
E
Multilateral exchange rate
Index
4,5
if
Federal funds rate
%
6
M
Multilateral imports
$
2
Mj
Bilateral imports
$
4
N
Net employment growth (C – D)
%
1
π
Inflation, GDP deflator
%
6
PQ
Final goods (producer) price
Index
3
P*
Foreign final goods (producer) price
Index
5
S
Total sales (shipments)
$
3
Wi
Production worker compensation
$
3
X
Multilateral exports
$
2
Xj
Bilateral exports
$
4
Y
Domestic sales (S – X)
$
3
Y*
Foreign real GDP volume
Index
5
*
NOTE: For P , the consumer price is used when the producer price is not available.
a
See appendix text for description of sources.
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